Comments on: Globalized jihad, then (1993) and now http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/03/globalized_jihad_then_1993_now/ National Security Studies Program :: Weatherhead Center Thu, 12 Nov 2009 21:06:56 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: Martin Kramer http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/03/globalized_jihad_then_1993_now/comment-page-1/#comment-278 Martin Kramer Tue, 11 Mar 2008 17:45:54 +0000 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/03/globalized_jihad_then_1993_now/#comment-278 I wouldn't rush to give too much credit to INR for producing this document, interesting though it is. The trend wasn't <i>that</i> difficult to discern, and by August 1993, the backwash from Afghanistan was a major topic of discussion in the media. Steve Coll was doing some landmark reporting for the <i>Washington Post</i> on precisely these topics. For example, on August 2, almost three weeks before the INR paper, the <i>Washington Post</i> ran a front-page story under the headline "Radical Movements Thrive on Loose Structure, Strict Ideology." The next day, another front-page story appeared under the headline "Global Network Provides Money, Haven." (Coll, in Egypt and Israel, did most of the reporting on both stories.) The August 3 story, by the way, had an early and very interesting account of bin Laden, reported by Steve LeVine out of Khartoum. Excerpt: <blockquote> Binladen himself declined to be interviewed. A Sudanese state security officer posted at his office in Khartoum said Binladen fears arrest or assassination by Egyptian, Saudi or Western government agents. Arguably, the best way to think about Binladen's multistory Khartoum guest house is not as a centralized, string-pulling headquarters of Egyptian or other radicalism, but rather as one among many scattered centers of gravity where militant Islamic radicals may find haven, succor or support. Binladen is a rich radical with a following. "They don't believe in organizations," said Hamza Hasan, an exiled Saudi who edits an anti-government magazine in London. "They think they are a jamaa (an Arabic word that means "group" or "society" and often connotes loose organization but firm commitment to religion)." </blockquote> That same summer, basing myself entirely on media reports, I wrote an article for the 1992 <i>Middle East Contemporary Survey</i> entitled "The Global Village of Islam," where I devoted a section to "The Afghan War Veterans," with sub-sections on Egypt and Algeria. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing provided a tremendous impetus for journalistic investigation. There was plenty of material out there, and the open sources pretty much had the story, at least at the level of resolution needed for broad-trend analysis. Between 1993 and 2001, most people lost interest. It was never a question of not knowing. It was always a matter of not understanding. <i><a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/martin_kramer/" rel="nofollow">Martin Kramer</a> is a member of MESH.</i> I wouldn’t rush to give too much credit to INR for producing this document, interesting though it is. The trend wasn’t that difficult to discern, and by August 1993, the backwash from Afghanistan was a major topic of discussion in the media. Steve Coll was doing some landmark reporting for the Washington Post on precisely these topics. For example, on August 2, almost three weeks before the INR paper, the Washington Post ran a front-page story under the headline “Radical Movements Thrive on Loose Structure, Strict Ideology.” The next day, another front-page story appeared under the headline “Global Network Provides Money, Haven.” (Coll, in Egypt and Israel, did most of the reporting on both stories.)

The August 3 story, by the way, had an early and very interesting account of bin Laden, reported by Steve LeVine out of Khartoum. Excerpt:

Binladen himself declined to be interviewed. A Sudanese state security officer posted at his office in Khartoum said Binladen fears arrest or assassination by Egyptian, Saudi or Western government agents.

Arguably, the best way to think about Binladen’s multistory Khartoum guest house is not as a centralized, string-pulling headquarters of Egyptian or other radicalism, but rather as one among many scattered centers of gravity where militant Islamic radicals may find haven, succor or support.

Binladen is a rich radical with a following. “They don’t believe in organizations,” said Hamza Hasan, an exiled Saudi who edits an anti-government magazine in London. “They think they are a jamaa (an Arabic word that means “group” or “society” and often connotes loose organization but firm commitment to religion).”

That same summer, basing myself entirely on media reports, I wrote an article for the 1992 Middle East Contemporary Survey entitled “The Global Village of Islam,” where I devoted a section to “The Afghan War Veterans,” with sub-sections on Egypt and Algeria.

The 1993 World Trade Center bombing provided a tremendous impetus for journalistic investigation. There was plenty of material out there, and the open sources pretty much had the story, at least at the level of resolution needed for broad-trend analysis. Between 1993 and 2001, most people lost interest. It was never a question of not knowing. It was always a matter of not understanding.

Martin Kramer is a member of MESH.

]]> By: Daniel Byman http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/03/globalized_jihad_then_1993_now/comment-page-1/#comment-277 Daniel Byman Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:32:01 +0000 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/03/globalized_jihad_then_1993_now/#comment-277 Matt Levitt's incisive <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/03/globalized_jihad_then_1993_now/" rel="nofollow">take</a> on the 1993 INR report reminds us of two obvious but often-ignored points. First, much of what is supposedly "new" in terrorism today has historical parallels. Scholars and analysts thus have much to add to our understanding of current trends, and it is a shame that relatively few are willing to offer their insights to policymakers. Second, the intelligence community often gets it right, or at least gets it pretty close. The 1993 report does not read exactly like prophecy, but history should judge it as a remarkably prescient look at a trend that at the time was difficult to discern. The salafi-jihadist movement became both stronger and more centralized as the 1990s wore on—and much more dangerous as a result. (Compare, say, the amateurish nature of much of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing with the coldly and brutally professional strikes in 2001.) Since the post-9/11 ousting of the Taliban and global manhunt for Al Qaeda operatives, the organization has had to decentralize more, a shift that has many consequences but that, on the whole, is positive from a U.S. counterterrorism perspective. The reestablishment of a safe haven in parts of Pakistan, however, throws this accomplishment into jeopardy. <i><a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/daniel_byman/" rel="nofollow">Daniel Byman</a> is a member of MESH.</i> Matt Levitt’s incisive take on the 1993 INR report reminds us of two obvious but often-ignored points. First, much of what is supposedly “new” in terrorism today has historical parallels. Scholars and analysts thus have much to add to our understanding of current trends, and it is a shame that relatively few are willing to offer their insights to policymakers. Second, the intelligence community often gets it right, or at least gets it pretty close. The 1993 report does not read exactly like prophecy, but history should judge it as a remarkably prescient look at a trend that at the time was difficult to discern.

The salafi-jihadist movement became both stronger and more centralized as the 1990s wore on—and much more dangerous as a result. (Compare, say, the amateurish nature of much of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing with the coldly and brutally professional strikes in 2001.) Since the post-9/11 ousting of the Taliban and global manhunt for Al Qaeda operatives, the organization has had to decentralize more, a shift that has many consequences but that, on the whole, is positive from a U.S. counterterrorism perspective. The reestablishment of a safe haven in parts of Pakistan, however, throws this accomplishment into jeopardy.

Daniel Byman is a member of MESH.

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