Prof. Mandelbaum’s examination of the Cuban, Chinese, and Russian analogies casts doubt on the prospects for U.S.-Iran engagement. Further doubt is raised by an examination of the extensive record of such engagement already logged by U.S. administrations since 1979. Every U.S. president has reached out to the Iranian regime, to no avail.

This outreach has failed, in my view, not because of insufficient U.S. effort; to take one example, the Clinton administration made nearly one dozen unilateral concessions despite receiving no reciprocation from the government of Mohammad Khatami. Nor is it, as is often claimed, due to historical grievances or mistrust. In response to President Obama’s Nowruz message to Iran, Majles Speaker Ali Larijani scoffed, stating that the U.S.-Iran dispute was not an “emotional issue” that could be solved with “fine words.” The frequent citation of these two explanations for the lack of progress in U.S.-Iran relations reflects a certain solipsism—a belief that Iranian policy is a function of U.S. policy, and that changes to U.S. policy would therefore bring corresponding changes by Iran.

In fact, at the heart of the U.S.-Iran dispute are divergent interests. Tehran does not desire reconciliation with the United States. There are two reasons for this, both of which stem from the fact that the Iranian regime values its own survival above all. First, anti-Americanism is a pillar of the Revolution, and any acknowledgment by Iran’s rulers that one facet of Revolutionary ideology is anachronistic risks challenging the entire system. Second, as Prof. Mandelbaum notes, autocratic regimes such as Iran’s thrive on closure and are threatened by openness.

While the regime may not desire reconciliation with the United States, it does desire talks with the United States. For Tehran, these talks are not a means to an end, but an end in themselves. They confer upon the regime a greater legitimacy and prestige than they would otherwise enjoy, and bolster Iran’s hegemonic aspirations. Talks carry other benefits for the regime, and dangers for the United States; they risk disheartening advocates of reform in Iran and U.S. allies in the region, they may convey weakness to Iran’s leaders and embolden rather than temper their nuclear ambitions, and, most practically, may give the regime the time it needs to perfect its nuclear capabilities.

Put together, this paints a rather bleak picture for engagement: poor prospects for success, and significant risks to even trying. Yet every U.S. president has tried, for a simple reason: the alternatives are grim. Faced with the possibilities of a nuclear-armed Iran or a war with Iran, it is tempting to grasp at even the smallest chance of success in negotiations. This leads me to the conclusion that the Obama administration’s efforts must be concentrated on increasing that chance of success. Doing this will require pressure, and lots of it, in order to convince Iran’s rulers that a negotiated agreement, despite the threat it poses to the regime, will be less costly than either the status quo or further progress down the nuclear weapons path. War and peace in the Middle East hang on this simple geopolitical arithmetic.

Michael Singh is an associate fellow of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former senior director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council.

When it comes to Iran, it is my view that few if any historical cases of U.S. engagement or non-engagement with ideological hostile regimes offer us much insight. Iran is in many ways sui generis. Its decision system is a black box for the most part, even to those who study the regime most closely. It may well be that the Iranian regime, modeled as it seems to be on a clutch of Shi’a clerics discussing theological and other issues (I wish I knew more Safavid history), could not take “yes” for an answer even if its inner, closeted majority wanted to. It is very hard for U.S. decisionmakers to dope out a sequence of events that may issue from a U.S. initiative to engage, because we do not have a very good grasp of what Imam Khamenei thinks or how his relations with other senior clerics affect the decision process as a whole.

It’s not just a problem with a person or an inner sanctum of decisionmakers, either. In this case, I think it is even harder for us to anticipate where an initiative would end up because the strategic cultures of our two countries are substantially different. The streamlined historical narratives we all carry around in our heads, and which we use to assess the potential actions of others, are shaped by certain assumptions about human nature and history itself. If a person grows up believing that we are all conceived in sin and must rely on the strict religious instruction given by those who understand sacred texts in order to guide us away from our natural dispositions, his or her way of understanding history is going to differ from that of a person who believes that people are born free to construct their moral personalities in a world that is full of hope and possibility. Without belaboring the point, which some will accept and others reject (foolishly), most senior American decisionmakers know little of of how Iranian Shi’a clerics see the world. We had a vastly better idea of how an assortment of Communists did.

So in fact we don’t know if the Iranian leadership will read American actions as an indication of weakness, as some fear. Or whether they will view it as an act attempting to establish symbolic equality, the prerequisite in Arabo-Muslim culture for serious dealing. Or whether they will interpret it as a discrete act, or only in the context of what the United States does varyingly in the region and the world (very likely). We can, if we try hard, know a lot more about likelihoods in this regard, but we are unlikely ever to be sure how the Iranians are reading our intent. And that, of course, makes all the difference when it comes to judging if, and more important maybe, how, to pursue “engagement.” I think the Cuban, Chinese, Russian and, just by the way, the apartheid South African cases, have little of certain value to teach us in this case, but plenty of potential to mislead.

All that said, I would make only three other brief points about the Iranian “engagement” debate. First, just as the Bush administration wanted to be the un-Clinton, the Obama administration wants to be the un-Bush. This is silly but politically natural, and it happens all the time. In this case, it adds a certain carrying-capacity globally since, rightly or wrongly, the Bush foreign policy is marked low by most national elites. So here is a case where “change” buys the administration some chits and perhaps prolongs its honeymoon. This is regardless of the actual efficacy of any initiative, of course.

Second, any such engagement initiative will cause laundry problems among several of our Sunni Arab associates. It already has, and that’s why Secretary Gates went to the region carrying the diplomatic equivalent of “fresh wipes.” They don’t believe him, and they don’t trust the new President. So while an engagement initiative might or might not yield benefits, it will certainly exact some costs (which, however, can sometimes themselves be put to good uses).

And third, for all I know (and I don’t know), Obama administration principals are pretty damned determined to take a hard line on Iranian proliferation dangers, up to and including using force if the Iranians cross the red-line, which I would define as actually moving to a test. If so, they may read the timeline in such a way as to move them to show the world —the so-called non-existent international community—that they have done all they could, gone the extra mile, done the multilateralist drill, and been oh so slow to anger, before they lower the boom on the mullahs. They may think, too, that all this “optical” preparation work will deter the Israelis from acting prematurely on their own, but that depends on what gets said in private on this score, and I am not privy to it. In my case, then, not only do I strain to imagine what the Iranians may understand by an American engagement initiative, I am not even sure what my own government intends by it.

Adam Garfinkle is a member of MESH.