Comments on: No tango in Paris http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/07/no_tango_in_paris/ National Security Studies Program :: Weatherhead Center Mon, 09 Nov 2009 22:04:14 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: Itamar Rabinovich http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/07/no_tango_in_paris/comment-page-1/#comment-816 Itamar Rabinovich Tue, 22 Jul 2008 19:17:18 +0000 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/07/no_tango_in_paris/#comment-816 Asad's evasiveness is hardly surprising. For the Syrians, since the beginning of the Madrid process every aspect of normal interaction would only be conceded at a price. Handshakes, sharing a cup of coffee or a joint photo had to be extracted. This had a very negative effect on Israeli public opinion. It was difficult for Ehud Barak to mobilize Israeli opinion to support withdrawl from the Golan when Faruq al-Shara refused to shake his hand in public. The efforts invested by us Israeli negotiators and the U.S. peace team in persuading Hafez al-Asad that without public diplomacy there would not be a deal, failed. His son persists in this line and this has been exacerbated by two other facts: • Both he and Olmert, when they began this give and take (remember, this is not even a negotiation, these are proximity talks through Turkey), were interested in the process and not necessarily in the substance; both saw tactical advantages accruing to them. • Olmert is on his way out and Asad does not even try to conceal the change in attitude. At this point, Asad is the clear beneficiary. Olmert facilitated his rehabilitation and Asad gave him nothing. <i><a href="http://ksgfaculty.harvard.edu/Itamar_Rabinovich" rel="nofollow">Itamar Rabinovich</a> was Israel’s chief negotiator with Syria. He is visiting professor of public policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.</i> Asad’s evasiveness is hardly surprising. For the Syrians, since the beginning of the Madrid process every aspect of normal interaction would only be conceded at a price. Handshakes, sharing a cup of coffee or a joint photo had to be extracted. This had a very negative effect on Israeli public opinion. It was difficult for Ehud Barak to mobilize Israeli opinion to support withdrawl from the Golan when Faruq al-Shara refused to shake his hand in public. The efforts invested by us Israeli negotiators and the U.S. peace team in persuading Hafez al-Asad that without public diplomacy there would not be a deal, failed.

His son persists in this line and this has been exacerbated by two other facts:

• Both he and Olmert, when they began this give and take (remember, this is not even a negotiation, these are proximity talks through Turkey), were interested in the process and not necessarily in the substance; both saw tactical advantages accruing to them.

• Olmert is on his way out and Asad does not even try to conceal the change in attitude.

At this point, Asad is the clear beneficiary. Olmert facilitated his rehabilitation and Asad gave him nothing.

Itamar Rabinovich was Israel’s chief negotiator with Syria. He is visiting professor of public policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

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