In imperial times the Ottomans took the lead, for both geopolitical and sectarian reasons, in countering Persian encroachments in the Fertile Crescent. The embrace of secularism after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, however, coupled with the strong Kemalist aversion to associating with foreign powers in their regional policies (in a common Turkish formulation, refusing to serve as a local “gendarme” for the Americans), led Ankara to abandon this role for the most part.

Nevertheless, as Steven Cook suggests, there remain good reasons for Turkish concern today, ranging from Iran’s enhanced position in Syria and Iraq, to its efforts to exacerbate a Palestinian-Israeli conflict that can still destabilize the entire region (including Turkey itself). The imperative of countering Iran, however, is paralyzed by Turkey’s domestic pathologies—above all, its ongoing inability to accommodate Kurdish identity. Thus, far from viewing the Kurds as a potential conduit for the projection of its own influence into the Fertile Crescent, Ankara finds itself driven to collaborate with Syria and Iran in a common effort to suppress Kurdish nationalism. A recent confirmation of this collaboration came earlier this month when Turkey’s land forces commander Gen. İlker Başbuğ acknowledged that the Turkish and Iranian militaries have been coordinating their operations in northern Iraq.

A final point: Lee Smith ends his comment by seeming to suggest that Erdoğan and the AKP government seek a closer relationship with Syria than the Turkish military might like. In fact, Turkey’s military and civilian secularist elites have actively backed closer security and economic cooperation with both the Syrian and Iranian regimes in recent years. That is not likely to change as long as neither regime poses a direct threat to the primary concern of those elites: the preservation of their monocultural nationalist ideology at home.

Malik Mufti is a member of MESH.

If American strategy in the Middle East is geared toward containing Iran and if exploiting the differences between Damascus and Tehran is an important part of that plan, then Washington should be offering much more than its present tepid support for the Turkish–sponsored negotiations.

But “exploiting the differences” between Damascus and Tehran is not part of that plan for the excellent reasons that he described above—i.e., there are few, if any, differences to exploit. U.S. strategy is to isolate both the Iranians and the Syrians, not throw them lifelines, or have allies in Jerusalem and Ankara do so.

In February, the Treasury Department designated Syrian president Bashar al-Asad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf in an effort to hurt the Syrian regime financially, a tactic that seems to be working. Last week Turkcell reportedly opted out of a deal with Makhlouf’s Syriatel, leaving Makhlouf with no choice but to swallow the 69 percent he was looking to sell to the Turks. So, it is doubtful at this point that Washington has any interest in Ankara, or anyone, helping to “rehabilitate Syria’s crumbling infrastructure” when the regime’s behavior has not changed one bit to Washington’s liking.

Who knows what the AKP government hopes to gain from its role as mediator? Perhaps Erdoğan, like Olmert, wishes to enhance his prestige domestically. Maybe the Turks, like other regional players, want to spread their bets—a little on the U.S.-backed regional order, and a little on the Iranian axis. It is also worth recalling that when the Israelis leveled the Syrian nuclear facility, they flew through Turkish airspace to get there, a fact that Erdoğan, if not necessarily the Turkish military, might wish for his terror-supporting neighbor in Damascus to forget as quickly as possible. At any rate, from Washington’s perspective, it is hard to see how the Turkish role is any way constructive.

Lee Smith is a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute.

I suspect the difference between us is not over substance, but instead with a middle-aged Washingtonian’s understanding of the implications of being “bedfellows,” versus those of a young whippersnapper in more libertine NYC. I am so old-fashioned…

Jon Alterman is a member of MESH.

While I appreciate Jon’s effort to highlight the emerging differences between Damascus and Tehran, his comment that the two countries are “bedfellows but not soul mates” struck me as a bit off the mark. Senators John Kerry and Chuck Hagel made a more egregious mistake in the Wall Street Journal this week when they referred to Syrian-Iranian ties as a “marriage of convenience.” I am not sure where this idea came from, but it is clear that the relationship between Syria and Iran is much more than a tactical move on the part of the parties. The rationale for the ties, which date back to 1979, are bound up in geo-strategy, economics (for the Syrians, at least), and the exigencies for Syria’s ruling Alawi minority to gain and maintain some Islamic street cred.

Moreover, despite the apparent divergence between Syria and Iran on a number of issues, Damascus has no place else to go. Although the Syrians regard the recent Arab summit as a success, they remain estranged from Arab heavyweights like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. To be sure, the Qatari role in the Doha Agreement—which word in the region says came with significant financial incentives to Damascus—indicates that Syria is not totally isolated. It is important to point out, however, that Qatar’s foreign minister was coordinating with his Iranian counterpart all along the way. The Syrians may be, as some have surmised, talking to the Israelis in Ankara because they want to get out from under the Iranians and making nice with Israel is a sure-fire way of achieving that goal. While the dialogue in Turkey is positive, American policymakers should not lose sight of how troublesome the Syrians can be. Damascus has a long history of playing both sides of the fence.

All that being said, I believe the Israeli-Syrian dialogue underway in Ankara is one of the most interesting recent developments in the region. I don’t believe that an agreement is imminent, but the Turkish role is intriguing. If American strategy in the Middle East is geared toward containing Iran and if exploiting the differences between Damascus and Tehran is an important part of that plan, then Washington should be offering much more than its present tepid support for the Turkish–sponsored negotiations.

Besides Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah, Bashar al-Asad is in the thrall of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, though how long he will be the PM is the subject of another post. There is clear evidence in Damascus of Syrian-Turkish cooperation as Turkey has become one of Syria’s most important trading partners and Turkish companies help rehabilitate Syria’s crumbling infrastructure. Washington should encourage this relationship in the hope that historical Turkish-Persian mistrust and enmity will create more daylight between Damascus and Tehran.

Of course, this hoped-for gap is not going to happen overnight, but if any country can play a constructive role in this regard, it is Turkey. The Israelis have implicit trust in Erdoğan on Syria; Washington should follow Jerusalem’s lead and ride the Turks on this one as far as they can take us.

Steven A. Cook is a member of MESH.