Middle East Strategy at Harvard

In November 2002, the Chronicle of Higher Education asked a number of scholars this question: “What will the world be like five years after a war with Iraq?” To mark the fifth anniversary of the Iraq war, MESH asked all of the respondents to revisit their predictions. This week, MESH is posting the responses it has received.

Barry Rubin is a member of MESH. In 2002, he wrote: “A post-Saddam Iraq seen as reasonably democratic, independent of American control, and improving its people’s lives might become a model, promoting the cause of representative government and human rights in the region. If so, the United States would get credit and not blame for its actions.” (Read his full prediction here.)

From Barry Rubin

I was quite worried at the time about the decision to invade Iraq. There was no doubt that the United States and its allies could win the war militarily, but the key problem was what would happen afterward. Why should one believe that Iraq would become democratic—and stable as well—virtually overnight? Given the country’s history, political culture, and divisions this seemed unlikely.

And there was also the problem of risk. What if things went wrong? The existing situation was about as good as one could expect. The failure of the Arab-Israeli peace process, due to Syria and the Palestinian leadership, as well as September 11 and other events had led many more people in America and the West to understand how the region actually worked. They came to comprehend that the region’s problems were not the fault of the United States or Israel, but were due to the nature of the regimes and their ideologies.

I thought—and so did almost everyone in Israel I heard on this issue—that there was a huge amount of naiveté in the U.S. policy. The general consensus was that as long as sanctions remained on Iraq, Saddam was not going to be much of a threat. The real concern was Iran. Yet if things went wrong in Iraq, America’s political capital would be squandered and Israel would be called upon to pay a large part of the price.

But there were two other factors to be considered. First, there was the situation of the Iraqi people. How could one in good conscience advocate a policy in which they continued to live under such a brutal dictatorship, especially if an alternative was available? The other was the point that America was at war. And while this should not still criticism, it should also engender support.

How do things look five years later? It is easy to reach a conclusion but hard to be sure it is the right one. Would it have been better if the invasion had never taken place? I can see arguments on both sides. Regrettably, my worst fears about the cost in American prestige and credibility, as well as a return to the old, bad analysis of the region, have come true.

I don’t think the United States can really win in Iraq, though it also cannot lose. What I mean by this is that the U.S. effort, most recently the Surge, has improved the situation within Iraq, a state of affairs that many see as a victory. Yet all U.S. forces can do is to create a situation of relative calm after which the Iraqi political system and military capability will decide what happens next. The United States can only create suitable conditions for this—and it has—but how is the turnover to take place? If U.S. troops cannot be withdrawn or even significantly reduced, what does this tell us?

And there is also another question about who will ultimately reap the benefits of victory within Iraq. Does the added aspect of heightened Iranian influence mean the whole policy was a mistake? The internal situation is difficult, not only in terms of Sunni-Shia divisions but also due to internal Shia splits, the strength of Islamist sentiments, the ability of Iran and Arab neighbors to disrupt the society, and many more.

What of the regional situation? The war in Iraq has had close to zero effect on the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the removal of Iraq as a factor is in part balanced by the increase of Islamist power, though this might well have happened any way. Nor did it have any meaningful effect on Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons, the next big issue in Gulf security.

My prediction at the time was that the attack, if successfully carried out, would lead Arab governments to see the United States as a more dangerous enemy—and hence one not to be trifled with—and a more serious security asset. If one looks at public opinion polls, it would seem the United States is more unpopular in the Arabic-speaking world. But popularity is not the point. It makes us feel better or worse, but is simply not the way Middle East politics work where it counts. And regarding what counts, I am not sure one can say that these events have materially worsened U.S. relations with Arab regimes at all. The ultimate result will depend on whether American intervention seems successful and if the United States is seen as steadfast.

Finally, consider the tremendous irony of the situation and U.S. policy: the United States is supporting an Iraqi government whose number-two ally is Iran while fighting proxies of its own allies, the Sunni countries who oppose an expansion of Iranian influence!

There were no easy answers in 2003; there are none now.