I will only offer some complementary thoughts here, especially now that I’ve read the responses by Mssrs. Exum and Goksel, as well as the very helpful comment by the anonymous LAF officer, that I think lay at the heart of the op-ed’s weakness.

David talks about the sectarian fragility of the LAF and the political constraints on its actions. All of this, as well as the political burden of it being the “only unified national institution,” have rendered the actual functions of the Army quite diverse, even inchoate, while simultaneously constricting what it can do and placing stress on force coherence. Here one can ask what, for example, does Noe’s “forceful mediator” actually mean? I have my own ideas on that, especially since this term resembles the role that Hasan Nasrallah wishes to proscribe for the Army, as evident from both his recent speeches as well as his militia’s recent actions.

Aside from that, there are the issues of procurement and doctrine, which were indirectly raised in the other comments. First, with regards to procurement, as the LAF officer notes, what is the Lebanese Army actually capable of digesting and integrating, before we even talk about “advanced weaponry”? (To conflate that with the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament is just silly, especially given Hezbollah’s recent utterances—revealing what the less credulous among us somehow knew was the case—that its weapons are not related to the Shebaa Farms, are not a consequence of occupation, but rather are “a doctrine, a method, a way of life, a vision, a Jihad and a [religious] legal responsibility” and a proscription for Hezbollah’s vision of Lebanese society.)

Second, what is the Army’s doctrine, and what would be a realistic one for it? As the comment by the LAF officer demonstrates, it would be most fruitful for the United States to train solid officers and build a relationship and trust with the officer corps, helping them identify proper needs and formulate a realistic and effective national security strategy.

Already the United States has begun certain programs, such as this one. It has also begun training programs for the Internal Security Forces. Building their capabilities will allow them to define their role and tasks as well as those of the LAF, to Lebanon’s benefit.

Tony Badran is research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

When an army spends more than 90 percent of its budget for personnel expenses, it doesn’t have much left for anything else. The battles against Fatah al-Islam have exposed these weaknesses, and much has been done since to provide the army with its basic material needs, with the assistance provided by the United States and other friendly countries. But this still doesn’t mean it will ever be an army that David Schenker wants taking on his bad guys in internal strife, or a fully combat-ready force capable of stopping the Israeli army that Nicholas Noe hopes for, so that Hizbullah will agree to disarm.

The army is improving. With appropriate material infusion, along with strong questioning by friends, and with the essential infantry training advocated by Andrew Exum, it will continue to play the essential role of the national unity pillar. But if we keep on insisting that it should take on a full internal security role, that army will be quickly politicized and face the real risk of disintegration. Today it is the army that is called out to intervene even with minor incidents, while a 25,000-strong Internal Security Force watches.

What is first needed are the baby steps to improve the ISF performance and public credibility. This could start by teaching its personnel that merrily cruising around with their brand new U.S.-provided vehicles doesn’t mean you let go with your sirens to express your appreciation of the impeccably groomed women of Beirut or to say hello to colleagues; and that Beirut streets belong to the state and not to private security companies, building concierges and shopkeepers. People crave a serious public security service.

But there is hope. I think U.S. officials have at last recognized the dangers of pushing the army to handle internal security in such a volatile political environment. The army’s needs are now being realistically assessed while a crash program appears to be in progress to upgrade the ISF. Now, if only that program also addresses what needs to be done to make that force nationally credible…

Timur Goksel is former senior advisor of UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). He is a security consultant and teaches courses on the UN and conflict management in the Middle East at the American University of Beirut.

The LAF had been under Syrian domination from 1990 until 2005. From that date until today it had undergone only one attempt at reorganization, which was a total failure. I refer to reorganization of the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th mechanized infantry brigades, after personnel reductions due to the deactivation of conscription. Instead of merging brigades to make them larger, the planners proceeded to create what they called “light brigades,” which are not equipped with tank and artillery battalions, and which have been remarkable failures. If, during the Nahr el Bared battle, one of these light brigades had been on the front line with Fatah al-Islam, the battle would have spread from the Shekka tunnel (20 kilometers to the south) up to the Arida border post with Syria, It was the the old and established 5th, organized on the U.S. model in 1983 (with an M48A5 tank battalion and an M198-equipped artillery battalion) that confined fighting to the proximate vicinity of the “new camp.” Tanks and artillery are what stopped Fatah al-Islam.

On the other hand, we know that due to the reluctance of Gen. Michel Sleiman to engage Fatah al-Islam, and due to poor organization at the operational level of the Army, we gave Fatah al-Islam ten whole days before changing from a containment tactic to an aggressive counterattack. This counterattack too, instead of being conducted according to basic war criteria—massing necessary troops, firepower concentration and unity of command—was conducted incrementally, because of the non-existence of two major organisms in the Operations Staff: strategic assessment and tactical assessment. No commander was appointed as head of these operations until very late during the battle. The result: many mistakes, lost time, and the loss of fifty soldiers to friendly fire. The average Lebanese soldier is, in my humble opinion, a model of courage and self-sacrifice, and this was the main contributor to the Army’s success in that battle. That soldier deserves to be better commanded.

No army today can plan for its future without taking into consideration the organization of friendly armies, as well as enemy ones, and the main sources of threats it will likely have to face, as the previous posts indicate. It makes no sense that the LAF has two monstrous tank regiments, with 12 tank companies each, but only one mechanized infantry with three platoons, and with an inadequate staff for conducting operations.

If the LAF is not first helped to reorganize its Operational Headquarters system, it will not benefit from any help, whatever its nature. Until then, the LAF’s body will be unable to digest any “vitamin”—equipment, training, weapons—or profit from them optimally.

The identity of the author of this comment is known to MESH.

I was confused by Nicholas’s argument in favor of the United States providing more expensive, ‘prestige’ weapons systems to the LAF—as if what the LAF needs to be successful on the battlefield is the latest tank or aircraft. The U.S. defense industry would no doubt love the Lebanese government to invest in such programs, but the fighting which took place in and around Nahr el Bared last summer illustrated the LAF’s need for much more ‘low-tech’ training and equipment. The LAF badly needs basic light infantry equipment and a long-term advisory program to help develop the tactical skills of the LAF’s infantry units. The United States, as David points out, has been very helpful with the former, and I would like to see us more active with the latter.

I, like David, am all in favor of a more robust military partnership with the LAF. But we need to think hard about the likely missions the LAF will be called upon to execute in the near future. To my mind, threats emerging from within Lebanon—along the lines of groups like Fatah al-Islam—represent a more realistic adversary than the Israel Defense Forces. (The LAF, remember, largely avoided being drawn into the fighting between Hezbollah and the IDF in 2006.)

Besides, I do not believe Israel really fears a stronger Lebanese army—even one with advanced weapons systems. Conventional threats and armies, after all, are something Israel has grown quite comfortable in dealing with. Unconventional groups like Hezbollah are something else entirely, and I would remind Nicholas that at its heart, Hezbollah’s military wing is little more than a very good light infantry unit—not some advanced Western army fighting with the latest combined arms technology.

I applaud much of the advocacy Nicholas has performed for Lebanon—and the excellent summer exchange program he has developed for scholars interested in working on the country. All the same, I find his analysis on defense issues weak. But I would love to read his response to our criticism.

Andrew Exum is a member of MESH.