Defining and confronting the Salafi Jihad
Feb 11th, 2008 by MESH
From Assaf Moghadam
In recent years, a growing number of analysts and policymakers, have referred to the doctrines guiding Al Qaeda and its associates as an ideology, and appear to have influenced the Bush administration into adopting the term as well. President Bush, for example, has characterized the 9/11 suicide hijackers as men who “kill in the name of a clear and focused ideology.” Although descriptions of the precepts and beliefs guiding Al Qaeda and its associates as ideological in nature certainly hit the mark, few serious attempts have been made to justify the use of the term ‘ideology’ in connection with the Salafi Jihad—the guiding doctrine of Al Qaeda, its affiliates, associates, and progeny. A closer look at what makes the Salafi Jihad an ideology reveals that a more proper term to describe the Salafi Jihad would be as a religious ideology.
The Salafi Jihad is an ideology because its functions are essentially congruent with those of other ideologies.
- First, ideologies have an explanatory function, whereby they attempt to raise awareness among a certain group that a certain problem deserves their attention. Salafi-Jihadists attempt to raise awareness among Muslims that their religion has been on the wane.
- Second, and analogous with the diagnostic function of modern ideologies, the Salafi Jihad identifies the alleged source of the Muslims’ conundrum in the persistent attacks and humiliation of Muslims on the part of an anti-Islamic alliance of what it terms ‘Crusaders,’ ‘Zionists,’ and ‘apostates.’
- The third function of the Salafi Jihad also parallels that of other ideologies, namely its attempt at creating a new identity for its adherents. Several scholars, including Olivier Roy, have argued that Muslims and Western converts adopting Salafi-Jihadist tenets suffer from a crisis of identity. To those who are disoriented by modernity, the Salafi Jihad provides a new sense of self-definition and belonging in the form of a membership to a supranational entity. Salafi-Jihadists attempt to instill into Muslims the notion that the only identity that truly matters is that of membership in the umma, the global community of Muslims that bestows comfort, dignity, security, and honor upon the downtrodden Muslims.
- Finally, like all ideologies, Salafi-Jihadists present a program of action, namely jihad, which is understood in military terms. They assert that jihad will reverse the tide of history and redeem adherents and potential adherents of Salafi-Jihadist ideology from their misery. Martyrdom is extolled as the ultimate way in which jihad can be waged—hence the proliferation of suicide attacks among Salafi-Jihadist groups.
What, however, is the Salafi Jihad’s relationship to religion? Religions differ from ideologies in two important respects.
First, the primary focus of ideologies is the group, whereas that of religions is the individual. Precisely because of its preoccupation with the group as a whole, ideology demands great loyalty and commitment on the part of the individual member. Ideologies, like religions, demand verbal assent from their members. But more than religions, ideologies also demand complete control over the thoughts, words, and deeds of their adherents. This characteristic also applies to Al Qaeda and like-minded groups.
Second, religions tend to support existing orders, while ideologies tend to confront them. “Ideologies are not merely world-reflecting but world-constituting,” writes Bruce Lawrence. “They tend to have a ‘missionary’ zeal to show others what they need to do, to correct and help them to that end.” Thus, unlike religious leaders, bin Laden goes beyond merely disagreeing with those who do not share his beliefs—he battles them.
Yet, while the Salafi Jihad is distinct from Islam due to the former’s ideological nature, it also differs from ordinary ideologies in an important respect. It tends to use religious words, symbols, and values to sustain itself and grow—a tendency that defines it as a religious ideology. Ideologies are usually devoid of religious symbols. Ian Adams, for instance, writes that “what separates [religion from ideology] is that while the central feature of a religious understanding is its concept of the divine, the central feature of an ideological understanding is its conception of human nature.”
Unlike secular ideologies, however, the Salafi Jihad invokes religion in three ways.
- First, it describes itself and its enemies in religious terms, such as the ‘Army of Muhammad,’ the ‘lions of Islam,’ and of course ‘jihadist.’ Their enemies are labeled as Crusaders, apostates, or infidels.
- Second, Salafi-Jihadists describe their strategy and mission as a religious one. Their struggle is a jihad, which they themselves define in military terms, as opposed to the ‘internal war’ against human temptations. Their main tactic, they claim, is not suicide attacks, but ‘martyrdom operations.’
- Finally, they justify acts of violence with references drawn selectively from the Quran. Most Muslims, including non-violent Salafis, cite a number of sources from the Quran and hadith against the killing of civilians. Salafi-Jihadists, on the other hand, cite a number of Quranic verses and Hanbali rulings in support of their actions.
Accurately labeling the nature of Salafi-Jihadist doctrine as a religious ideology is not merely an exercise in academic theorizing, but has important policy implications. Confronting Salafi-Jihadists on religious grounds is highly problematic because Salafi-Jihadists draw from the same religious sources—albeit selectively and stubbornly—that inform the lives and practices of over a billion other Muslims. It is for that reason that ordinary Muslims—not to speak of non-Muslims—find it difficult to challenge Salafi-Jihadists without running the risk of being accused of targeting Islam as a whole.
A counter-terrorism approach that highlights the corruption of Salafi-Jihadists ideology not on religious, but on secular grounds is more likely to have the desired effect of weakening the appeal of the Salafi Jihad. Rather than highlighting the doctrinal and theological inconsistencies within Salafi-Jihadists, the United States and its allies would be wise to grasp every opportunity they have to highlight the disastrous consequences that Salafi-Jihadist violence has wrought on the everyday lives not only of Westerners, but first and foremost on Muslims themselves.
It is a simple, though not sufficiently emphasized fact that the primary victims of Salafi-Jihadists are Muslims, who are killed and maimed in far greater numbers than non-Muslims. Salafi-Jihadists openly justify the killing of civilians, including Muslims, under a logic of the ends justifying the means. It is equally a fact that leaders of Salafi-Jihadist organizations hypocritically preach about the benefits of martyrdom, but rarely, if ever, conduct suicidal operations themselves, or send their loved ones on such missions. It is a fact that Al Qaeda and associated groups offer no vision for Muslims other than perennial jihad—hardly an appealing prospect.
Waging a battle against a religious ideology such as the Salafi Jihad is a challenging task that requires commitment and ingenuity. Yet, highlighting a few simple, but damaging facts about the actual results of Salafi-Jihadists can also go a long way.
This post is an excerpt from a longer article to appear in the forthcoming issue of the CTC Sentinel, the new monthly publication of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. —MESH
Update: The longer article has appeared here. —MESH
Comments are limited to MESH members.
2 Responses to “Defining and confronting the Salafi Jihad”
I very much appreciate Assaf Moghadam’s attempt to parse the precise nature of Salafi Jihadism, and to derive therefrom some practical guidance for how to design appropriate strategic communications. I have little to offer with regard to his practical suggestions, except to mention one caveat: It is it risky and probably counterproductive for non-Muslims to try to weigh in on theologically tinged issues. This is not only because in criticizing Salafi thinking might offend other Muslims, but because non-Muslims are not qualified in the eyes of most Muslims to have any opinions on such matters. We would be well advised to identify those authentic sources of Islam that oppose Salafi interpretations, and quietly help them by linking them to one another, by financing quietly their good works, and by encouraging them to speak out. This is what we should have been doing now for more than six years; instead, we have mainly be concerned with the U.S. image in the Muslim world—a marginal and mostly pointless exercise concerning an adolescent superpower’s easily bruised ego.
I do, however, disagree with Moghadam on a few analytical points. First, the contention that ideology is a group phenomenon while religion is an individual one does not strike me as correct. Ask any anthropologist of the Middle East, or of any other traditional society, and he or she will tell you that religion is for the most part organic to a community, and particularly so to the endogamous social organizations that still characterize many Middle Eastern societies. A person is born into a religion by virtue of being born into a tribe. No one particularly cares what a person believes privately so long as he or she conforms to expected social roles, and these are sanctioned by religion. That leaves room for some non-conformism in belief in a way that need not upset social relations. This is pretty wise and stable an arrangement, for the most part—one that certain forms of modernity miss. In the West, after Hobbes and Locke and the rest, yes, religion has been confessionalized and privatized. And yes, in theological terms, a Muslim (like a Jew) engages God directly and individually. But in terms of politically sociology, no, religion is a very social business in most societies, and that certainly includes most Middle Eastern societies.
Nor do I think it possible to show that religion is always status quo and ideology always anti-status quo. Revitalization movements in religion can be very anti-status quo. Think Muhammad himself. Think the Almohads. Think the jointure of the Al-Saud and the Al-Wahhab. For that matter, think the White Lotus societies that overthrew a Mongol dynasty in China in the 14th century. Think radical Protestants like Luther or, better, Thomas Muntzer in the Peasants Rebellion. Now, if one ipso facto tries to define all such episodes as ideology just because they are anti-status quo, then one has a rollicking case of circular thinking, if ever there was one. And ideology can be status quo, too—even the formal kind. Think Brezhnevian stagnation; think the latter day Stasi state in the DDR.
No, the key difference between religion and ideology, as Anna Simons and others have pointed out, is that religion is indeed organic to society and so does not need day-in, day-out enforcers. But when there are no enforcers of ideology, it dries up and blows away. It does not link into the mazes and traditions of people to be able to do without artificial forms of sustenance. The other difference is that religion promises understanding and salvation when it comes to cosmic mysteries. It thus brings solace. Ideology, on the other hand, is limited in what it can promise to outcomes on earth. This may seem a trivial matter, but it isn’t. Religion has a way of providing balance for people as to what they can affect in life and what they cannot affect. It provides a practical philosophy for coping with difficulties. Ideology, on the other hand, has no innate balance. Its general tendency is not to promote calm and balance, but always to stimulate action, to marshal discontent or angst in order to go out and do something, whether on behalf of change or on behalf of defending the status quo from real or imagined assailants. The cumulative social impact of this difference can be significant.
All of which brings us back to the problem Moghadam has so wisely identified. Is Salafi Jihad comprised of ideological or religious energies? Well, it is some of both, as he says. It is, as Mark Lilla would put it, an example of political theology (The Stillborn God, Knopf, 2007 and well worth reading). Here’s a thought experiment for you: Suppose you stopped saying and thinking “Protestant Reformation” and “French Revolution” and started thinking instead “Protestant Revolution” and “French Reformation.” In other words, suppose you scrambled categories in your head between what is religious and what is political in terms of Western history. Notwithstanding the differences between religion and ideology noted above, you would find perhaps, as I have, that thinking about creedal systems as a whole, in which theology is either implicit or explicit but always present, and in which political ideology is either implicit or explicit but also always present, is an interesting exercise. It forces us to re-think the associations we have learned, and it generates new questions that our old scheme of compartmentalization prevented us from formulating. Assaf Moghadam is trying to wrap his mind around a really difficult question. My hat is off to him for trying. As for myself, I have generated plenty of questions from this exercise but, alas, not yet many answers. I just don’t know enough yet.
Adam Garfinkle is a member of MESH.
Thanks to Adam Garfinkle for a truly impressive comment. I would only add that it might be possible to simplify, at least conceptually, the way we think about the group-versus-individual question.
It seems that ideology, like nationalism and ethnicity, has the ability to motivate people on the basis of group factors. Members will engage in actions to perpetuate the group, help it survive, etc. Think about people dying for their country.
One potential difference between religion and all of these things is that while religion “shares” with them the ability to motivate people on a group basis, there is an added individual basis for motivation due to the possibility of salvation. That is to say, religion shares with nationalism or ideology (which could be a nationalist ideology) the ability to motivate people to engage in actions, even to die, for the group.
However, religion adds the possibility for individual benefits in the form of the afterlife/salvation/etc.
So it is the combination of both individual and group benefits that might, conceptually, make religion interesting.
Michael Horowitz is a member of MESH.