Even more than they blame the United States, Russians blame the loss of their empire on Gorbachev and Yeltsin. These two men, they believe, willingly surrendered the empire for “promises” from the West that were never fulfilled. (They overlook the fact that the West never made the “promises” to Russia that Russians think it did.) If the collapse of the empire, then, was the foolish act of “weak” leaders, then its resurrection can also be accomplished through the determined act of a strong leader. Recent events in Georgia will only confirm Russian belief that this is possible.

It would not be surprising if Moscow arranged for “patriotic forces” to invite Russian intervention in southern and eastern Ukraine, oil-rich Azerbaijan, the rest of Georgia, or elsewhere in the former Soviet Union outside the Baltic states (which are NATO members). Further, these efforts may well be successful—or at least appear to be so initially since America and the West are unlikely to go to war to protect any of these places.

But will this lead to increased Russian influence in the Middle East? At first glance, the answer may appear to be “yes.” Much of the Middle East is anti-American. Russia is anti-American. So it would appear that the Middle East would welcome the rise of Russian influence. This view, however, is mistaken. Radical Islamists who hate the United States also hate Russia. Al Qaeda has certainly not forgotten about the Chechens and other Muslims in Russia. Further, whatever differences those in the Middle East (both Muslim and non-Muslim) who fear radical Islamists have with the United States, they are well aware that Russia will neither be willing nor able to replace the U.S. as a protector.

Further, forceful efforts by Russia to rebuild the USSR will only serve to rekindle age-old fears of Russia in Turkey and Iran over Russian expansionism. Nor has the Muslim world forgotten how the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan—or how it was forced to withdraw from there. It is one thing for Russia to take over South Ossetia and Abkhazia—the equivalent of a couple of counties—where ethnic hatreds have given them allies. But can Russia win a long, drawn-out conflict in the Middle East?

Many, including some Russians, would point to Chechnya as a Russian military success story. But Russian success there is mainly due to Moscow having outsourced the war to the Kadyrov clan—former Islamist insurgents who became allies with Moscow in exchange for being allowed to do whatever they want in Chechnya except declare independence. If Moscow ever tried to replace the Kadyrovs, it is highly likely that a full-scale insurgency would quickly break out again in Chechnya.

Moscow’s action in Georgia may appear to be a victory in the short-run but prove to be a blunder in the long-run. For there are many Muslim nations in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia that might also like to secede. Moscow may see a sharp difference between those seeking to secede from Georgia on the one hand and from Russia on the other. But it is not at all clear that the peoples of the region do. If South Ossetia and Abkhazia can become independent, then why not Chechnya, Ingushetia, Tatarstan, or other Muslim regions inside Russia?

Putin’s war in Georgia may presage a new wave of Russian expansionism. But it may also trigger a new wave of ethnic conflict in the Caucasus that threatens to unravel the Russian Federation. Instead of Russia expanding into the Middle East, parts of Russia may become part of the Middle East.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.

MESH Pointer: See the earlier MESH thread, Debacle in the Caucasus, and the later posts, Putin’s war and the Middle East and Turkey’s troubles in the Caucasus.