Comments on: Tolerating terrorism in Yemen http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/05/tolerating_terrorism_in_yemen/ National Security Studies Program :: Weatherhead Center Mon, 09 Nov 2009 22:04:14 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: Adam Garfinkle http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/05/tolerating_terrorism_in_yemen/comment-page-1/#comment-529 Adam Garfinkle Thu, 08 May 2008 08:54:23 +0000 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/05/tolerating_terrorism_in_yemen/#comment-529 Daniel Byman has it <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/05/tolerating_terrorism_in_yemen/" rel="nofollow">right</a> on Yemen, a dangerous place that gets too little attention. He mentions Gregory Johnsen in his post and rightly so: He's actually spent a fair bit of time there. For a fuller picture of Yemen's situation and the government's deal with the bad guys, see Johnsen's 2006 essay, "Well Gone Dry: A Letter from San'a," <i>The American Interest</i>, <a href="http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=195&MId=6" rel="nofollow">here</a>. <i><a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/adam_garfinkle/" rel="nofollow">Adam Garfinkle</a> is a member of MESH.</i> Daniel Byman has it right on Yemen, a dangerous place that gets too little attention. He mentions Gregory Johnsen in his post and rightly so: He’s actually spent a fair bit of time there. For a fuller picture of Yemen’s situation and the government’s deal with the bad guys, see Johnsen’s 2006 essay, “Well Gone Dry: A Letter from San’a,” The American Interest, here.

Adam Garfinkle is a member of MESH.

]]> By: Bernard Haykel http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/05/tolerating_terrorism_in_yemen/comment-page-1/#comment-528 Bernard Haykel Thu, 08 May 2008 08:53:14 +0000 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/05/tolerating_terrorism_in_yemen/#comment-528 Daniel Byman's <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/05/tolerating_terrorism_in_yemen/" rel="nofollow">posting</a> on Yemen is accurate and underscores that the different tack that Yemen has adopted in dealing with Al Qaeda is largely the result of the following factors: 1. There is a politically significant domestic constituency of Al Qaeda sympathizers in Yemen and as such the constraints of managing this group are internal to Yemen's domestic scene. The government in Sanaa cannot eject easily this group from the body politic or is unwilling to do so. 2. Appeasing the United States does not trump the Yemeni government's desire to keep Al Qaeda and its local sympathizers on side. 3. Yemen has a relationship with Salafi-Jihadis that pre-dates 9/11 and has used these forces against local Zaydi-Shiites, Sufis as well as the Socialists. In other words, the Al Qaeda-type people are a useful, perhaps necessary, tool in the hands of the government in Sanaa, one which it will not relinquish easily. <i><a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/bernard_haykel/" rel="nofollow">Bernard Haykel</a> is a member of MESH.</i> Daniel Byman’s posting on Yemen is accurate and underscores that the different tack that Yemen has adopted in dealing with Al Qaeda is largely the result of the following factors:

1. There is a politically significant domestic constituency of Al Qaeda sympathizers in Yemen and as such the constraints of managing this group are internal to Yemen’s domestic scene. The government in Sanaa cannot eject easily this group from the body politic or is unwilling to do so.

2. Appeasing the United States does not trump the Yemeni government’s desire to keep Al Qaeda and its local sympathizers on side.

3. Yemen has a relationship with Salafi-Jihadis that pre-dates 9/11 and has used these forces against local Zaydi-Shiites, Sufis as well as the Socialists.

In other words, the Al Qaeda-type people are a useful, perhaps necessary, tool in the hands of the government in Sanaa, one which it will not relinquish easily.

Bernard Haykel is a member of MESH.

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