This question is salient without reference to any particular date. There was nothing special about 9/11; it was chosen because Al Qaeda had completed its operational preparations. The calendar of Osama bin Laden or of any of his associates–operatives or groups–is different, and is based upon the potential effectiveness of the attack. 9/11 took place and was planned when the Bush administration started talking about attacking Saddam’s Iraq. Bin Laden saw it as the best opportunity to drag the United States into a battlefield in the heart of the Arab world, and try to defeat or weaken American power.

Byman writes: “This is not because bin Laden lacks interest in an attack. As he knows, attacks on U.S. soil would be popular among his key constituents and would help him recruit and raise money. In addition, he genuinely believes that the United States is evil and deserves punishment.” But bin Laden does not merely seek revenge. Al Qaeda seeks symmetry with its enemies, which is easier to achieve in its own local arenas. In these arenas, Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups are very much on the march. Their popularity and ability to recruit support owe more to fighting Arab or Muslim dictatorships, than to killing American in the United States. The present priority is to shake the local regimes in the Arab world, in addition to Somalia (as well as Kenya, perhaps), Afghanistan and, in the past year, Pakistan.

Bruce Riedel ends his comment by saying: “Al Qaeda may calculate it needs to do something different this time around.” That something is most likely escalation of its efforts in the Middle East and South Asia. The United States might respond by escalating its attacks against these insurgents in return, as it recently did in Syria. But this will only add to Al Qaeda’s popularity. A more effective strategy for fighting Al Qaeda and the other Jihadis would be pushing through real changes and reforms in the Arab world, especially in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Morocco.

Reuven Paz is diirector of the Project for Research of Islamic Movements (PRISM), the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya (Israel).

First, we did see at least one and perhaps two major Al Qaeda attacks on American targets in the run up to our elections. On September 17, the U.S. embassy in San’a, Yemen was attacked by an Al Qaeda terrorist squad with the apparent goal of breaking into the Embassy and killing or capturing American diplomats. If not for the effectiveness of the local guard force, we might have witnessed a very bloody episode with significant American casualties. The Yemeni government has blamed the attack on the Al Qaeda franchise in Yemen and said some of the attackers had fought with al Qaeda in Iraq. This was the first Al Qaeda attack on an American embassy since the East Africa bombings ten years ago.

On September 20, the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad was blown up by a suicide bomber probably from either Al Qaeda or one of its local Pakistani allies. While the Marriott was a target for a number of reasons—including possibly because the terrorists thought the Pakistani president might be there that night—it is also a prominent symbol of America in the capital of Pakistan and frequently has senior American officials as guests.

So while we thankfully were spared an October attack on the U.S. homeland, Al Qaeda did attempt two very significant attacks on American targets in late September. Second, I also agree with Dan’s observation that the transition period or the early days of a new administration may be a more lucrative target for Al Qaeda. Having played the election eve message card in 2004 when it put out an Osama bin Laden message on the eve of the vote, Al Qaeda may calculate it needs to do something different this time around.

Bruce Riedel is a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.