Middle East Strategy at Harvard

From Steven A. Cook

Politicians, journalists, academics, and other observers of foreign relations are hardly rigorous when it comes to defining “national interests.” Definitions tend to range from the tautological to something akin to Justice Potter Stuart’s, “I know it when I see it.” Too often scholars invoke interests to explain state or individual behavior without ever explaining how their claims were derived. Given how often the concept of national interest is invoked, it should not be too much to ask analysts to take some care explaining precisely what they mean.

Historical precedent is a good place to start, but it is not just a matter of declaring, “Washington has historically pursued Y policies to achieve X, therefore X must be in the interest of the United States.” Maybe; maybe not. A better, albeit not perfect, way of getting to that interest is to examine critically the relative costs Washington has been willing to bear to achieve some goal. When you apply this kind of analysis to the Middle East, it is obvious that Washington’s interests in the region are:

1. Securing the free flow of oil.
2. Ensuring Israel’s security.
3. Countering terrorism and rogue states.
4. Preventing other powers from dominating the region.

Numbers three and four could be rolled into the first two interests. After all, countering terrorism, confronting rogue states, and preventing others from dominating the region are all derivative of Washington’s core interests—oil and Israel.

It’s important to note that democracy promotion is not and never was an interest of the United States. That’s not to say that I do not support the aspirations of millions of Middle Easterners who want to live in more open and democratic societies. Rather, like the policy of supporting “authoritarian stability,” promoting democratic change in the Middle East was the means by which the Bush administration sought to secure America’s regional interests. Rather than rely on authoritarian leaders who, it is believed, contribute to an environment that breeds terrorism, the United States hoped to promote democratic politics so that angry (mostly) young men could process their grievances through democratic institutions rather than through violence.

The problem with the policy was that no one ever was able to answer how Washington could protects its interests in the short and medium terms—when transitions are fraught politically and states are unstable—until the long term when, it is believed, more appropriate democratic partners would emerge. I tried answering the question (see my 2006 essay, “The Promise of Pacts”), but no one listened.

The threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East are not terribly surprising. First, in a “Back to the Future” moment it will likely be Moscow, not Beijing, that will be a competitor for influence in the region. The semi-authoritarian or authoritarian nature of the Russian regime and its crony capitalist system fit quite well with the Middle East. Recently, Moscow sent an aircraft carrier into the Eastern Mediterranean and has begun outspending the United States on cultural and public diplomacy in important countries like Egypt. It is unlikely that Russia will supplant the United States as the preeminent power in the region, but the Arab world may soon have an alternative to play off of Washington. The best evidence of this was the prevailing positive sentiment about Moscow in the Arab press after Russia invaded Georgia last August.

Obviously, Iran’s drive for nuclear technology is a threat to a regional order that has generally been hospitable to the exercise of American power. As scary as this seems, Washington should start thinking about the day after the Iranians realize their nuclear goal and how to deter Tehran. There is very little evidence that either incentives or coercion is going to stop Iran’s efforts. Deterring Iran is a tough sell politically, especially after President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s odious remarks at the UN General Assembly, but deterrence is precisely what the Israelis are trying to achieve. We should do the same and extend our nuclear umbrella to our allies in the Middle East.

The other threat to Washington’s interests in the Middle East is Israel’s self-destructive behavior in the West Bank. The United States cannot help ensure the longevity of the Zionist project if the Israelis keep doing things that will ultimately undermine the Jewish and democratic character of Israel. It is time for the settlements to go. There is no reversing the demographic trends that will result in more Arabs between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea than Jews. As long as Israel holds on to the West Bank, it will face the existential threat of too many Palestinian babies relative to the number of Israeli Jewish babies.

Steven A. Cook made these remarks at a symposium on “After Bush: America’s Agenda in the Middle East,” convened by MESH at Harvard University on September 23.