» Globalized jihad, then (1993) and now Middle East Strategy at Harvard

Globalized jihad, then (1993) and now

Mar 11th, 2008 by MESH

Fifteen years from now, when classified documents produced today begin to be declassified, we will surely look back with some discomfort and see just how far off some of our judgments were when written in 2008. Such is the nature of intelligence assessments. What would be worse, however, would be for us to look back fifteen years hence and find ourselves stuck in much the same place we are today.

This reflection is prompted by reading a recently declassified August 1993 report, “The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous,” written by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Its subject was the possible spillover effect of Afghan Mujahidin fighters and support networks moving on to fight in other jihad conflicts, alongside other militant Islamic groups worldwide. Much of the report could be applied to the themes Daniel Byman raises in a recent post on this blog, about Al Qaeda in Iraq.

For example, writing in 2008 Byman notes that “fighters who went to Iraq learned a new set of capabilities that are now dispersed to the far corners of the earth.” Compare that to the 1993 report, which found that “the support network that funneled money, supplies, and manpower to supplement the Afghan Mujahidin is now contributing experienced fighters to militant Islamic groups worldwide.” When these veteran fighters dispersed, the report presciently predicted, “their knowledge of communications equipment and experiences in logistics planning will enhance the organizational and offensive capabilities of the militant groups to which they are returning.”

Writing in 2008, Byman very rightly noted that “many of the foreign fighters in Iraq will go home, and even small numbers of fighters may radicalize and change the orientation of existing local groups, as happened with Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon.” A section of the 1993 report, entitled “When the Boys Come Home,” noted that these veteran volunteer fighters “are welcomed as victorious Muslim fighters of a successful jihad against a superpower” and “have won the respect of many Muslims—Arab and non-Arab—who venerate the jihad.”

At that time, these Mujahidin returned to Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Libya and beyond, where they trained local militants and further radicalized local groups. Libya, the 1993 report notes, was once one of the largest backers of Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (since then designated a terrorist by the United States and the UN) but “now fears the returning veterans and has lashed out publicly against them.” Indeed, several of these Libyan veterans formed the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and became senior members of core Al Qaeda. In 2006, the U.S. government would note that “The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group threatens global safety and stability through the use of violence and its ideological alliance with al Qaida and other brutal terrorist organizations.”

The 1993 report describes several trends that remain issues of serious concern today, including some of the same streams of financial support that continue to finance today’s militant Islamist groups. To the present-day reader, who will digest this 1993 report with an eye towards the conflict in Iraq, perhaps the most disturbing analytical judgement (which could have been pulled out of a current National Intelligence Estimate), is this:

The war-era network of state sponsors and private patrons which continues to support the mujahidin has no rigid structure and no clearly defined command center, but receives guidance from several popular Islamic leaders and financial support from charitable Islamic organizations and wealthy individuals. Key figures who have emerged as the mentors of the mujahidin provide one another with the contacts and conduits needed to keep the militant groups they support in business.

The network circa 1993 was not an exact parallel to today’s combination of Al Qaeda operatives (a smaller but no less committed cadre) and like-minded followers of a virtually-networked, leaderless jihad. But the 1993 warning of an unstructured network of jihadists moving on from their current area of operations to other battlefronts could have been written this morning.

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Posted in Afghanistan, Daniel Byman, Martin Kramer, Matthew Levitt, Qaeda, Terrorism | 2 Comments

2 Responses to “Globalized jihad, then (1993) and now”

on 11 Mar 2008 at 10:32 am1 Daniel Byman

Matt Levitt’s incisive take on the 1993 INR report reminds us of two obvious but often-ignored points. First, much of what is supposedly “new” in terrorism today has historical parallels. Scholars and analysts thus have much to add to our understanding of current trends, and it is a shame that relatively few are willing to offer their insights to policymakers. Second, the intelligence community often gets it right, or at least gets it pretty close. The 1993 report does not read exactly like prophecy, but history should judge it as a remarkably prescient look at a trend that at the time was difficult to discern.

The salafi-jihadist movement became both stronger and more centralized as the 1990s wore on—and much more dangerous as a result. (Compare, say, the amateurish nature of much of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing with the coldly and brutally professional strikes in 2001.) Since the post-9/11 ousting of the Taliban and global manhunt for Al Qaeda operatives, the organization has had to decentralize more, a shift that has many consequences but that, on the whole, is positive from a U.S. counterterrorism perspective. The reestablishment of a safe haven in parts of Pakistan, however, throws this accomplishment into jeopardy.

Daniel Byman is a member of MESH.
on 11 Mar 2008 at 1:45 pm2 Martin Kramer

I wouldn’t rush to give too much credit to INR for producing this document, interesting though it is. The trend wasn’t that difficult to discern, and by August 1993, the backwash from Afghanistan was a major topic of discussion in the media. Steve Coll was doing some landmark reporting for the Washington Post on precisely these topics. For example, on August 2, almost three weeks before the INR paper, the Washington Post ran a front-page story under the headline “Radical Movements Thrive on Loose Structure, Strict Ideology.” The next day, another front-page story appeared under the headline “Global Network Provides Money, Haven.” (Coll, in Egypt and Israel, did most of the reporting on both stories.)

The August 3 story, by the way, had an early and very interesting account of bin Laden, reported by Steve LeVine out of Khartoum. Excerpt:

Binladen himself declined to be interviewed. A Sudanese state security officer posted at his office in Khartoum said Binladen fears arrest or assassination by Egyptian, Saudi or Western government agents.

Arguably, the best way to think about Binladen’s multistory Khartoum guest house is not as a centralized, string-pulling headquarters of Egyptian or other radicalism, but rather as one among many scattered centers of gravity where militant Islamic radicals may find haven, succor or support.

Binladen is a rich radical with a following. “They don’t believe in organizations,” said Hamza Hasan, an exiled Saudi who edits an anti-government magazine in London. “They think they are a jamaa (an Arabic word that means “group” or “society” and often connotes loose organization but firm commitment to religion).”

That same summer, basing myself entirely on media reports, I wrote an article for the 1992 Middle East Contemporary Survey entitled “The Global Village of Islam,” where I devoted a section to “The Afghan War Veterans,” with sub-sections on Egypt and Algeria.

The 1993 World Trade Center bombing provided a tremendous impetus for journalistic investigation. There was plenty of material out there, and the open sources pretty much had the story, at least at the level of resolution needed for broad-trend analysis. Between 1993 and 2001, most people lost interest. It was never a question of not knowing. It was always a matter of not understanding.

Martin Kramer is a member of MESH.