Iran does not wish to be an international pariah, an eventuality which fits neither its self-image as a great historical power, nor its more mundane needs as an aspiring political and economic power. Iran does care about its citizenry, and is neither a North Korea nor Saddam’s Iraq. Until now, however, it has not been called upon to pay much of a price and has thus not had sufficient reason to forgo the nuclear program, instead eating its (yellow) cake and having it too. Russia, as Freedman correctly points out, has no intention of playing ball in the Security Council, but this has nothing to do with the recent events in Georgia and has been its long-standing policy. The only way to change that might be for the United States to engage it as a legitimate partner and address its concerns and interests, rather than trying to force it to swallow totally outdated and gratuitous acts—such as NATO expansion right on its borders and an anti-missile system that might be rendered unnecessary to begin with, were the United States to bring Russia on board the anti-Iran campaign.

Notwithstanding my remarks above, it is quite possible that Iran’s strategic interests in having nukes are such that no combination of positive or negative inducements can dissuade it from its nuclear program The answer, however, to the extent that one exists, lies in extra-UN pressures, beginning with greatly heightened Western sanctions, followed by a U.S. naval blockade and—only if this fails—possible direct military action. The timeline to an Iranian nuclear capability is certainly growing shorter, and while graduated, the process will have to be relatively short: in a worst-case scenario, something on the order of a year; in a rosier one, a few years. So far the Iranian program has proven lengthier than the worst-case scenario proponents had feared, but at some point, most likely during the next administration’s first term, it will happen.

We have to be ready. The next administration should also pursue a dialogue with Iran, not because it will succeed—it will probably not—but because the serious measures that will be required will only be feasible when U.S. domestic and international opinion is convinced that all other measures have been truly exhausted.

I do not believe, as Freedman implies (possibly unintentionally), that anyone in a position of responsibility in Israel is agog at the thought of military action. Yes, Israelis probably approach it with a greater sense of resignation and willingness to contemplate the possibility, but no one in Israel is cavalier about this or deludes themselves that it will be another Osirak. It will not. As the old expression goes, nothing concentrates one’s thinking like having a loaded gun at one’s head, and this is precisely how Israel perceives an Iranian nuclear capability. That said, I believe there is a military option—one that involves fewer costs than many assume—as I explained in an earlier post.

Chuck Freilich is a member of MESH.