Middle East Strategy at Harvard

From Stephen Peter Rosen

…when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (Sherlock Holmes)

What are the alternatives available to the United States in Iraq? Three appear to be worth considering.

First, the United States might consider withdrawing its forces to the areas that produce the bulk of Iraqi oil in the south. This would enable the United States to ensure that oil is pumped and exported from the country, and to prevent Iraqi oil revenues from going to a hostile government. This would mean the defense of an enclave, supported by physical and electronic barriers, and would reduce the manpower needed to defend the U.S. position in Iraq. Periodic raids would be conducted to spoil impending attacks on those enclaves. While this would deny Iran or a hostile Iraqi government the ability to use oil revenue for hostile purposes, this would be an openly imperial seizure of territory, which would confirm every worst suspicion of the United States in the Islamic world, and perhaps lead other countries to make similar grabs of oil producing areas.

Second, the United States could withdraw U.S. ground forces from Iraq, but maintain a naval and air force presence in the Gulf and the Gulf states. We would accept whatever state emerged as dominant in Iraq, and hope that economic motives would lead it to produce and sell Iraqi oil in the world market. Though the oil revenue might flow into the hands of people we do not like, the remaining American military presence in the region would deter Iraqi or Iranian military aggression or coercion of the Gulf states. Money might flow from Iraq to terrorist organizations, and Iraq might become an area within which terrorists could be trained, but this is happening now. American air power and special forces could strike at terrorist training camps to reduce their level of operations, and to retaliate against egregious terrorist attacks.

Until 2007, this appeared to be a serious option. It now appears less attractive. The acceleration of the Iranian nuclear enrichment program and the decrease in the credibility of any American or Israeli action against Iranian nuclear weapons productions facilities mean that an American withdrawal would take place against the backdrop of a nuclear Iran. The credibility of American guarantees to the Gulf states in that context would be low. Moreover, the demographics of Iraq are such that we can expect disproportionately large numbers of young Iraqi males of military age for the next fifteen years. They are likely to be unemployed, and easy recruits for militias, street mobs, and the like.

In short, absent an effective Iraqi state that has a monopoly of force, and that can put young men to work or put them in a national army, the demographic foundation of Iraqi society seems unlikely to support any kind of social peace. Endemic war internal to Iraq would be the consequence of this option. Endemic internal war in Iraq, a nuclear Iran, and the withdrawal of American forces would seem to create the conditions for an expansion of Iranian control over Iraqi and Persian Gulf oil production and sales.

The remaining option is the continuation of current levels of American ground forces in Iraq, with an increased emphasis on building an Iraqi police force and national army from the ground up, with continued American operations to clear and secure populated areas, and continued American air and artillery support for Iraqi ground force operations against insurgents. This would have to be supported by an expansion of the Army and Marine Corps. While costly, it is not clear where else in the world the United States would need to deploy its ground combat forces. Iranian influence would be balanced by American ground, naval, and air forces. U.S. casualties would probably spike as Iran and the Shi’ite militias under their influence tried to force the United States out, but could decline if the Iraqi army improved. The end state would be an Iraqi state built around an army, and that could keep social peace, perhaps on the model of Turkey in the 20th century.

The first two options are not impossible, but if the outcomes associated with them are unacceptable, we are left with the last remaining option—however improbable.