But Washington would be in a much better position in negotiations with a new government in Baghdad in 2011 if the United States helps prevent the Iranian regime from dominating the political process in Iraq. To the extent there can be an “Iran-free” Government of Iraq post-2010, it may be possible to have enough U.S. forces in Iraq to preserve the gains of the counterinsurgency strategy that General Kimmitt helped to design with Generals Petraeus and Odierno. Minimizing Iran’s influence in Iraq would also help achieve our security, economic, and diplomatic interests in Iraq.

A second point at issue concerns the status of the People’s Mojahedin of Iran (PMOI), the Iranian dissidents in Iraq. Mark’s participation in the Status of Forces Agreement negotiations gives him a bird’s eye view of the PMOI situation in Iraq.

With respect to the “Protected Persons” status of the PMOI under Article 27 of the Geneva Conventions, there are two sides to the story. On one side, Tehran and its allies in the Iraqi government claim that the organization has no status, and enjoys virtually no protection since responsibility for protection of the PMOI transferred from the United States to Iraq. They seek extradition, repatriation, and forced dislocation of the PMOI.

On the other side, there are those in the Government of Iraq who believe in observing international law and international humanitarian law. They hold that Article 27 of the Convention, as Mark stated, “prevents extradition or forced repatriation to Iran as long as the United States maintains a presence in Iraq.” Mark’s view is supported by many—and certainly not all—in the Iraqi government, and many more Iraqi politicians. In an interview on May 12, 2009 with the Al-Ittihad daily of Iraq, Iraqi Vice President, Dr. Tariq al-Hashimi, stated that “Iraq must guarantee security and safety of the PMOI individuals in the context of the Fourth Geneva Convention, because we are a civilized country committed to the International Law.”

Mark is correct that if my “advice on a responsible timeline is followed, there will be no U.S. forces in Iraq after 2011 to prevent… extradition or forced repatriation [of the PMOI from Iraq].” Hence, I modify my position and agree with Mark that “We need to remain in Iraq well beyond 2011 for a host of vital national interests—security, economic and diplomatic interests as a minimum—and any ‘responsible troop drawdown’ should be adjusted accordingly.”

Raymond Tanter is a member of MESH.

Ray correctly notes that the next 19 months will be critical as the combat brigades withdraw and are replaced by a transitional force of 30,000-50,000 forces to train, advise, protect and conduct counter-terrorism operations. However, we should not forget that the transitional force will only remain for another 12 months when, according to the Status of Forces Agreement, all U.S. troops will be withdrawn. This key point—the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011—should be renegotiated with the Iraqi authorities after the new government is seated in 2010. We need to remain in Iraq well beyond 2011 for a host of vital national interests—security, economic and diplomatic interests as a minimum—and any “responsible troop drawdown” should be adjusted accordingly. Anything other than that can hardly qualify as “responsible.”

Regarding his second point on the protection of the “Iranian dissidents,” otherwise known as the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK) or the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI), it would appear that their future is fixed. As someone who participated in the protracted Status of Forces Agreement negotiations, I would take issue with his point that the MEK enjoys “protected persons” status under Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and U.S. forces are required to “continue such protection… so long as the American military is present and combat operations are ongoing.” In fact, Article 27 only prevents extradition or forced repatriation to Iran as long as the United States maintains a presence in Iraq. Security for the protected persons can transfer to the sovereign Government of Iraq, as long as the proscription against extradition or forced repatriation is observed. And, if Ray’s advice on a responsible timeline is followed, there will be no U.S. forces in Iraq after 2011 to prevent their extradition or forced repatriation.

Hardly responsible.

Mark T. Kimmitt is a member of MESH.