There must be many reasons why after 9/11 so many policymakers and analysts have chosen to overlook the relationships between Islamist groups and Arab states. But it strikes me that, beside their religious orientation, this is the one common thread running through the three different categories of Islamist organizations that Tamara identifies—transnational takfiris, nationalist militants in weak states, and local groups “that eschew violence… and aspire to a political role” in relatively strong states.

For instance, in the first category, there is Al Qaeda in Iraq—allowed transit and provided with logistical assistance, at the very least, by the Syrian regime. In the second there is Hezbollah, whose relationship with Syria has already been noted, and Hamas, the chief of whose political wing is a neighbor of Bashar al-Asad. In the final group, there is Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, which also has close ties to the Hashemite Kingdom’s historical rival in Damascus.

I don’t mean to pick on the Asad family, for the fact is that all Arab regimes play the same game. From Nasser dumping relatively tame members of the Muslim Brotherhood on Saudi Arabia, to Riyadh’s own Prince Nayef whose foreign and domestic policy sends troubled Salafist youth off to die and kill Shia and Americans in Iraq: the regimes use Islamists of all stripes to create havoc abroad and destabilize rivals.

Clearly Arab rulers have a huge stake in warning us against Islamists within their own borders vying for shares of power; but insofar as their actions speak louder than words, the regimes are showing us that Islamists of all stripes really are trouble, or else they wouldn’t be so useful serving strategic interests—at the expense of someone else’s regime. So, I am not sure why Americans should be left holding the bag, trying to create a democratic process out of thin air in order to temper those who the experts in Arab politics know are least susceptible to liberal remedy.

Lee Smith is a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute.

In her discussion of local/national groups, Tamara notes, “That groups like this choose to run in elections is itself evidence of the extent to which electoral legitimacy is becoming the norm among Arab citizens.” Interesting. If this norm has been established, then this is certainly an important development. This would suggest that Arab societies and Islamist movements have embraced a core principle of democracy. Yet isn’t it equally possible that Islamist participation is the result of strategic calculation? After all, Islamists may decide to participate in elections because they perceive electoral procedures as the most efficient means of accumulating political power as opposed to say, fomenting revolution or embracing democracy.

Finally, I don’t understand the analytic connection between the existence of a strong state, a non-violent Islamist movement, and the prospects for democratization. Tamara is arguing that the chances of “democratic Islamist politics” are best among strong states in the region that manifest non-violent Islamist groups. Let’s stipulate that my friends Josh Stacher, Samer Shehata, and Marc Lynch are correct: The Muslim Brotherhood has evolved into an organization ready to play by the democratic rules of the game. So what? Given the extreme compulsion under which they live, it seems unlikely that the Brothers can have a dynamic effect on the overall authoritarian structure of the Egyptian state.

Steven A. Cook is a member of MESH.

The problem in Egypt is that the government has blocked the emergence of virtually all new political groups and parties for decades now, stunting the possible growth of groups such as the Brotherhood in the direction of greater political pragmatism. Egypt could by now have something along the lines of Morocco’s Party of Justice and Development, perhaps as an outgrowth of the Wasat movement of the 1990s. But so far the authorities and the ruling National Democratic Party believe it wiser to close off nearly all avenues for legitimate political competition.

This was clear in the 2007 constitutional amendments, which outlawed not only any political party based on religion but any political activity with any religious “frame of reference”—marja’iyyah, the exact word often used by political movements in other countries making the transition from Islamist to Muslim Democrat—as well as in the barring of Brotherhood candidates from recent elections for local councils and the upper house of parliament. The fear in Egypt at this point is not that the Brotherhood is too extreme or will become so, but rather that it is becoming too pragmatic and therefore too appealing to voters in a more open system.

Michele Dunne is a member of MESH.