The question for the United States, however, is not one of capability but of will. With the situation still insecure in Iraq, with a rising insurgency in Afghanistan, and with the possible Talibanization of Pakistan a growing concern, there are influential voices in Washington, led by the Secretary of Defense, which are opposed to a U.S. strike on Iran. If these voices prevail, then it would appear Israel would have to do the job itself.

Robert O. Freedman is a member of MESH.

Israel may decide to take military action in order to remove temporarily the nuclear threat. It will do so after it will reach the sad conclusion that it has been left once again alone to face enemies intent on destroying the Jewish State. Desertion of Israel is precisely what some Iranians are expecting of what they call the Christian World (the West). As a realist, I know that we live in a self-help system and the Ayatollahs may be right.

Efraim Inbar is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.

Chuck Freilich is a member of MESH.

First, the Persian Gulf has long been a zone of exclusive U.S. dominance—so much so that maintenance of this dominance rises to the level of a doctrine. Were the United States to abdicate or divide its responsibility for enforcing order in this zone, we really would be in a post-American Middle East. Israel’s role in the Pax Americana has been limited to the Levant. That role has been invaluable, obviating the need for the United States to deploy its own forces there; would that the United States had an Israel-equivalent in the Gulf (where it has no security allies, only dependencies). But the United States does not have such an equivalent, and importing Israel into the Gulf to fulfill the task of order-enforcer there would signal American weakness, not strength. It may add weight to diplomatic efforts for Israel to seem to be chafing at the bit. But if push came to shove, Israeli action would be as detrimental to the U.S. interest as it would have been in Iraq in 1991 and 2003.

Second, while Mark Katz may be right in calculating that an Israeli lead role might salvage some pro-American opinion in Iran, its effect on opinion elsewhere would be so negative as to endanger the very success of the operation. A U.S.-led operation would stand up far better at the Security Council, it would gain more discreet and open nods of approval from European and Arab governments, and it would be considered, by those so inclined, to be an action undertaken on behalf of the world’s collective interest by the sole superpower. When it comes to legitimacy in the use of force, especially over days or weeks, size matters.

Martin Kramer is a member of MESH.

If the Israelis attacked alone, the United States would still bear all of the political costs of the attack. The attack would be less effective if it were not carried out with the full might of the United States, and it would simply be shameful to allow a weaker and more vulnerable ally to carry American water. Everyone knows this, and knows that the final decision will rest with the United States. For that reason, the recent Israeli exercises were not particularly useful, and suggest that the American government gave the green light to them because it was willing to grasp at anything in order not to have to grapple with reality.

The reality is that the current Iranian government will not give up the nuclear program.

The reality is a non-nuclear strike at the Iranian nuclear facilities would have to be executed by both the United States and Israel, would combine cruise and ballistic missile strikes with manned air strikes and special operations against Iranian command and control facilities, surface-to-air missile installations, and naval installations, as well as the nuclear facilities, all in a matter of a day or two. Forces would also be held ready for follow-on or retaliatory strikes on the logistics facilities that feed weapons from Iran into Iraq and Lebanon, depending on the effectiveness of the initial attacks and the response of the Iranian government and people.

The reality is that neither the United States nor the Israeli government can be sure where the Iranian nuclear facilities are. Here I must respectfully disagree with Joe Joffe. In 1990, before the war, the U.S. government was confident that it knew where the Iraqi nuclear installations were, but discovered dozens more after UN inspectors got into the country. We still are not sure what the North Koreans have in terms of a uranium enrichment capability. If long tunnels and large caverns were dug in Iran for the enrichment facilities, we cannot know where the centrifuges are underground. We cannot know what kind of blast doors and partitions were constructed underground to limit damage, nor what preparations have been made to add expedient protection if there is warning of an attack. Even a perfectly placed human intelligence agent can make mistaken assessments, as we have seen. Initial air strikes would, most probably, have to be followed with more strikes in weeks or months, to stop Iranian repair and recovery. Would Russia and China cooperate with the United States after a preventive air strike to limit Iranian acquisition of replacement technology? This seems unlikely.

So what, really, are our options? A massive, sustained aerial campaign is one option. The political costs seem much too high. Measures to slow the Iranian program down and to help the opponents of Ahmadinejad may be possible, though how effective they would be is impossible to judge from outside the government. Policies and capabilities to limit the political gains the Iranians will seek from their nuclear weapons are possible, and I have discussed them in earlier postings. A retaliatory doctrine that holds Iran responsible for nuclear weapons use in the region, backed by the United States, Israel, and NATO, if possible, should be the subject of discussion now. There will be many problematic scenarios involving attacks that cannot be immediately and clearly linked to Iran. These will have to be explored, along with the appropriate responses. My suggestion is that in the event of an anonymous nuclear attack that we suspect to be linked to Iran, that Iran be given 48 hours to prove, to our satisfaction, that they were not involved. If they do not, we and our allies will retaliate in a manner that is a massive as necessary, and as discriminate as possible.

There are, perhaps, better options. But they need to be identified, discussed, and put in place before the Iranians get their first weapon. Submarines with nuclear armed missiles need to be in place in waters south of Iran as a dedicated retaliatory force. Coastal and missile defenses need to be strengthened, and so on.

There is a last unpleasant reality that must be faced. The Israeli military and the Israeli clandestine intelligence services have, in the past, misled the Israeli government and drawn them into confrontations they did not anticipate or want. This is a matter of historical record, before 1956 and in the first Lebanon war. In the current confrontation with Iran, there may be Israelis who believe that Israel is faced with extinction, that the Israeli government is unable to do what is necessary, and that true Israeli patriots are obligated to save the Israeli people by whatever means necessary, even if this means taking unauthorized actions that people will later thank them for. It is in the interest of Israel and the United States that we also face this possibility clearly and make sure that it is eliminated.

Stephen Peter Rosen is a member of MESH.

There will, of course, be a negative Iranian reaction whether the United States or Israel does so. In either case, Iran can be expected to step up its support to its allies in Iraq. It may also cause problems for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Perhaps Hezbollah and/or Hamas will react in some violent way. The Iranians, though, will need to be cautious. After all, the United States could do something that it has not done up to now: support separatist groups in Iran such as the Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis. This is something that Tehran does not want to see happen at all. The future of not just the Islamic Republic, but Iran itself would be in doubt.

In my view, though, Iran would react somewhat differently depending on whether the attack came from Israel or the United States. A direct American attack would make it difficult for those Iranian groups seeking improved relations with Washington to continue doing so. As I have argued before, there is a wellspring of positive feeling toward the America in Iran. Washington may not be aware of this, but the Iranian government is—and fears it. Washington could lose this good will if it attacked Iran directly. Indeed, Ahmadinejad and those virulently opposed to improved relations with the United States may actually benefit from a U.S. attack on Iran if this sours Iranian public opinion on the United States.

Many in Iran, of course, would see America as behind an Israeli attack as well. An Israeli attack, though, might well lead to an understanding in Iran that Tehran may need better relations with the United States in order to restrain Israel. There is, however, no guarantee that there will be any such realization.

Still, even the possibility of this is important for the United States to consider, because there is a strategic case to be made for improved Iranian-American relations. While many focus on the threat posed by Iran, the United States and its allies face other threats—including a resurgent one from Russia. Russia appears to be trying to dominate Eurasian energy routes to Europe. Improved relations with Iran could lead to Iranian gas flowing to Europe via Turkey. Iran could also allow Central Asian and Azeri oil and gas an alternative route to Western markets. A direct American attack on Iran would make achieving these goals more difficult than an Israeli attack, in my judgment.

On balance, then, if there is going to be an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, American interests would be better served if this was done by Israel and not the United States itself.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.

It seems to me likely that Israel will act before the United States decides to tackle the Iranian program militarily. Short of Iran declaring its nuclear weapons capability publicly through announcement or testing, or some new IAEA discovery, the United States will remain constrained in its ability to tackle the problem on its own. In addition to the heavy overseas commitments of U.S. forces and preoccupation with two wars, the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear program, with which many other nations disagreed, probably pulled the rug out from under any public support in the United States for such an action.

Many critics argue that Israel cannot do to Iran’s nuclear program what it did to Iraq’s. However, Whitney Raas and Austin Long, in their article “Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities” (here), argue that a rough net assessment of Israel’s capability to cripple key nodes of the Iranian nuclear program demonstrates it is more robust and capable than many imagine. Of course, this neither guarantees that Israel will strike this way nor that such a strike would succeed with near-perfect reliability, as in the Osirak example. Moreover, there are several difficult choices Israel will have to make in order to effectuate this strike plan. However, the window of time for a successful, damage-limiting strike against the Iranian nuclear program may be rapidly closing.

The New York Sun recently reported several “nightmare scenarios” U.S. intelligence agencies are considering in the event the U.S. or Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. While the account makes it seem as if Iran has a full range of targets to select for retribution, its actual choices are more restricted. Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt do a great job (here) of showing that Iran’s responses to previous attacks have been mixed and its possible responses to a U.S. or Israeli strike are limited. Iran would take a drubbing should it try attacking ships of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, and the oil fields of Saudi Arabia are harder targets than they might seem. The most likely responses would be asymmetric, of the kind Iran has been engaged in for years, through its intelligence services, the Qods Force, and through its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah. However bad such “nightmare scenarios” might seem to a non-Israeli audience, they cannot compete with the holocaust-like threat of a nuclear-armed Iran to the Israelis. Further, Israel has been dealing with the asymmetrical threat from Iran and Hezbollah for years.

The United States, too, has been in a low-intensity conflict with Iran for decades, ever since the revolution of 1979. The only new twist would be whether Iran directs Hezbollah to take its form of warfare to America. A June 19 ABC News report indicated that Hezbollah sleeper cells may have already been activated in Canada, with the presumed goal of attacking “soft” Jewish targets as revenge for the assassination of Imad Mugniyeh in Syria last February, for which Israel credibly denies involvement. It is no stretch to imagine Hezbollah selecting soft targets in the United States as well.

The United States will be blamed for an Israeli strike, whether it “delegates” the job to Israel or not. For that, the United States will need to prepare for a possible Iranian riposte. In the event, however, the United States may well want to help Israel ensure the strike’s success and limit the amount of damage to non-military targets. Such cooperation may be effected through real-time intelligence feeds and behind-the-scenes military support. Certainly the United States will need to mitigate the diplomatic storm against Israel after the event.

Mark T. Clark is a member of MESH.