I have stated my disagreement with Robert Pape’s central thesis in a long review article published in late 2006 (here). Although I do not argue in this article that Pape has it completely wrong, I think his thesis that suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation is less valid for suicide attacks by Salafi-Jihadist groups—the predominant pattern of suicide attacks today—than it is for the suicide attacks of the 1980s and 1990s. It may be true that Islamists fighting ‘non-Muslims’ have executed many more suicide attacks, but I would take issue with Hegghammer’s belief that there is a clear and observable tendency in that regard. I believe that the tendency is actually pointing in the other direction. Increasingly, suicide attacks occur in countries—and against regimes—that are Muslim, such as Algeria, Iraq, Pakistan, or Afghanistan. Yes, many of the attacks in these countries are targeted at foreigners, but a growing number target Muslims who are regarded as ‘apostates’—with the attack against Benazir Bhutto being the most prominent example.

As to the relationship between ideology and terrorism, I share Raymond Ibrahim’s sense that the discussion of the role of ideology in the emergence of terrorism is extremely important. But Thomas Hegghammer asks a legitimate question nevertheless: does it matter? My personal take is that ideology does matter, but we should not be under the impression that it explains everything.

I have examined the interplay between ideology and suicide attacks in my dissertation (forthcoming as a book in September 2008) by looking at the ideological orientation of over forty groups that conducted nearly 1,270 suicide attacks between 1981 and April 2007. In my study, I found that unequivocally, Salafi-Jihadist groups have assumed the leadership among groups that employ this modus operandi in a number of respects, including in terms of numbers of organizations, numbers of attacks, and even in the average and overall lethality of suicide missions. In 1997, for example, not a single Salafi-Jihadist group perpetrated a suicide attack. In 1998, 17 percent of groups that conducted these attacks adhered to Salafi-Jihadist ideology, followed by 25 percent in 1999 and 67 percent in 2000. In 2006 and 2007, that percentage peaked at 70 percent and 67 percent, respectively. Moreover, suicide attacks by Salafi-Jihadist groups carried a much higher lethality than attacks by non-Salafi-Jihadist groups. Although Salafi-Jihadist groups are responsible for only 15 percent of attacks in the time frame of 1981 to April 2007, I found that they were responsible for at least a third (34 percent) of all fatalities caused by suicide attacks in that period.

So what about the ’so what’ question Hegghammer asks? Although I tend to disagree with Hegghammer that further inquiry into the role of ideology is futile, I share his judgment that there are limits as to what ideology helps us explain. Most importantly, I found no evidence that ideology is ‘the cause’ of suicide attacks per se. The causes of suicide attacks are complex, and must be found in the interplay of personal motivations, strategic and tactical objectives of the sponsoring groups, as well as the larger societal and structural factors affecting the bomber and the group. In addition, ideology is acquired by individuals for reasons having to do with emotions and beliefs—a topic that is highly complex, but well deserving of more scholarly attention.

If ideology is not ‘the cause’ of suicide attacks per se, then what is its role? I believe that ideology plays an important role in that it helps reduce the suicide attacker’s reservations to perpetrate the act of killing and dying. Specifically, ideology fills three roles:

• First, it helps the suicide bomber justify the act by articulating why this act is called for, and why every ‘true’ Muslim must participate in it. The ideology describes—and statements by suicide bombers reflect—the need to defend Islam from attack as an individual duty for each and every Muslim; the participation in jihad as the ultimate proof of one’s worthiness as a Muslim; and the failure to participate in jihad as an act of heresy.

• Second, Salafi-Jihadist ideology shapes the mental framework of the suicide attacker by constantly repeating the West’s real or perceived infractions against Islam. These infractions appear particularly grave to some Muslims because Salafi-Jihadists tend to employ conspiracy theories to further incite fear and hatred of the West.

• Third, it helps the suicide attacker to morally disengage himself from his act and from the victim. Ideology helps create a dichotomy of good-versus-evil (’true’ Muslims on one hand vs. kuffar on the other), and it dehumanizes the enemy by describing him as defiled, degenerate, bereft of any sense of decency, unjust, and cruel.

Assaf Moghadam is a member of MESH.

First is that the review allegedly ignores ideology and doctrine. Well, the essay may not be entirely devoted to Al Qaeda’s declarations, but to say that I ignore ideology is simply not true. One of the five main books reviewed is Messages to the World; I highlight a main theme in bin Laden’s statements (Palestine); I speak of the ideological differences between socio-revolutionary Islamists, classical jihadists and global jihadists, and I offer an interpretation of Al Qaeda’s ideology as extreme pan-Islamic nationalism. All this is analysis of ideology; it is just emphasizing its political as opposed to its theological dimension. Ideology is not the same as theology, and it is perfectly possible to analyze Islamist ideology without using Arabic theological terms in every sentence.

Ibrahim’s second point is that the utility of studying individuals is overrated and that I focus too much on bin Laden trivia. Of course the gossipy queries are insignificant; I think most readers apart from Ibrahim understand that the rhetorical questions were tongue and cheek. Instead of attacking me, Ibrahim should address those (like Adam Robertson, Yonah Alexander or Kola Boof) who have probably made more money than I ever will by spreading false bin Laden trivia in their books. If Ibrahim thinks bin Laden is not worth studying, that is fair enough, but I would strongly disagree. Bin Laden is the single most influential individual in the global jihadist movement, and the thorough historiography of writers like Peter Bergen and Lawrence Wright has helped the war on terror.

Third is my alleged failure to mention the Qaeda texts that do contain religious ranting. My point is simply that bin Laden’s discourse is more political and less irrational than the average Western reader thinks. Of course there is religious discourse in Al Qaeda’s statements, but there is also a lot of politics, including those directed at Muslim audiences.

Ibrahim’s fourth complaint concerns my partial support for Robert Pape’s theory, which I admit is a minority view. Ibrahim holds the majority view in the terrorism research community, which is that Pape has it completely wrong and that religion is driving suicide terrorism. Of course there are nationalist movements in many parts of the world that do not use suicide bombings—just like there are secular groups that do. I am interested in the observable patterns of behavior among Islamist groups, which is that Islamists involved in struggles against non-Muslims have executed many more suicide attacks than have Islamists fighting their local regimes. There is a clear and observable tendency in the empirical data which the advocates of the religion or cult hypothesis cannot explain. I am not suggesting that nationalism alone accounts for all instances of suicide bombings, but it certainly seems to increase the probability that an Islamist group will resort to such tactics.

The fifth and final criticism is that my emphasis on seeing jihadists as humans and not as fanatics constitutes a “simple grievance-based explanation of terrorism.” This is a very curious interpretation. By highlighting the role of individuals and the power of their agency, I am going against those who see jihadism as the linear expression of poverty, state repression or Western imperialism. However, this also—and I suspect this is what bothers Ibrahim—challenges the view that the behavior of jihadists is determined by religion and ideology.

Here we are at the crux of the matter. Ibrahim’s critique is motivated by a profound and honest disagreement about the role of religion and ideology in Islamist militancy. I happen to hold the view that ideology is only one of the factors that determine the timing, level and form of Islamist violence. I am also of the view that there are limits to the study of the theological dimension of Islamist ideology, and that we can better predict the behavior of militant Islamist groups by looking at the political preferences expressed in their texts.

Ibrahim seems to suggest that the study of jihadist ideology is a forgotten or underestimated line of inquiry in academia. This may have been the case five years ago, but not any longer. There now exist several edited compilations of Al Qaeda texts (Ibrahim published one in 2007; I published three others in 2003 and 2005). There is at least one academic journal devoted solely to studies of jihadist ideology, while other journals regularly feature articles on the same subject. This is not to mention the numerous blogs and websites that monitor jihadi propaganda. There is no shortage of exegeses of jihadi ideology. What we need is new ways of analyzing it.

Ibrahim’s alternative to my “mantras” seems to be that jihadists are driven by religious ideology. Fine; I don’t disagree. But what exactly does this help us explain? It does not explain chronological or geographical variations of violence; nor relative differences in popularity between radical ideologies; nor differential recruitment; nor the timing of key ideological permutations. The “yes-or-no” debate over whether or not religious ideology causes Islamist violence is in my view futile and intensely boring. I am interested in understanding why Islamists use violence when, where and in the way they do. In this quest, Raymond Ibrahim’s mantra does not get me very far.

Thomas Hegghammer is a postdoctoral research associate at Princeton University.