And Matt Levitt is incorrect to equate the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) with the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). The MEK is an opposition group based in Iraq; the NCRI is the Iranian parliament-in-exile, based in Paris, of which the MEK is one member. While the MEK, or People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI) as it’s known in Europe, is listed as a terrorist group by the EU, the NCRI is not. This contradiction with U.S. policy, where both groups are listed, was one inspiration for my initial post.

Levitt also mistakenly claims that the European Court of Justice “decided in the end to maintain the blacklisting of the MEK.” In fact, the European Council, the executive body of the EU, decided to maintain the listing, in defiance of the Court.

In addition to these factual inaccuracies, Matt Levitt mischaracterizes my position as, “The MEK should be de-listed because it targets an adversary of the United States.” Levitt responds to this straw man by asserting that the United States should not turn a blind eye to those terrorists who target our enemies, in which category he places the MEK, because doing so would cede the counterterrorism high ground.

My actual position is that it is in the U.S. interest to delist the MEK because it not only opposes a principal adversary, but also because the group does not engage in terrorism. Accordingly, in a May 2003 New York Post op-ed, Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson posed the following question and answer: “Is the MEK a terrorist group? No.”

Levitt refers to 2001 attacks inside Iran cited by the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, but Levitt and the State Department would be hard pressed to find an example of an attack since then, because there have not been any such attacks.

Consistent with the Pipes-Clawson conclusion and extensive Iran Policy Committee research, on November 30, 2007, the Proscribed Organizations Appeals Commission (POAC) of the United Kingdom ordered the Government to delist the PMOI. It is notable that this court made it very clear that delisting the PMOI was not ordered because of any larger foreign policy context involving Iran as an adversary of the UK, which Levitt incorrectly supposes to be my justification for delisting:

We were not persuaded by the Appellants that it was unlawful for the Secretary of State not to take into account that, on their case, the system of government in Iran is undemocratic and repressive. The Secretary of State was and is entitled to conclude that there is no right to resort to terrorism, whatever the motivation.

Instead, the UK court ordered the delisting of the PMOI because the group was found to not be a terrorist organization:

[T]here is no evidence that the PMOI has at any time since 2003 sought to re-create any form of structure that was capable of carrying out or supporting terrorist acts. There is no evidence of any attempt to “prepare” for terrorism. There is no evidence of any encouragement to others to commit acts of terrorism. Nor is there any material that affords any grounds for a belief that the PMOI was “otherwise concerned in terrorism” at the time of the [deproscription] decision in September 2006.

Under the section of the U.S. Code that sets forth the criteria for designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, it must be the case that the group so designated is “foreign,” “engages in terrorist activity,” and “the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States.” If the judgment of the UK court were applied to U.S. law regarding designation, the MEK listing would clearly be unwarranted.

I concur with Levitt’s conclusion that the MEK should be held to the same standard as the Iranian regime. Doing so finds unimpeachable evidence of Tehran’s terrorist activity, as well as equally valid evidence that the MEK does not engage in terrorist activity.

Raymond Tanter is a member of MESH.

But that was not the main thrust of Ray’s posting. It was just the hook for the real point: that the MEK should be de-listed because it targets an adversary of the United States. On that point I disagree. We lose the counterterrorism high ground if we only call out and designate those terrorists who target our friends and allies. As long as the MEK—a radical, cult-like group—continues to carry out acts of terrorism and political violence, it should remain on the U.S. list of designated terrorist groups.

True, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has de-listed the MEK as a terror organization, and the European Court of First Instance ordered MEK’s funds unfrozen. But the European Court decided in the end to maintain the blacklisting of the MEK, and so should the United States.

The history of the MEK aside, the group’s ongoing violent activities—and its financial support activity here in the United States—clearly place the group well within the definition of a terrorist group worthy of being so designated by the United States.

Consider this, from the State Department’s 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism, released in April 2007 (the 2007 report is expected to be released next month):

In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during “Operation Great Bahman” in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar attack against a major Iranian leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved in regular mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids against Iranian military and law enforcement personnel, as well as government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border. Also in 2001, the FBI arrested seven Iranians in the United States who funneled $400,000 to an MEK-affiliated organization in the UAE which used the funds to purchase weapons.

As I have written on this blog before, Iran poses a variety of threats to its neighbors, the international community, and the international financial system. From support for terrorist groups, to nuclear proliferation, to the use of deceptive financial practices to hide its support for these illicit activities, Iran maintains a threatening posture that must be addressed. But forgiving the MEK its acts of terrorism simply because they target an adversary is not the answer. Indeed, today’s targeted financial measures against Iran are focused on Iran’s illicit activities and those most directly involved in those activities. That is the same standard we should apply to the MEK.

Matthew Levitt is a member of MESH.