In some ways, I feel that I am poorly qualified to offer any informed comment. As a social science researcher with expired security clearances and no access to classified intelligence products, I cannot make any authoritative claim about Hezbollah’s external activities and capabilities. The best presentation I have heard on Hezbollah’s alleged external operations and capabilities was given by MESH member Matt Levitt not too long ago, and part of what made Matt’s presentation so compelling was his humility. He was up front and honest about how little we know and admitted that most of what is out there in unclassified reports is largely speculative.

That said, even if Hezbollah possesses a potent external operation, I feel attacks on Western targets outside the Middle East are highly unlikely. First, I agree with Freilich that it is significant that Hezbollah did not attack targets external to southern Lebanon and northern Israel in 2006 despite coming under direct, heavy pressure by the combined might of the Israel Defense Forces in July and August of that year. We can sit back now, in 2008, and reason that Hezbollah was never threatened existentially in 2006. But I’m not sure that’s the way it appeared to Hezbollah in the first week or so of the war—when the Israeli air force was seemingly attacking at will and a powerful ground invasion appeared likely. So if Hezbollah is not going to attack external targets when it is under attack itself, would it attack external targets in the event of an attack on Iran? Maybe, but this leads me to my second point.

As recently as January, the United States had 196,600 military personnel deployed to Iraq and surrounding countries. It had 25,700 personnel deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan. If you’re Iran, your nuclear program is attacked, and you decide to respond against the United States, why would you order terror attacks external to the region when you can simply make life miserable for the United States in Iraq? The past year and half have demonstrated that despite impressive gains in Iraq and a truly heroic effort by our soldiers and diplomats, a large portion of that country’s security environment is determined by the Iranians, who have leverage with nearly all of Iraq’s political parties and factions. If Iran desires to turn the heat up there or elsewhere in the region, it can. And punishing the United States in such a way for an attack on Iran’s nuclear program makes a lot more sense than Hezbollah-orchestrated external terror attacks.

This is also why I suspect an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program would be greeted with outrage among America’s uniformed officer corps. Although Israel cannot be expected to act in the interests of any nation but Israel, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program has the potential to erase many if not all of the hard-won gains in Iraq and to make the environment there and elsewhere in the region much more dangerous for U.S. servicemen. I am in agreement with Patrick Clawson and Mike Eisenstadt that Iran’s response to an attack on its nuclear program would largely depend on what kind of attack it was—and that there is much that we do not know about how Iran would respond given various scenarios. But as a veteran of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and with many close friends still serving in each country and elsewhere in the region, I would certainly understand why an Israeli attack on Iran would, at this moment, not be welcomed (to put it mildly) by those operating in already difficult political-military environments in Iraq and elsewhere.

Andrew Exum is a member of MESH.

1. American presidents since Carter—including G.W. Bush—have attempted to reach a bargain with Iran for nearly thirty years, and every one has failed. I don’t think there is any reason to believe the Iranians will change their minds now, when they think they’re winning the whole pot. I think Chuck agrees;

2. I do not agree that Iran is not irrational. The people at the very top of the regime are fanatics, I think they would welcome a showdown with the Satanic forces;

3. Chuck’s scenario is too static, and oddly leaves out the Iranian internal dynamics. I cannot imagine a quiescent population. Depending on how and where an attack happens, there are many different possible developments, ranging from “rallying round the mullahs” to “seizing the moment” and assaulting the regime in the major cities. I don’t think anyone can predict such things, and I don’t want to witness what actually happens. I think the regime is hollow, and that we would be much better advised to support political revolution than to expend all our energies on debating a terrible scenario.

Michael A. Ledeen is Freedom Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.