In reading through his post, which dealt largely with security, I wanted to suggest a further question for consideration now that the provincial elections are over: Will there actually be a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as called for in Iraqi law?

Prior to the provincial elections, the short answer would have been an unqualified yes. At the time the SOFA was debated last fall, popular sentiment seemed so strongly against it that the Iraqi parliament passed it only after insisting that the public ratify the agreement by referendum prior to July 30. Grand Ayatollah Sistani gave his tacit support only after the referendum provision was included. So what has changed?

According to preliminary results coming out of Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki’s “State of Law” list seems to be dominating the provincial elections. His list has come in first in every province of the South and in Baghdad. Remarkably, in the predominantly Sunni province of Salahaddin, his list is reportedly coming in second. In Basra, where he first earned his reputation as being a man of action, Maliki’s list appears headed for an outright majority having routed the Fadila party which came in dead last with fewer votes than the Communists, according to Al-Mashriq newspaper.

Maliki’s success in these elections derives largely from the perception that he was able to deliver security to the people of Iraq while the other parties brought only sectarianism and failure. If he can now build on his success by appointing competent governors and delivering services in the provinces he should be able to extend his margin of victory in the December parliamentary elections, perhaps securing a large enough parliamentary group to govern without resort to a grand coalition. Only one thing clouds this vision: the summer referendum on the SOFA.

During the parliamentary debate last fall Maliki strongly supported the SOFA. He spoke out on television and radio and even went so far as to organize counter demonstrations to those organized by Muqtada al Sadr. In his arguments to the Iraqi people he made the case that the SOFA was the best way to “end the occupation” and argued that he had wrested a specific date out of a President who said he would never agree to one. This was politically risky in the extreme but clearly has not hurt him in these elections. He could make the case again in July but the polarization it would risk might hurt his chances in December, especially since the parties who had lost out to him in the south, including the Sadrists and ISCI, would use the SOFA as a wedge issue to eat into his base.

For this reason, Maliki may be tempted to make the argument that the provincial elections were themselves a referendum on the SOFA. And why not? His political opponents attacked him for his support of it to no avail. The other governmental parties who supported the agreement also did relatively well, including IIP which would also not likely want to face a referendum. Besides, who needs another election when you have possibly four more in the year ahead? And since the Obama Administration wants to accelerate the timetable for withdrawal in any case, why not let sleeping dogs lie? One wonders if this was not something Maliki raised with Ayatollah Sistani when he met with him yesterday.

If Maliki is considering this as a way forward he should weigh the attendant risks. One is the risk of precedent. In the disputed territories of Ninewah, Diyala, and Salahaddin provinces, the Kurdish parties that have lost out in Mosul, for instance, nonetheless claim that the voters in these towns and villages voted in clear majorities for them—a referendum, if you will, on their desire to join the Kurdish Regional Government. The precedent of ignoring the law is also not something to take lightly. If you can ignore the law on so significant a point then why obey any part of it? And then there are the Sunni provinces and their new leadership, especially those affiliated with the Haadba list in Ninewah, who may see in a decision not to hold a referendum another example of betrayal from Baghdad.

SOFAs, as Mark knows, tend to be negotiated behind closed doors for a reason, especially in the Middle East where governments are so bereft of legitimacy that they would not dare to make security agreements with the United States a subject of referenda. (Even in the United States, there are occasions when the Executive Branch deems it both unnecessary and unhelpful to submit such agreements to the Senate for the American people’s representatives’ approval.)

For this reason, the prospect of an empowered Iraqi prime minister taking his case directly to the people has immense appeal. Maliki should take the risk. If he does and wins in a straight up or down vote, his legitimacy and strength will be enhanced. The prospects of losing are, in any case, small. The vote for Maliki in these elections was because he ushered in a period of security and stability in Iraq. Iraq without a SOFA means an immediate withdrawal of American forces and risks the end of such security. No Iraqi will want to take this risk, especially if Prime Minister Maliki makes the case.

J. Scott Carpenter is a member of MESH.

Relevant checklist points include:

1. Will Maliki continue to move in the direction of constitutional change that could bring much-needed checks and balances to the 2005 constitution?

2. Will he translate his nationalist rhetoric into coalition-building with Sunnis and secularists in local council, or will he revert to cooperation with the Kurds and sectarian Shiite leaders?

3. Will the Da’wa support a nationalist candidate in the ongoing election process of the next parliamentary speaker, or will it revert to its previous alliance with the ethno-federalists in the Iraqi parliament: KDP, PUK, ISCI and the IIP?

Reidar Visser is a research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and editor of the Iraq website historiae.org.