The first 100 days (3)
Sep 17th, 2008 by MESH
The MESH roundtable on the theme of “The First 100 Days” continues. MESH members have been asked these questions: What priorities should the next administration set for immediate attention in the Middle East? What should it put (or leave) on the back burner? Is there anything a new president should do or say right out of the gate? And if a president asked you to peer into your crystal ball and predict the next Middle East crisis likely to sideswipe him, what would your prediction be?
MESH members’ answers are appearing in installments throughout the week. (Read the whole series here.) Today’s responses come from Josef Joffe, Mark N. Katz, and Walter Laqueur.
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Josef Joffe :: It was always wrong to claim that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, or even with all the Arabs, was the root of all evil in the Middle East. That clash was always one conflict among many, both within and between Arab/Muslim nations—between states and states, rulers and ruled, and sects and denominations. Since the rise of Iranian power in the aftermath of Iran’s war against Iraq (1980-88), the dominant regional conflict has again been over hegemony. Past claimants have been Egypt, Egypt-plus-Syria, and Saddam’s Iraq. Now it is Iran, pitted against the reigning hegemon, the United States, and its regional allies ranging from Israel to Saudi Arabia.
Iran’s hegemonic quest deserves the lion’s share of the next administration’s attention. The aim is to contain and deter and possibly intimidate a power that has married its revolutionary ambitions to sudden oil wealth, and which is well-advanced on the road to nuclear missile-weapons. Whatever happens in this arena will affect America’s power and interests by at least an order of magnitude more than events unfolding between Gaza and Nablus. Indeed, the so-called “core” of the Middle East conflict has shrunk pari passu with the enlargement of the Middle Eastern stage that now extends from the Levant via the Gulf to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
By itself, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has no strategic implications simply because neither side has any strategic option against the other. The Israelis cannot “destroy” Palestine, and vice versa. Over the decades, it has also become clearer that no Arab state is willing to send its boys to die for Jenin, let alone Haifa. Iran would like to acquire a strategic option against Israel, but its murderous desires have very little to do with imposing a two-state solution on Jerusalem. The point is rather to eliminate America’s most important regional pawn (well, make it “castle” and “rook”) from the chessboard. So, for the next administration, “it is the hegemony, stupid.”
Add to this a cold-eyed assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. It may well be true that neither side is interested in a two-state solution. The Israelis will not repeat the “Gaza gambit”—unconditionally vacating Hamas- or Fatah-controlled lands that are turned into a launching pad for rocket and terror attacks against Green-Line Israel. What goes for Gaza, goes triply for the West Bank. No sane government will leave the security situation between Tulkarem and Jericho in the hands of a Palestinian authority, no matter whether it is Fatah- or Hamas-dominated. There may also be a more charitable element in play here: No Palestinian authority acceptable to Israel will want to forego the protection of the Israeli army.
Are the Palestinians truly interested in their own state? An affirmative answer is hardly a given. If statehood were their main business, the Palestinians would have turned Gaza into a proto-state between 1994 (when Arafat set up shop there) and 2005 (when Sharon vacated the Strip), and into a real state after the withdrawal. Instead, the Hamas game was not state building, but a test of wills and endurance, the object being to demonstrate that the Palestinians were (a) completely immune to deterrence and (b) willing to absorb any punishment the Israelis meted out to them, whether blockades, bombs or incursions. Entities that want to become states do not behave in this self-debilitating manner. Hence, we ought to conclude that statehood (rather than, say, honor, pride or dreams of final victory) is not the primary objective of the Palestinian powers that be. Nor are two states what Israelis long for day and night.
Whence two prescriptions follow for the next administration. One, pay homage to the irradicable theory according to which Palestine is the “core” of the conflict; engage in meetings, bilaterals, conferences; be an “honest broker.” But do not confuse motion with movement, given that neither Israel nor the Palestinians are pining away for two states. Second, keep in mind what the real issue is: the hegemonic ambitions of Iran. Talk to Iran, by all means, but keep piling up the powder and protect your alliances, especially with the strongest ally of them all, Israel. And do not expect too much from talking. Iran’s is a classic revolutionary foreign policy—like that of Napoleon, Stalin/Trotsky, the Mussolinis and of course Hitler. Revolutionary regimes must be defanged or contained until the “break-up” or “mellowing” of their power; they do not lend themselves to the normal give-and-take of diplomacy. Read George F. Kennan’s “Mr. X” article; that’s the best one-sentence advice there is.
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Mark N. Katz :: In addition to the many problems in the Middle East that we already know about (Islamic extremism in several countries, the conflict in Iraq, the Iranian nuclear issue, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, etc.), it will be important for the new administration to recognize that there is a larger, overarching problem affecting the region: the fragmentation of existing states along ethnic, sectarian, and regional lines.
It is well known that Iraq has fragmented into Sunni Arab, Shi’a Arab, and Kurdish sectors. But the forces of fragmentation are also present in other countries in the region. These include Kurds in Turkey; Azeris, Kurds, Baluchis and others in Iran; Pushtuns and Baluchis in Pakistan; Pushtuns and others in Afghanistan; southerners in Yemen seeking to undo the 1990 unification of North and South; and both southerners and Darfuris in Sudan. Minority rule by Alawites in Syria is resented by the Sunni majority there, and in Lebanon there is a clash for control over the state between the Shi’a minority on the one hand and the other minorities on the other. Looked upon in this light, the ongoing tension between Israelis and Palestinians is not exceptional, but normal for the Middle East.
By ending the Sunni minority dominance in Iraq, allowing the Shi’a majority to dominate the national government, and furthering Kurdish control over the country’s north, the American-led intervention that began in 2003 has strengthened the forces of fragmentation in the Middle East. The United States, however, did not cause them to arise. Indeed, fragmentation in the Middle East is part of a larger global tide of fragmentation that began at the end of the Cold War. While successful secession or transitions from minority to majority rule were rare during the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union into fifteen different states led the way to further secessions, including the breakup of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia, and of Kosovo from Serbia. Russia has acted forcefully to secure Abkhaz and South Ossetian secession from Georgia, but is vulnerable to secessionist forces itself in the North Caucasus. Indeed, secessionist forces are active in Europe, Asia, Africa, and even the Americas.
In Europe, both democratic governments and the European Union are attempting to defuse the demand for independence by granting autonomy and providing resources that regions would not enjoy if they became independent. In the Middle East, however, where both governments and secessionist movements tend to be authoritarian, violence has so far proven to be the method preferred by both sides in these struggles.
The potential impact on the rest of the world of conflict related to fragmentation in the petroleum-rich Middle East is enormous. Nor will quelling it be easy. Even the presence of large numbers of American troops in Iraq could not prevent widespread inter-communal fighting in Iraq during the early years of the occupation (they have had more success lately). They obviously cannot do much about this problem in countries where they are not present.
What can be done? Supporting one side could well prove an opportunity for Al Qaeda and its affiliates to side with—and gain control over—the other. Promoting democracy and conflict resolution, though, will not work either if they lead to all-or-nothing referenda on secession that prompt the losing side to reject the results and continue fighting.
A solution that could work is to promote federalism as a means of giving those who support and those who oppose fragmentation part of what each wants. The deployment of peace-keeping forces may be essential for the achievement and maintenance of such solutions.
Dealing with the fragmentation of the Middle East is clearly not something that the next administration will be able to resolve within its first 100 days. Just acknowledging that fragmentation is a serious problem and beginning to seriously think about how to deal with it during this period, though, would help the next administration in formulating its overall Middle East policy.
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Walter Laqueur :: I remember countless position papers on every possible contingency written for new administrations. A few of them I wrote. I do not recall a single instance when use was made of them. New incumbents have their own agendas and limited attention span to absorb information and advice. And quite often they think they know better.
The major conflicts that seem most likely to occur are insoluble in present circumstances. There should be deterrence; the absence of deterrence invites aggression. But deterrence may not work. A change in this respect may occur but only after a major disaster has taken place affecting the major powers, when greater readiness to collaborate can be expected. This refers for instance to failed states which should be (and I think eventually will be) of equal concern to China, India and Russia. It refers to future proliferation and the use of weapons of mass destruction by states or terrorist groups. As long as they have not been used, there will not be sufficient readiness to cooperate on the international level nor sufficient understanding within societies.
With all this there ought to be intensive negotiations with friends and enemies alike. Unless this is done there will be recriminations about missed opportunities for the next hundred years. But there ought to be no illusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy in the contemporary world. The idea that the United Nations or our European allies or a new alliance of democratic states could be of great help facing a major crisis is fanciful—to put it mildly.
It will be more profitable to plan for the post-disaster age than for the very near future. However, governments are seldom willing to invest much thought in thinking how to confront threats that might (or might not) occur in a number of years. Some Russian hotheads have mentioned the possibility of war with America in a decade from now. But this should not be taken too seriously. A new period of containment will probably be necessary. But having ignored (or underrated) Russia for a long time, there is now the danger that the threat will be overrated. It is a colossus on a base of oil and gas. It will recover some of its influence in the countries that once were part of the Soviet Union (and to some extent in the former “People’s democracies”). Its moment of glory is likely to be short.
One issue which ought to have top priority is reducing the dependence on imported oil and finding new sources of energy. This is the Achilles’ heel not only of the United States but of Europe and the developing countries. Technological breakthroughs are possible provided the enormous effort needed will be undertaken. Both parties agree in principle on the necessity to do this, but will they live up to their promise? It will always be difficult to find the huge funds needed and to mobilize science and technology. But this is the only way to remedy a fatal weakness, and the beneficiaries will be not only the United States but also many other countries. If America succeeds in this huge enterprise, it will find it much easier to gain support in world affairs.