Comments on: ‘The Israeli Secret Services vs. Terrorism’ http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/03/the-israeli-secret-services-and-the-struggle-against-terrorism/ National Security Studies Program :: Weatherhead Center Thu, 12 Nov 2009 21:06:56 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: Walter Laqueur http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/03/the-israeli-secret-services-and-the-struggle-against-terrorism/comment-page-1/#comment-1937 Walter Laqueur Wed, 25 Mar 2009 19:48:02 +0000 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/?p=541#comment-1937 I read Ami Pedahzur's <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/03/the-israeli-secret-services-and-the-struggle-against-terrorism/" rel="nofollow">post</a> with interest and look forward to reading his book. I agree with him that armies are not the best instrument to deal with terrorism. I also agree that it is much cheaper in every respect to negotiate with terrorists than to fight them. But it all depends on what the terrorists want and whether their demands can be satisfied at not too high a price. For this reason (and for some others), generalizations can be misleading. And it is also for this reason that Israeli successes and failures are only of limited relevance with regard to other places. "Most democracies," Pedahzur writes, "end up negotiating with terrorists on a frequent basis and cut deals with them." It happened in Northern Ireland (one hopes the arrangement will last), but there were no deals in Spain, France, Germany, Italy or other democracies. What happened (and happens) outside Europe is yet another story. Wherever overwhelming power is employed without restraints (Chechnya, Homs and Hama to give but two examples), the terrorists are defeated. But democratic countries cannot usually act this way, unless their very existence is at stake. In other words, there is one law for countries laboring under the handicap of restraints, and those (the majority) who do not. As for the latter, the rules of "asymmetric warfare" do not apply. I am willing to predict with some confidence that there is no future for terrorism in China unless central state power disintegrates. <i><a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/walter_laqueur/" rel="nofollow">Walter Laqueur</a> is a member of MESH.</i> I read Ami Pedahzur’s post with interest and look forward to reading his book. I agree with him that armies are not the best instrument to deal with terrorism. I also agree that it is much cheaper in every respect to negotiate with terrorists than to fight them. But it all depends on what the terrorists want and whether their demands can be satisfied at not too high a price.

For this reason (and for some others), generalizations can be misleading. And it is also for this reason that Israeli successes and failures are only of limited relevance with regard to other places.

“Most democracies,” Pedahzur writes, “end up negotiating with terrorists on a frequent basis and cut deals with them.” It happened in Northern Ireland (one hopes the arrangement will last), but there were no deals in Spain, France, Germany, Italy or other democracies.

What happened (and happens) outside Europe is yet another story. Wherever overwhelming power is employed without restraints (Chechnya, Homs and Hama to give but two examples), the terrorists are defeated. But democratic countries cannot usually act this way, unless their very existence is at stake. In other words, there is one law for countries laboring under the handicap of restraints, and those (the majority) who do not. As for the latter, the rules of “asymmetric warfare” do not apply. I am willing to predict with some confidence that there is no future for terrorism in China unless central state power disintegrates.

Walter Laqueur is a member of MESH.

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