The Holocaust was an unprecedented disaster and remains a trauma, but it is no analogy for Iran and the bomb.

On June 7, 1981, the day of the Israeli attack against Iraq’s Osirak reactor (Operation Opera), we were invited to tea in a garden in Zahala north of Tel Aviv. My neighbor at the table—a major figure in the defense establishment, though at that time he was a mere member of the Knesset—was smoking more than usual, and looked at his watch every five minutes. From which I drew the conclusion that he knew something I did not.

Only the next day we knew. The New York Times wrote editorially that the Israeli attack was “an act of inexcusable and short-sighted aggression,” and other comment was in a similar vein: Israel had to be punished for a blatant breach of international law. But Israel was forgiven and hardly punished.

It is seldom remembered that most leading figures of the Israeli defense establishment and Intelligence (except the air force) were against the action at the time. Menachem Begin was suspected of pressing for it for party political reasons, what with a general election coming up soon after. These suspicions were unjust; it was a gamble, but it succeeded.

But what was gained in a perspective of almost thirty years? It certainly added greatly to Israel’s military prestige, but would the general situation in the Middle East today be radically different if Operation Opera had failed or if it had not taken place in the first place? I do not think so. According to all we know with the benefit of hindsight, Saddam would not have been able to produce nuclear bombs within the foreseeable future, and if he had, he would not have dared to use them against enemies capable of retaliating massively.

In any case, there is no analogy with the present situation. True, there would not be deep and prolonged mourning all over the world if Israel managed to damage or even destroy the Iranian capacity to produce nuclear bombs. But Israel is not in a position to stem the global wave of proliferation; facilities that were destroyed can be rebuilt relatively quickly, and nuclear bombs in the contemporary world can be stolen or bought.

I am not altogether pessimistic concerning effective international countermeasures against weapons of mass destruction. But this will probably happen only after the first (or second) conflict in which such weapons have been used.

Will deterrence work against Iran? One should not rule it out. Iranian intentions concerning Israel are known, but its leaders do not wish to pay too high a price, such as losing the means to achieve their main ambition of becoming the predominant power in the Middle East, or perhaps endangering their very existence. True, clients could be used in offensive actions, hoping that the hand of Iran would not be easily detected. But this may not work, and in any case, it may mean losing control in a very dangerous game.

Deterrence as far as Israel is concerned would mean strengthening its defensive (anti-missile) and offensive capacity. It would mean, most painful for many, a fundamental reorientation of Israeli foreign policy as practiced since 1967.

There is fog of war and an even more impenetrable fog in pre-war situations. Decisions may have to be taken, but there are no certainties concerning enemy intentions, about the capacity of one’s own side and the opposing. In such situations, analogies are of very limited help, because each situation is essentially unique and unprecedented.

Walter Laqueur is a member of MESH.