To be sure, Turkey was hardly alone in witnessing large demonstrations of public anger leveled against Israel and those who allegedly comprise its supporting “lobbies.” Manifestations of anti-Israel and anti-Semitic animosity took place on the streets of cities throughout Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Few, if any, however, surpassed the size, determination, and passion of anti-Jewish hostility on display in Istanbul and some of Turkey’s other towns.

Moreover, these raw feelings were not confined only to organized street demonstrations but spilled over into the country’s schools, shops, work-places, newspapers and television stations, etc. In short, while Turkey was only one player in a newly globalized movement of extreme hostility focused on Israel and the Jews, the country stood out for what appeared to be an effort to stimulate and spread such aggressive feelings. None of Turkey’s Jews was physically assaulted, and its major institutions, which are heavily secured, received no damage. But many of the community’s members, finding themselves on the receiving end of such an angry onslaught, were made to feel not just uneasy but unwanted.

In seeking to account for this disturbing state of affairs, Soner Cagaptay looks away from history and towards politics. Given recent political developments in the country, he is not wrong to do so, although a truly comprehensive explanation would have to look back in time and acknowledge periods of relatively good relations between Jews and Muslims but also some extremely tense and even destructive times. There were periods when Jews suffered as the result of discriminatory government policies against minorities in general, such as the levying of special taxes on non-Muslim Turkish nationals (1942), which proved to be ruinous for many Jews. At other times, Jews have been specifically targeted as such: in earlier decades there were anti-Jewish riots in some parts of the country; and recent years have seen lethal terrorist assaults against Turkish synagogues and assassination attempts against prominent figures in the Jewish community. Despite the often heralded “tolerance” that Ottoman rulers extended to the Jews, all has not been entirely just and amicable over the generations. Had it been so, the size of Turkey’s Jewish population―once numbering perhaps 90,000 souls―would be a lot larger than the roughly 20,000 it is today.

Nevertheless, Cagaptay is correct to put the blame for the worst of today’s anti-Semitic developments on the country’s political leadership headed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s present prime minister, whose penchant for using incendiary language may have been a prod to the open release of anti-Jewish sentiments within nationalist and Islamist segments of Turkish society. When a country’s prime minister charges that “Israel’s barbarity is beyond cruelty,” that “Israel has become a country of bandits” and is guilty of “crimes against humanity,” that “Israelis” (or Jews) “know very well how to kill,” and that “sooner or later, Allah will punish [them],” his inflammatory messages will not be lost on his supporters, numbers of whom are likely to take their cue from their nation’s leader and act accordingly. Add to these pernicious charges the irresponsible accusation that Jews “control the media” and “disseminate false reports on what is happening,” and the picture, already ugly, becomes worse still.

Much of the overwrought rhetoric cited above appeared in the run-up to Turkey’s municipal elections, which have just concluded. Some commentators interpret the Turkish prime minister’s harsh words as intentionally aimed to improve his party’s chances with the electorate. (If so, the tactic seems to have failed, for the AKP fared less well in this election than in the previous one.) Others see Erdoğan’s rough treatment of Israel’s Shimon Peres at Davos as exposing more visceral, less politically calculated impulses.

Whatever his motives, Erdoğan’s encouragement of popular anti-Semitism can only damage his country internally and make it appear to be an unreliable actor on the international stage. He himself seems to have recognized as much when he belatedly issued a much-publicized statement declaring, “Those who think to act against Jews will have to face me.” This stern warning was highlighted in some of the mass media, which also registered a cautionary note about the damaging effects of popular anti-Semitism, noting that it is bad for the country and should be restrained.

No one knows for sure what lies ahead, but a couple of conclusions might be drawn from these unnerving events. One has long been known: anti-Semitism is nothing for people in positions of leadership to fool around with, for when released into society, it will have predictably toxic effects. Those on the receiving end of such venom will suffer, but in different ways, so, too, will those who use anti-Semitism for their own ends.

Pursuing a politics of anti-Israel and anti-Jewish incitement may elevate Turkey’s Islamist image in Iran and win Erdoğan favor in parts of the Arab world. But if Turkey wishes to be seen as a responsible partner among Western nations, it would do well to curb populist appeals that encourage the growth of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism within the public sphere. To do otherwise, as Soner Cagaptay persuasively argues, is to take the country down a path that it does not want to follow.

Alvin H. Rosenfeld is professor of Jewish studies and English at Indiana University.

Let us accept Cagaptay’s account of the changes in Turkey as resulting from the influence of the government. But why should a religiously-oriented party exhibit anti-Semitism? Can it really have nothing to do with the party’s raison d’etre, the advancement of Islam? Two elements deeply embedded in Islam are anti-Semitism and the insistence on domination. This is hardly news to any student of Friday sermons or Islamist pronouncements. The former characteristic is documented exhaustively in Andrew Bostom’s The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism; the latter in Bat Ye’or’s Islam and Dhimmitude and Bostom’s The Legacy of Jihad.

It should thus hardly come as a surprise that a turn toward Islam-oriented politics would lead to increased anti-Semitism and antipathy for a non-Muslim power. Cagaptay fears that we might blame, “god forbid, the Turks’ religion, Islam.” As one of the principles of Islam is that any criticism of Islam must be answered by summary execution, this is probably good advice. Even in Canada (unlike in the Netherlands), where one is not likely to be executed for criticism of Islam, such criticism easily leads to prosecution by the so-called Human Rights Commissions, and, failing that, certain accusations of “Islamophobia” and racism. Islamism in the East and political correctness in the West discourage criticism of Islam. And yet, there is a mysterious correlation between Islam and Islamism. It may be worth closer examination.

Philip Carl Salzman is a member of MESH.