Middle East Strategy at Harvard

From Alan Dowty

The meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu has triggered a stampede of soothsayers. Every aspect of their encounter is scrutinized for clues to their personal chemistry and, by extension, the future course of U.S.-Israeli relations. But these relations are rooted in forces more fundamental than personalities, intriguing as these two iconic figures may be.

Predictably, the meeting produced no crisis and no breakthrough. It marked the beginning of a new phase in the relationship, one that will take time to play out. Two clocks have been started: one marks the passage of time before Iran unveils its first nuclear weapon, and the other measures progress in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations before the next explosion on that front. Indications are that Netanyahu has succeeded in gaining priority for the first clock, not because of any cleverness on his part but because of the simple fact the Iranian issue has a time-urgency that, in Samuel Johnson’s words, “doth wonderfully concentrate the mind.”

The Israeli estimate of the Iranian nuclear timeline was revealed two weeks ago by Gen. Michael Herzog, chief of staff to the defense minister, speaking at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (surely the timing was not accidental). The estimate is that Iran now has about 1,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium, which is about two-thirds of what would be needed for a first nuclear explosive, following further enrichment to bomb-grade level. There are various opinions about how long this further enrichment would take, and presumably it could not be done in the Natanz enrichment facility without attracting the notice of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Israel, according to Herzog, disagrees with the U.S. assessment that Iran has suspended weaponization efforts for now. Consequently, he projects completion of the first Iranian nuclear device by late 2010 or early 2011.

The dominant view in Israel, clearly shared by Netanyahu and all elements of the current government, is that an Iranian bomb would be an existential threat to Israel and accordingly must be prevented by all possible means. Diplomacy and sanctions would be preferred if they work, and U.S. military action would be preferable to an Israeli military operation. But there is readiness for Israeli action as a last resort, the main hesitation being its military feasibility. There is recognition that such an attack would exact a high price in Iranian retaliation on a number of fronts, and that it would at best delay the Iranian program by a few years, but that it might still be a necessary choice. A delay of a few years proved to be enough in the Iraqi case.

This is the message that Netanyahu undoubtedly delivered in Washington, but it is the same message that any Israeli Prime Minister would have delivered, whatever the “personal chemistry” of the interlocutors. Israel will allow time for the new U.S. approach, of diplomacy combined with (intensified) sanctions, to be tried, in hopes of avoiding harder choices. To give this approach the best chance of success, any Israeli government will try to make a last-resort attack look as inevitable as possible, whatever its ultimate intentions. This is reflected in the series of signals sent by the Israeli government before Netanyahu assumed office: air exercises in the Mediterranean, attacks in Syria and Sudan, requests for particularly relevant munitions.

Netanyahu obviously pressed for a deadline in the diplomatic channel. Obama’s public response was to reject the idea of a precise deadline, but to indicate that there should be a clear sense of success or failure by the end of the year. The clock will probably run, then, until sometime in mid-2010. By this time it will be clear whether Iran’s enrichment program has been contained, and in particular whether any of the low-enriched uranium has been upgraded or not (one possible outcome is that Iran would remain in possession of low-enriched uranium, which is not illegal in itself and which fits the Iranian fiction that it is destined for use as fuel). If there is evidence of production of high-enriched uranium or active weaponization efforts, there would still be time before the first usable device could be tested. And, as it happens, the Israeli Iron Dome missile defense, against short-range rockets, is also scheduled for first deployment in mid-2010.

This, and not the Palestinian issue, is the more likely source of crisis in the U.S.-Israel relationship. It appears extremely unlikely that the United States would use military force, at least within this time frame—although recent statements by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and President Shimon Peres, minimizing the likelihood of Israeli action, seem to be part of an effort to encourage U.S. action. It is also clear from recent statements by Vice President Joseph Biden and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that the United States currently opposes Israeli action. As in the 1981 bombing of the Iraqi reactor, an Israeli attack would probably evoke condemnation from all sides, including the United States, even though many would privately welcome the action—even more than in 1981.

The Palestinian clock, on the other hand, moves at a less harried pace and is much less likely to rock U.S.-Israeli relations. The Palestinian question, after all, has been “urgent” for decades. The central reality is that there is no Palestinian partner able and willing to conclude and implement a two-state solution in both the West Bank and Gaza. It is doubtful that the Palestinian Authority (PA) could even implement an agreement limited to the West Bank.

Once again, the fact that Israel is represented by Netanyahu is less critical than imagined. Even a left-wing Israeli government, continuously chanting the mantra of a two-state solution, would not be able under current conditions to achieve a final settlement, despite hyperactive support from the United States and moderate Arab regimes. Thus negotiators during the post-Annapolis round of talks floated the novel notion of a “shelf agreement” that would be negotiated then but implemented only at an undetermined future date.

Netanyahu’s visit was marked by much unintentional comedy over the question of whether or not he would utter the two magic syllables “two-state.” But clearly he will not speak these words and upset many members of his own Likud party, when there is no serious negotiation in the offing and thus nothing to be gained. On the other hand, it is clear that an overwhelming majority of Israelis are willing to accept a two-state solution in principle: 74 percent in one poll, 78 percent in another. Even the platform of Likud in the recent election did not explicitly reject—nor endorse—the two-state formula, while Likud’s right-wing governing partner, Yisrael Beitenu, not only leaves room for a Palestinian state but would even add Arab-inhabited areas of Israel proper to it. In fact only two small parties on the right, which between them won a total of seven seats, explicitly rejected the idea of a Palestinian state.

If a two-state solution becomes a realistic possibility at any point, any Israeli government will either sit at the table or be replaced. For that matter, during his first term of office Netanyahu himself negotiated the Hebron and Wye agreements in the framework of the Oslo process, which was clearly (if not explicitly) premised on creation of a Palestinian state. As Netanyahu said in his joint press conference Monday, if satisfactory conditions for Palestinian self-government could be worked out, “the terminology will take care of itself.”

The major source of friction on the Palestinian track is likely to be the issue of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, to which Obama added a new emphasis in his own remarks. The issue of a freeze on settlements could become contentious, given that Israeli governments have frozen the creation of new settlements but not the expansion of existing ones. Pressure to freeze all settlement growth would add a new dimension to the latent U.S.-Israeli disagreement (going back to 1967) on this issue.

In the meantime, is it possible that frustration over lack of progress toward two states will generate emergence of a “three-state” solution? Given the deadlock between Hamas and Fatah in talks to reunify Palestinian territories, will there be a move to focus on nation-building in the West Bank with the prospect of a settlement limited to that area? Is this any less realistic than other options on the table? Time will tell.