Comments on: Turkey’s troubles in the Caucasus http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/08/turkeys_troubles_in_the_caucasus/ National Security Studies Program :: Weatherhead Center Thu, 12 Nov 2009 21:06:56 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: Malik Mufti http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/08/turkeys_troubles_in_the_caucasus/comment-page-1/#comment-1022 Malik Mufti Mon, 08 Sep 2008 15:49:44 +0000 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/?p=379#comment-1022 Michael Reynolds <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/08/turkeys_troubles_in_the_caucasus/" rel="nofollow">touches</a> on a very important point when he ascribes Turkey's ineffectual response to the crisis in the Caucasus to a deep-rooted tradition of wary isolationism. In my own research on Turkish strategic culture, I have investigated how mechanical adherence to a security paradigm centered on upholding the status quo has paralyzed Turkish policy at a time of upheaval and flux—not just in the Caucasus, but in the Balkans and the Middle East as well. However I also identified a counter-paradigm in Turkish strategic culture—manifested in the policies of Adnan Menderes and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu in the 1950s, and of Turgut Özal between 1983 and 1993—that is much more ready to exhibit the "boldness" Mike calls for. There is reason to believe that Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül incline toward this bolder counter-paradigm. During the early 1990s both men echoed Özal's evocation of Turkey's Ottoman past—and of its expansive, cosmopolitan, imperial worldview—to call for a comprehensive revision of security policy. Erdoğan, for example, was quoted as saying in 1993: "Turkey has the power to sustain an imperial vision. In fact, if Turkey wants to take its place as a prominent member of the global community in the 2000's (and it should), then it is obliged to adopt an imperial vision." (<a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=nUYfHQAACAAJ" rel="nofollow">Here</a>, p. 430.) When I interviewed Gül in November 2000, he elaborated as follows: <blockquote>There are two conceptions in Turkey. The first is an inward-looking conception that considers Turkey exclusively within its borders ... that has severed all links to its history. "Peace at Home, Peace in the World"... that might have been appropriate at a certain juncture... but not to current realpolitik conditions.... The second conception argues that there are certain realities. Turkey governed this region for so many centuries. It has great potential.... History, geography, current events, all oblige us not to ignore [what is happening with] the Turks in Russia, the Circassians, Bulgarians, even in China. I am among those who subscribe to this second conception.</blockquote> Since coming to power after winning the 2002 national elections, Erdoğan and Gül have remained embroiled in the country's intense domestic debates, particularly on secularism and the Kurdish question. They have therefore not yet been given a chance to reveal if they still intend to embark on a genuinely new course in foreign affairs. In the meantime, with Turkey's regional policy remaining on the conventional auto-pilot Mike so rightly decries, the lost opportunities and embarrassing setbacks continue to pile up. <i><a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/malik_mufti/" rel="nofollow">Malik Mufti</a> is a member of MESH.</i> Michael Reynolds touches on a very important point when he ascribes Turkey’s ineffectual response to the crisis in the Caucasus to a deep-rooted tradition of wary isolationism. In my own research on Turkish strategic culture, I have investigated how mechanical adherence to a security paradigm centered on upholding the status quo has paralyzed Turkish policy at a time of upheaval and flux—not just in the Caucasus, but in the Balkans and the Middle East as well. However I also identified a counter-paradigm in Turkish strategic culture—manifested in the policies of Adnan Menderes and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu in the 1950s, and of Turgut Özal between 1983 and 1993—that is much more ready to exhibit the “boldness” Mike calls for.

There is reason to believe that Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül incline toward this bolder counter-paradigm. During the early 1990s both men echoed Özal’s evocation of Turkey’s Ottoman past—and of its expansive, cosmopolitan, imperial worldview—to call for a comprehensive revision of security policy. Erdoğan, for example, was quoted as saying in 1993: “Turkey has the power to sustain an imperial vision. In fact, if Turkey wants to take its place as a prominent member of the global community in the 2000’s (and it should), then it is obliged to adopt an imperial vision.” (Here, p. 430.) When I interviewed Gül in November 2000, he elaborated as follows:

There are two conceptions in Turkey. The first is an inward-looking conception that considers Turkey exclusively within its borders … that has severed all links to its history. “Peace at Home, Peace in the World”… that might have been appropriate at a certain juncture… but not to current realpolitik conditions…. The second conception argues that there are certain realities. Turkey governed this region for so many centuries. It has great potential…. History, geography, current events, all oblige us not to ignore [what is happening with] the Turks in Russia, the Circassians, Bulgarians, even in China. I am among those who subscribe to this second conception.

Since coming to power after winning the 2002 national elections, Erdoğan and Gül have remained embroiled in the country’s intense domestic debates, particularly on secularism and the Kurdish question. They have therefore not yet been given a chance to reveal if they still intend to embark on a genuinely new course in foreign affairs. In the meantime, with Turkey’s regional policy remaining on the conventional auto-pilot Mike so rightly decries, the lost opportunities and embarrassing setbacks continue to pile up.

Malik Mufti is a member of MESH.

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