<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Egypt, Iran, the United States: All politics is local</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/</link>
	<description>National Security Studies Program :: Weatherhead Center</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2009 21:06:56 -0500</lastBuildDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4</generator>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
		<item>
		<title>By: Steven A. Cook</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/comment-page-1/#comment-1999</link>
		<dc:creator>Steven A. Cook</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2009 18:23:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/?p=554#comment-1999</guid>
		<description>I agree and disagree with both Michele Dunne and Jon Alterman. It&#039;s clear that President Mubarak wants to kiss and make up with Washington, but it is not just a function of the Obama administration. Yes, Cairo&#039;s policy over the last few years was to wait out the Bush administration because, in the words of one official, &quot;anything that comes next has got to be better.&quot; But Mubarak and company&#039;s efforts to prove Egypt&#039;s strategic value span the last few years of the Bush era as well as the first few months of President Obama&#039;s term. Mubarak&#039;s seconding of King Abdallah&#039;s now famous (or infamous) Shi&#039;a crescent remark; his stand on the Lebanon war; his refusal to bow to political pressure during Israel&#039;s Gaza offensive; that senior Egyptian official stating bluntly, &quot;we want to help Washington keep the Iranians busy with themselves&quot;—all these were about placing Egypt on the right side of the regional divide, as Michele &lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;suggests&lt;/a&gt;. 

I agree with Jon&#039;s friendly &lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/#comment-1990&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;critique&lt;/a&gt; of Michele&#039;s contention that domestic political dynamics explain Mubarak&#039;s sudden activism. The elections of 2010 and 2011 are important, but they do not seem to be the primary factor driving the Egyptians.  There is something else going on here, and it is likely the Egyptian (and Saudi) mistrust of Washington&#039;s now-stated policy of engagement with Tehran. While neither Cairo nor Riyadh wants Washington to take military action against Iran (or authorize the Israelis to do so), they are also quite concerned that any American dialogue with the Islamic Republic will come at Egyptian or Saudi expense.  The Egyptians, although not as acutely paranoid as the Saudis (who worry that Washington wants to replace Riyadh with Tehran as its primary interlocutor), are nonetheless concerned that U.S.-Iran engagement will further erode Egypt&#039;s regional position. 

Mubarak&#039;s tough talk on Hezbollah and Iran is an implicit way of signaling to the Obama administration not to get too carried away with engagement, because Tehran remains a very bad actor. Whatever problems might have developed in the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship over the last eight years, the Egyptian president is reminding his American counterpart that Cairo remains critical in creating a regional environment that makes it easier for the United States to exercise its power.

&lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/steven_a_cook/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Steven A. Cook&lt;/a&gt; is a member of MESH.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree and disagree with both Michele Dunne and Jon Alterman. It&#8217;s clear that President Mubarak wants to kiss and make up with Washington, but it is not just a function of the Obama administration. Yes, Cairo&#8217;s policy over the last few years was to wait out the Bush administration because, in the words of one official, &#8220;anything that comes next has got to be better.&#8221; But Mubarak and company&#8217;s efforts to prove Egypt&#8217;s strategic value span the last few years of the Bush era as well as the first few months of President Obama&#8217;s term. Mubarak&#8217;s seconding of King Abdallah&#8217;s now famous (or infamous) Shi&#8217;a crescent remark; his stand on the Lebanon war; his refusal to bow to political pressure during Israel&#8217;s Gaza offensive; that senior Egyptian official stating bluntly, &#8220;we want to help Washington keep the Iranians busy with themselves&#8221;—all these were about placing Egypt on the right side of the regional divide, as Michele <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/" rel="nofollow">suggests</a>. </p>
<p>I agree with Jon&#8217;s friendly <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/#comment-1990" rel="nofollow">critique</a> of Michele&#8217;s contention that domestic political dynamics explain Mubarak&#8217;s sudden activism. The elections of 2010 and 2011 are important, but they do not seem to be the primary factor driving the Egyptians.  There is something else going on here, and it is likely the Egyptian (and Saudi) mistrust of Washington&#8217;s now-stated policy of engagement with Tehran. While neither Cairo nor Riyadh wants Washington to take military action against Iran (or authorize the Israelis to do so), they are also quite concerned that any American dialogue with the Islamic Republic will come at Egyptian or Saudi expense.  The Egyptians, although not as acutely paranoid as the Saudis (who worry that Washington wants to replace Riyadh with Tehran as its primary interlocutor), are nonetheless concerned that U.S.-Iran engagement will further erode Egypt&#8217;s regional position. </p>
<p>Mubarak&#8217;s tough talk on Hezbollah and Iran is an implicit way of signaling to the Obama administration not to get too carried away with engagement, because Tehran remains a very bad actor. Whatever problems might have developed in the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship over the last eight years, the Egyptian president is reminding his American counterpart that Cairo remains critical in creating a regional environment that makes it easier for the United States to exercise its power.</p>
<p><i><a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/steven_a_cook/" rel="nofollow">Steven A. Cook</a> is a member of MESH.</i></p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Michele Dunne</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/comment-page-1/#comment-1992</link>
		<dc:creator>Michele Dunne</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2009 14:23:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/?p=554#comment-1992</guid>
		<description>I agree with &lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/#comment-1990&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Jon Alterman&lt;/a&gt; that Mubarak may be using the Hezbollah threat to demonstrate Egypt&#039;s indispensability to Washington, as I indicated in my &lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;initial post&lt;/a&gt;. The further question I asked was why exactly Mubarak needs to work so hard at this now, when he already has a U.S. administration that is ready to embrace him. That is where the domestic political angle comes in. The need to secure presidential succession is now coloring many other issues, whether in domestic or foreign policy, and failing to take it into account leaves out a critical factor in understanding Egyptian actions and motivations.

&lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Michele Dunne&lt;/a&gt; is a member of MESH.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree with <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/#comment-1990" rel="nofollow">Jon Alterman</a> that Mubarak may be using the Hezbollah threat to demonstrate Egypt&#8217;s indispensability to Washington, as I indicated in my <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/" rel="nofollow">initial post</a>. The further question I asked was why exactly Mubarak needs to work so hard at this now, when he already has a U.S. administration that is ready to embrace him. That is where the domestic political angle comes in. The need to secure presidential succession is now coloring many other issues, whether in domestic or foreign policy, and failing to take it into account leaves out a critical factor in understanding Egyptian actions and motivations.</p>
<p><i><a href="" rel="nofollow">Michele Dunne</a> is a member of MESH.</i></p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Jon Alterman</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/egypt-iran-the-united-states-all-politics-is-local/comment-page-1/#comment-1990</link>
		<dc:creator>Jon Alterman</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2009 15:05:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/?p=554#comment-1990</guid>
		<description>I&#039;m not sure I agree with the domestic politics &lt;a href=&quot;&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;argument&lt;/a&gt;. Skeptical as I am of arguments that the world revolves around Washington, this gesture feels to me that it&#039;s intended for inside-the-Beltway consumption. With all of the Egyptian delegations passing through Washington in recent months, it&#039;s hard not to notice that Egypt is waging a charm offensive, perhaps to be capped with a presidential visit in the coming weeks. But charming the new administration means demonstrating Egypt&#039;s indispensability to U.S. policy in the Middle East, which has sometimes proven a harder sell. The current campaign has all the elements of such a play, a trifecta that highlights cooperation on Arab-Israeli security, counterterrorism, and curbing Iranian influence in the Middle East.

As I argued in my recent &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0409_menc.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;newsletter&lt;/a&gt;, though, the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship suffers from not having had a shared grand project at its core for some time. The current move by Egypt seems to me to be more about tactics than strategy, reinforcing a sense that this relationship isn&#039;t about anything in particular rather than vital to U.S. national security.

None of this is intended to deny the domestic upside of what the Egyptian government is doing, only to suggest that the more important audience is along the Potomac rather than along the Nile.

&lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/jon_alterman/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Jon Alterman&lt;/a&gt; is a member of MESH.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;m not sure I agree with the domestic politics <a href="" rel="nofollow">argument</a>. Skeptical as I am of arguments that the world revolves around Washington, this gesture feels to me that it&#8217;s intended for inside-the-Beltway consumption. With all of the Egyptian delegations passing through Washington in recent months, it&#8217;s hard not to notice that Egypt is waging a charm offensive, perhaps to be capped with a presidential visit in the coming weeks. But charming the new administration means demonstrating Egypt&#8217;s indispensability to U.S. policy in the Middle East, which has sometimes proven a harder sell. The current campaign has all the elements of such a play, a trifecta that highlights cooperation on Arab-Israeli security, counterterrorism, and curbing Iranian influence in the Middle East.</p>
<p>As I argued in my recent <a href="http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0409_menc.pdf" rel="nofollow">newsletter</a>, though, the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship suffers from not having had a shared grand project at its core for some time. The current move by Egypt seems to me to be more about tactics than strategy, reinforcing a sense that this relationship isn&#8217;t about anything in particular rather than vital to U.S. national security.</p>
<p>None of this is intended to deny the domestic upside of what the Egyptian government is doing, only to suggest that the more important audience is along the Potomac rather than along the Nile.</p>
<p><i><a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/members/jon_alterman/" rel="nofollow">Jon Alterman</a> is a member of MESH.</i></p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
