Middle East Strategy at Harvard

From Michael Young
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Is Iran trying to create a “Shiite crescent,” as its Arab critics insist, or is it a country merely interested in helping the oppressed in the Middle East, Sunnis and Shiites alike? That’s the question indirectly posed in this news report from Al-Jazeera in English (here, if you cannot view it above), and in many respects it’s a red herring. The truth is simpler. Iran will use all the instruments it can muster to advance its nationalist agenda in the region—Shiite solidarity in some countries, resistance to Israel or the United States in others, and popular displeasure with Arab regimes in yet others, with overlap possible in each.

Two things are interesting here. First, that Iran’s Arab rivals, realists to the bone, should tend to define Iranian behavior mainly in terms of ideology and sectarian affiliation. But that too is a red herring, because the Arab states realize that in competing with Iran, their principal comparative advantage remains Sunni sectarian mobilization. Iran, they know well, is as realist a state as any other, but one effective way of containing its power in the Middle East is to appeal to the ambient Sunni fear of a regional “Shiite threat,” no matter how vague and remote that concept may be.

A second thing interesting here is what Iran’s multi-layered ability to advance its regional interests means to the United States. There has been much talk of “engaging” Iran of late in Washington, and in and of itself that’s not necessarily a bad thing. Already, for example, this promise may have influenced the speech today of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in which he declared that Iran was prepared for a dialogue with America, provided it took place in “a fair atmosphere in which there is mutual respect.” But before we get any ideas that Ahmadinejad has truly warmed to such an opening, we might want to consider that the president felt a need to sound conciliatory because he couldn’t abandon that valuable card to his future rival in the presidential election, Muhammad Khatami.

The real question, however, is how does the United States engage Iran successfully when the Islamic Republic has proven so adept at advancing its national interests in intricate ways, and seems so much more clearheaded than the United States about the endgame? The Arabs have usually fought back by appealing to sectarian paranoia; but what can the United States do against an Iran that by all accounts is building a nuclear weapon in order to become a regional hegemon? An Iran that is indeed able to appeal to Shiites in Arab societies, perhaps most importantly in Lebanon? That can play on Arab sympathy for the Palestinians, while also influencing its allies in Iraq? And that can on occasion raise the domestic heat on American friends such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, because their societies question their legitimacy?

The simple answer is that, until now, we’re not quite sure. Amid all the talk of… well, talking to Iran, the Obama administration has yet to formulate a new and comprehensive policy toward the Islamic Republic. To talk is not a strategy; it’s just a verb. That doesn’t mean a brilliant scheme will not soon emerge from the catacombs of the National Security Council and the State Department. It doesn’t mean that Washington will inevitably be taken for a ride by the mullahs. But since we have an administration in Washington that has expressed its desire to break away from the allegedly “ideological” Bush years and return to the cooler pursuit of the national self-interest (”smart power.” as Hillary Clinton calls it), then we can probably assume that Tehran will test that ability to the limit.

The Al-Jazeera report is interesting because it limits itself to a conceptual template that the Iranians are glad to work within. For every Arab attack on the predominance of Shiite sectarian calculations in Iranian foreign policy, the Iranians can find a good refutation. The real issue is that Iran is as nationalist as any other state, and as flexible in balancing its ideological weapons with its political, financial, and military ones regionally. That will be an important lesson for the Obama administration to remember when or if it moves ahead in an exchange with Tehran. It should also provide a blueprint for how the U.S. should respond when trying to put Iran on the defensive. If Iran can play on several regional and international game boards, then Washington needs to match that. Now is Barack Obama’s opportunity to show that he has the subtlety that George W. Bush lacked.