<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Measuring Iraq</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/measuring-iraq/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/measuring-iraq/</link>
	<description>National Security Studies Program :: Weatherhead Center</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2009 21:06:56 -0500</lastBuildDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4</generator>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
		<item>
		<title>By: Charles W. Dunne</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/measuring-iraq/comment-page-1/#comment-2023</link>
		<dc:creator>Charles W. Dunne</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2009 21:17:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/?p=565#comment-2023</guid>
		<description>My former colleague Mark Kimmitt provides a very useful &lt;a href=&quot;http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/measuring-iraq/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;overview&lt;/a&gt; of the Defense Department&#039;s latest 9010 report on Iraq, and makes a number of excellent points. The progress in Iraq, particularly on the security issue, has been extraordinary over the last two years. Iraqi optimism toward the future is on the rise. And Iraqis feel safer not only in their own neighborhoods but, generally speaking, in traveling elsewhere in the country, a very risky proposition just a few short years ago.  

Still, a number of worrisome trends that could lead Iraq in a very different direction are not fully developed in the report. I examined some of these in my recent paper &quot;Iraq Going Forward&quot; (&lt;a href=&quot;http://irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/publications/Iraq_CD_Draft_rev_04-13.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;click here&lt;/a&gt;).

While overall deaths in ethno-sectarian and terrorist violence are, blessedly, far below what they were in 2006, the trends of the last two months—not to mention the last two days, in which over 140 people &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/25/world/middleeast/25iraq.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;were killed&lt;/a&gt; by suicide attackers—suggest another possible future for Iraq: that of a weak or failed state.  The Iraqi government&#039;s continued failure to effectively integrate the Sons of Iraq militia into the Iraqi Security Forces (and trust, respect, and pay them) lies at the bottom of a significant portion of this spike in violence. This has raised once again the possibility of a resurgence of Al Qaeda and/or an active Sunni Arab insurgency. 

Likewise, the apparent inability of the Iraqi government to make progress on the pressing issues that would constitute the basis of a stable, unified state—a law on petrochemical revenue-sharing, the balance of political powers between the national government and the provinces, and resolution of territorial disputes, such as the status city of Kirkuk—may threaten Iraq&#039;s political viability. These failures could lead to a progressive weakening of the central government or, perversely, a return to authoritarianism, neither of which would bode well for the future of Iraq as a stable democracy.   

These are the issues that, I believe, will determine Iraq&#039;s direction going forward, and as such are more important than the provision of electricity, clean water, and other services that the 9010 report examines as measures of stability. Without a political framework that gives people confidence in the rule of law, economic justice, and a share in political decision-making, a sense of unity and shared national purpose will be very difficult to achieve. The lure of ethnic and sectarian politics, partially discredited in the recent election cycles, could quickly return. 

Mark makes another very important point at the end of his post: the United States must remain engaged in Iraq in order to help steer the country in the right direction and consolidate the gains Americans have paid for in blood and treasure. I couldn&#039;t agree more. Active American military and political involvement, whether in a counterterrorism or more active capacity, will need to continue for some time to come. 

I would like to caution, however, that the United States is fast losing influence within the ecosystem of Iraqi politics. While we remain very influential, the success of our own efforts to construct democratic institutions has already ceded a good deal of power to the sovereign Iraqi people themselves. Elections for a new national parliament later this year are likely to accelerate this trend. We find ourselves today in much more of an advisory capacity than we have in the past. That is good for Iraqi democracy, but it does mean we will have to find new and perhaps more creative ways to help Iraq succeed.

&lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.linkedin.com/pub/b/739/637&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Charles W. Dunne&lt;/a&gt; was adviser to the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy at the Joint Staff in the Pentagon from 2007 to 2008, and served as Director for Iraq at the National Security Council from 2005 to 2007.&lt;/i&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My former colleague Mark Kimmitt provides a very useful <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/04/measuring-iraq/" rel="nofollow">overview</a> of the Defense Department&#8217;s latest 9010 report on Iraq, and makes a number of excellent points. The progress in Iraq, particularly on the security issue, has been extraordinary over the last two years. Iraqi optimism toward the future is on the rise. And Iraqis feel safer not only in their own neighborhoods but, generally speaking, in traveling elsewhere in the country, a very risky proposition just a few short years ago.  </p>
<p>Still, a number of worrisome trends that could lead Iraq in a very different direction are not fully developed in the report. I examined some of these in my recent paper &#8220;Iraq Going Forward&#8221; (<a href="http://irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/publications/Iraq_CD_Draft_rev_04-13.pdf" rel="nofollow">click here</a>).</p>
<p>While overall deaths in ethno-sectarian and terrorist violence are, blessedly, far below what they were in 2006, the trends of the last two months—not to mention the last two days, in which over 140 people <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/25/world/middleeast/25iraq.html" rel="nofollow">were killed</a> by suicide attackers—suggest another possible future for Iraq: that of a weak or failed state.  The Iraqi government&#8217;s continued failure to effectively integrate the Sons of Iraq militia into the Iraqi Security Forces (and trust, respect, and pay them) lies at the bottom of a significant portion of this spike in violence. This has raised once again the possibility of a resurgence of Al Qaeda and/or an active Sunni Arab insurgency. </p>
<p>Likewise, the apparent inability of the Iraqi government to make progress on the pressing issues that would constitute the basis of a stable, unified state—a law on petrochemical revenue-sharing, the balance of political powers between the national government and the provinces, and resolution of territorial disputes, such as the status city of Kirkuk—may threaten Iraq&#8217;s political viability. These failures could lead to a progressive weakening of the central government or, perversely, a return to authoritarianism, neither of which would bode well for the future of Iraq as a stable democracy.   </p>
<p>These are the issues that, I believe, will determine Iraq&#8217;s direction going forward, and as such are more important than the provision of electricity, clean water, and other services that the 9010 report examines as measures of stability. Without a political framework that gives people confidence in the rule of law, economic justice, and a share in political decision-making, a sense of unity and shared national purpose will be very difficult to achieve. The lure of ethnic and sectarian politics, partially discredited in the recent election cycles, could quickly return. </p>
<p>Mark makes another very important point at the end of his post: the United States must remain engaged in Iraq in order to help steer the country in the right direction and consolidate the gains Americans have paid for in blood and treasure. I couldn&#8217;t agree more. Active American military and political involvement, whether in a counterterrorism or more active capacity, will need to continue for some time to come. </p>
<p>I would like to caution, however, that the United States is fast losing influence within the ecosystem of Iraqi politics. While we remain very influential, the success of our own efforts to construct democratic institutions has already ceded a good deal of power to the sovereign Iraqi people themselves. Elections for a new national parliament later this year are likely to accelerate this trend. We find ourselves today in much more of an advisory capacity than we have in the past. That is good for Iraqi democracy, but it does mean we will have to find new and perhaps more creative ways to help Iraq succeed.</p>
<p><i><a href="http://www.linkedin.com/pub/b/739/637" rel="nofollow">Charles W. Dunne</a> was adviser to the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy at the Joint Staff in the Pentagon from 2007 to 2008, and served as Director for Iraq at the National Security Council from 2005 to 2007.</i></p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
