Middle East Strategy at Harvard

From Robert O. Freedman

The recent exchange of five Arab terrorists for the bodies of two Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah at the start of the 2006 war was a major defeat for Israel, one that must not be repeated. While one can understand the anguish felt by the families of the captured Israeli soldiers, Ehud Goldwassser and Eldad Regev, the manner in which the exchange was negotiated and then carried out could only be described as a debacle. Indeed, one wonders if the exchange was carried out by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in yet another attempt to curry public favor as he faces mounting public pressure to step down as prime minister.

The first mistake was not ascertaining, in advance, whether the two Israeli soldiers were alive or dead. Israel did have leverage with Hezbollah on this issue. Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah had staked his reputation on freeing the notorious Lebanese terrorist Samir Quntar, and Israel could have used this fact, at a minimum, to get Red Cross representatives to visit Goldwasser and Regev, to determine if they were alive. Indeed, it is a bit incongruous that terrorists like Quntar are allowed visits by the Red cross and even by Palestinians like the mother of another imprisoned terrorist, while captive Israelis are not allowed to have such visits, so that their families do not know whether they are alive or dead.

One way to deal with this imbalance—directly linked to the case of Gilad Shalit, the prisoner held by Hamas in Gaza—is to prohibit visits to Hamas legislators and terrorists imprisoned in Israel until Shalit is allowed regular visits. Similarly, Israel could end visits to the remaining Lebanese prisoners in Israeli hands, as punishment for the callous way Hezbollah treated Regev and Goldwasser. While some on the left might decry such policies as descending to the level of the terrorists, when one is dealing with cruel organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, it is necessary to use strong tactics. Reciprocity remains the basic principle in international relations, and so long as Hamas and Hezbollah do not abide by the Geneva Convention in their dealings with Israeli prisoners, neither should Israel.

Israel’s second mistake was the release of prisoners with “blood on their hands.” All this does is encourage more kidnapping, and more terrorist attacks on Israel. A number of the prisoners released by Israel went on to carry out additional terrorist attacks against Israel, the most notorious being Abbas Alsaid, who after his 1996 release helped plan the Passover attack in Netanya in 2002 which killed 30 Israelis. Indeed Quntar himself, after the prisoner exchange, vowed to attack Israel again

Israel’s third mistake was to ignore the domestic political situation in Lebanon at the time of the prisoner exchange. While Hezbollah, as a result of the Arab-mediated political settlement between itself and the Sunni government, had strengthened its political position in Lebanon, it had been strongly criticized by both Sunni and Christian Lebanese for turning its guns on them in the mini-civil war that erupted this past spring. By agreeing to the prisoner exchange when he did, Olmert enabled Nasrallah to portray himself as the hero of all the Lebanese, by getting the Lebanese prisoners back. Indeed, the Sunni-led government had no choice but to proclaim a national holiday on the day of the prisoner release to celebrate the “liberation of prisoners from the jails of the Israeli enemy.”

Israel’s fourth, and perhaps most serious mistake, was to weaken its deterrence posture vis-à-vis Hezbollah. Hezbollah, which has proclaimed itself as the guardian of Lebanese security, thereby repudiating both international and Lebanese calls for it to disarm, has threatened to use force to regain the disputed Shebaa Farms area, which is claimed by Lebanon, but which Israel captured from Syria in 1967. After the high price paid by Israel to regain the bodies of Regev and Goldwasser, Nasrallah may well be tempted to undertake another hostage-taking raid—or worse—in order to pressure Israel to turn over the territory to Lebanon, thus once again demonstrating that he is a true Lebanese nationalist hero. The only solution for Israel at this point is for Olmert to resign, and a new Israeli government to take power, one that would take a much tougher position on prisoner exchanges and one that would restore Israel’s deterrence posture.