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	<title>Comments on: Waiting for the dust to settle over Gaza</title>
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	<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/01/waiting-for-the-dust-to-settle-over-gaza/</link>
	<description>National Security Studies Program :: Weatherhead Center</description>
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		<title>By: Chuck Freilich</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/01/waiting-for-the-dust-to-settle-over-gaza/comment-page-1/#comment-1571</link>
		<dc:creator>Chuck Freilich</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Jan 2009 07:53:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/?p=496#comment-1571</guid>
		<description>I am in agreement with Alan Dowty&#039;s balanced &lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/01/waiting-for-the-dust-to-settle-over-gaza/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;analysis&lt;/a&gt;. As with everything else in the Middle East, there is no simple black or white answer to what really happened. I believe that Israel, by showing the cost of ongoing rocket fire, has restored some measure of deterrence, but given Hamas&#039;s fundamental nature as an organization, that it will be short-lived, a year or two if we are really lucky. Hamas does not care about the suffering of the Gazan population, except in a utilitarian way in as much as it reflects on its own standing. Indeed, pain and destruction are an integral part of its overall and long-term strategy. So given the heavy price, they will probably play it carefully for a limited period, waiting for the opportune timing and for memories to fade a bit, before initiating the next round.

I believe the international &quot;role&quot; in preventing smuggling is little more than a political cover that Israel needed to declare victory. The French navy will not succeed in preventing smuggling that the Israeli navy has not been able to prevent, and the tunnels will be rebuilt in short order. Even when Israel was in full control of the Philadelphi Corrdior it was unable to uncover them all, so let&#039;s be realistic, Hamas will be back in the smuggling game very soon. Actually, it already is.

There are two crucial points which were not raised in Dowty&#039;s piece or Muravchik&#039;s response: the Iranian dimension of the recent round and its impact on the future of the &quot;peace process&quot; which President Obama intends to prosecute &quot;aggressively.&quot; Operation Cast Lead is the first round with an Iranian proxy in many years that Israel can view as having been effectively waged and having ended positively--not a clear-cut victory, but a good one given the circumstances. This will give the Iranians some pause, somewhat stem the rising tide of the their successes, but will not fundamentally change the situation. They will undoubtedly draw the right (wrong) conclusions and Hamas will soon be armed with missiles capable of hitting Tel Aviv. The big issue remains the nuclear program, and this continues unabated and unaffected by the recent round.

If it was almost impossible to see how the peace process could have been promoted before recent events, the problem is even greater now and casts serious doubts on President Obama&#039;s well-meaning if presumably futile intentions. At the same time, wars and major operations do shake things up and sometimes allow for previously unattainable movement. The immediate threat to Abu Mazen&#039;s ongoing presidency (which officially ended in early January) has been removed by events, and he may be able to stick around for a while longer. As things stand today, Hamas would probably win presidential elections and the likelihood of a Netanyahu led government following the upcoming elections also does not bode well for greater flexibility on the Israeli side. So the focus should be on capacity-building in the West Bank, which is underway in recent months, and maybe on settlements. Anything beyond that is probably expecting too much.

Personally, I would like to see Israel end the embargo on Gaza; it has not succeeded and has only damaged Israel&#039;s stature. There is no point sticking to a position, justified though it may be, if it does not work and Israel will in all likelihood have to go in again in the not-distant future, at which time world opinion will remain important.

&lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/chuck_freilich/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Chuck Freilich&lt;/a&gt; is a member of MESH.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am in agreement with Alan Dowty&#8217;s balanced <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/01/waiting-for-the-dust-to-settle-over-gaza/" rel="nofollow">analysis</a>. As with everything else in the Middle East, there is no simple black or white answer to what really happened. I believe that Israel, by showing the cost of ongoing rocket fire, has restored some measure of deterrence, but given Hamas&#8217;s fundamental nature as an organization, that it will be short-lived, a year or two if we are really lucky. Hamas does not care about the suffering of the Gazan population, except in a utilitarian way in as much as it reflects on its own standing. Indeed, pain and destruction are an integral part of its overall and long-term strategy. So given the heavy price, they will probably play it carefully for a limited period, waiting for the opportune timing and for memories to fade a bit, before initiating the next round.</p>
<p>I believe the international &#8220;role&#8221; in preventing smuggling is little more than a political cover that Israel needed to declare victory. The French navy will not succeed in preventing smuggling that the Israeli navy has not been able to prevent, and the tunnels will be rebuilt in short order. Even when Israel was in full control of the Philadelphi Corrdior it was unable to uncover them all, so let&#8217;s be realistic, Hamas will be back in the smuggling game very soon. Actually, it already is.</p>
<p>There are two crucial points which were not raised in Dowty&#8217;s piece or Muravchik&#8217;s response: the Iranian dimension of the recent round and its impact on the future of the &#8220;peace process&#8221; which President Obama intends to prosecute &#8220;aggressively.&#8221; Operation Cast Lead is the first round with an Iranian proxy in many years that Israel can view as having been effectively waged and having ended positively&#8211;not a clear-cut victory, but a good one given the circumstances. This will give the Iranians some pause, somewhat stem the rising tide of the their successes, but will not fundamentally change the situation. They will undoubtedly draw the right (wrong) conclusions and Hamas will soon be armed with missiles capable of hitting Tel Aviv. The big issue remains the nuclear program, and this continues unabated and unaffected by the recent round.</p>
<p>If it was almost impossible to see how the peace process could have been promoted before recent events, the problem is even greater now and casts serious doubts on President Obama&#8217;s well-meaning if presumably futile intentions. At the same time, wars and major operations do shake things up and sometimes allow for previously unattainable movement. The immediate threat to Abu Mazen&#8217;s ongoing presidency (which officially ended in early January) has been removed by events, and he may be able to stick around for a while longer. As things stand today, Hamas would probably win presidential elections and the likelihood of a Netanyahu led government following the upcoming elections also does not bode well for greater flexibility on the Israeli side. So the focus should be on capacity-building in the West Bank, which is underway in recent months, and maybe on settlements. Anything beyond that is probably expecting too much.</p>
<p>Personally, I would like to see Israel end the embargo on Gaza; it has not succeeded and has only damaged Israel&#8217;s stature. There is no point sticking to a position, justified though it may be, if it does not work and Israel will in all likelihood have to go in again in the not-distant future, at which time world opinion will remain important.</p>
<p><i><a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/chuck_freilich/" rel="nofollow">Chuck Freilich</a> is a member of MESH.</i></p>
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		<title>By: Joshua Muravchik</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/01/waiting-for-the-dust-to-settle-over-gaza/comment-page-1/#comment-1558</link>
		<dc:creator>Joshua Muravchik</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 25 Jan 2009 01:24:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/?p=496#comment-1558</guid>
		<description>Thanks to Alan Dowty for getting the speculation ball &lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/01/waiting-for-the-dust-to-settle-over-gaza/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;rolling&lt;/a&gt;. My crystal ball is always extremely cloudy, but I am cautiously hopeful on two counts. 

If Israel has succeeded in stopping the rocket fire, then it has won. Having gone this far, Israel will have no choice but to take more drastic action—up to reoccupation—if the fire resumes. The range of the missiles grows, and the country cannot simply endure this endless barrage. Militarily, Hamas showed nothing, so I am inclined to doubt it will provoke another round.

As for the tunnels, I doubt that the smuggling will be stopped. There are simply too many players involved: Egypt, the United States, Europe. This diffusion of responsibility guarantees failure. But so what? If Hamas reloads its weapons but dares not fire them, how serious is that?

The other part of my optimism is that Hamas has been weakened. Never mind the quotes in today&#039;s dailies. Never mind the feeling of the moment. Hamas has above all one thing to offer the people: that it will fight to the end to win Palestine from river to sea. If, having brought down this much destruction, Hamas is reduced to smuggling weapons it dares not fire, then it is broken. As for overthrowing Hamas, I am not optimistic. You can&#039;t beat something with nothing. And Fatah today is next to nothing.

&lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/joshua_muravchik/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Joshua Muravchik&lt;/a&gt; is a member of MESH.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks to Alan Dowty for getting the speculation ball <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/01/waiting-for-the-dust-to-settle-over-gaza/" rel="nofollow">rolling</a>. My crystal ball is always extremely cloudy, but I am cautiously hopeful on two counts. </p>
<p>If Israel has succeeded in stopping the rocket fire, then it has won. Having gone this far, Israel will have no choice but to take more drastic action—up to reoccupation—if the fire resumes. The range of the missiles grows, and the country cannot simply endure this endless barrage. Militarily, Hamas showed nothing, so I am inclined to doubt it will provoke another round.</p>
<p>As for the tunnels, I doubt that the smuggling will be stopped. There are simply too many players involved: Egypt, the United States, Europe. This diffusion of responsibility guarantees failure. But so what? If Hamas reloads its weapons but dares not fire them, how serious is that?</p>
<p>The other part of my optimism is that Hamas has been weakened. Never mind the quotes in today&#8217;s dailies. Never mind the feeling of the moment. Hamas has above all one thing to offer the people: that it will fight to the end to win Palestine from river to sea. If, having brought down this much destruction, Hamas is reduced to smuggling weapons it dares not fire, then it is broken. As for overthrowing Hamas, I am not optimistic. You can&#8217;t beat something with nothing. And Fatah today is next to nothing.</p>
<p><i><a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/joshua_muravchik/" rel="nofollow">Joshua Muravchik</a> is a member of MESH.</i></p>
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