The moment of maximum danger
May 11th, 2009 by MESH
From Stephen Peter Rosen
The prospect of being hanged, we are told, wonderfully concentrates the mind, but on what? The prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon now concentrates our attention on the possibility of Israeli preventive military action or on American sanctions, both of which might prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. These are important policy options, but concentrating on them diverts us from what may be the moment of maximum danger, which will take place one or two years after Iran tests a nuclear weapon.
I am assuming that Iran will openly test its weapon, for the psychological impact the test will have, both in Iran and abroad. Given the uncertainties that other nations have about the ability of Iran successfully to construct a workable weapon on the Chinese/Pakistani model, only a successful test will yield the political benefits for which Iran has paid so heavily. Iran may test the weapon above ground, to minimize the chances that preparations for the test are detected, and to achieve the maximum visual impact, something the regime has sought and exaggerated in its ballistic missile test program. On current projections, this test could come in 2010 or 2011.
After the test, what will Iran do? It is noteworthy that many new nuclear powers (but not India) have offered nuclear weapons technology, not the bomb itself, to allies and clients. The technology is valuable, and easily transmitted covertly, for money or for diplomatic influence. Iran may not make explicit nuclear threats. It is hard to find any new nuclear power that has done so. But Iran is likely to feel more secure against American and Israeli military action on Iran in retaliation for Iranian actions short of nuclear weapons use, because it will in fact be riskier to proceed with such retaliation once Iran has the bomb.
Iran’s friends will also be emboldened. Hezbollah and Hamas may feel that Iran is better able to protect them against Israeli or American military action once Iran has a nuclear arsenal. The hard core of the Revolutionary Guards and their counterparts in Hezbollah will feel free to pursue a more aggressive agenda against Israel by military but non-nuclear means, once Iran has nuclear weapons. Iran may warn Israel that attacks by her on Lebanon or Gaza would be “dangerous.” Another Lebanon war or more attacks from Gaza are hardly unlikely under such circumstances. If so challenged, Israel will call Iran’s bluff, and use all the non-nuclear force at its disposal against targets in Lebanon or Gaza.
In that case, will Iran sit by and do nothing? At moments of intense non-nuclear crisis, facing defeat or political reverses, the United States, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, and even Israel have taken actions designed to convince foreign observers that they were getting their nuclear weapons ready to use, in order to persuade foreigners to be more cooperative. It is not necessary to attribute any eccentricity to the leadership of Iran in order to suggest that they, too, may seek to avoid the defeat of their allies in an intense crisis by increasing the readiness of their nuclear weapons. Seeing Iranian preparations for nuclear weapons use, what will Israel do?
In other words, it is not an Iranian nuclear bolt out of the blue that will be the problem, but Iranian-Israeli interaction in an intense crisis in which Israel sees Iranian nuclear forces becoming more ready for action, and in which Iran fears Israeli pre-emption. That will be the moment of maximum danger.
Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.
5 Responses to “The moment of maximum danger”
I am largely in agreement with Steve Rosen. The “bolt out of the blue” scenario is probably not the most likely one for the emergence of a concrete Iranian nuclear threat. Iran is certainly extremist, but does appear to be fundamentally rational in its behavior, in terms of an ability to weigh costs and benefits in a calculating manner. Since Israel is thought to be a nuclear power in its own right, it is hard to imagine that Iran would be willing to undergo the devastation of its own cities in an Israeli counterstrike. I have no doubt that Iran would be more than willing to pay a heavy price for the “divine joy” of Israel’s destruction. After all, it lost over 400,000 people in the war with Iraq during the 1980s. A “Tehran for Tel Aviv” exchange “alone,” however, would lead to the death of 10 million Iranians.
The Iranian threat is thus not likely to prove truly “existential” for Israel, but there is no doubt that it is a grave one in a variety of less than fully existential scenarios. And because there is absolutely no room for error when one’s national existence is at stake, Israel does have to treat it as if it is an existential threat and prepare accordingly. There do appear to be elements of irrationality in Iranian policy towards the United States and especially Israel, and since the Islamic regime does have “God on its side,” we cannot be confident that it will indeed behave as other countries do.
As Rosen correctly points out, however, the far greater threat, in terms of likelihood, is in the far greater ability to project influence that a nuclear capability would provide Iran, and the prospect that both Iran and its regional allies, Hezbollah, Hamas and Syria, would be emboldened to act in far more aggressive ways. Even if Iran does not adopt an open declaratory posture, or adopts just a “Japanese model,” this would undoubtedly have a major impact on Israel’s thinking in crisis situations and potential responses. I am not so sure that Israel, or any country facing a nuclear threat, would act so quickly to “call Iran’s bluff.” The minute nukes are invoked, even in a veiled and implicit manner, it is a new ballgame, an existential one, in which different rules apply.
I am also not confident that Iran will conduct a nuclear test to demonstrate its capability, and I believe that it may adopt a more ambiguous posture. Even an implicit hint would provide Iran with most of the domestic support and legitimization that the regime seeks, as well as the deterrent value vis-à-vis the United States, Israel and the Sunni states. While there may initially be some skepticism regarding Iran’s capabilities, and clearly not all of its claims regarding its missile and satellite capabilities have been fully substantiated, no one would wish to put a nuclear claim to the test, and any reasons for skepticism would presumably dissipate within a relatively short period of time.
The danger that Iran would engage in nuclear proliferation, whether of technology or even an entire bomb, however, is indeed a source of great concern. Though unlikely, one cannot dismiss the possibility of Iran proliferating capabilities to Hezbollah (or even less likely to Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad) for purposes of nuclear terrorism. While these groups are presumably fundamentally deterrable, because they would stand to lose a great deal, a true nightmare scenario is of Iran proliferating nuclear capabilities to Al Qaeda. Though no love is lost between Shi’ite Iran and the Sunni Al Qaeda, both share a similar “affection” for Israel, the United States and the West. It is not inconceivable that they could make common cause in this regard.
A nuclear Iran thus remains an unacceptable prospect. Engagement, combined with a concrete prospect of severe sanctions, is by far the preferable option. Iran, like other countries, will respond best to a combination of carrots and sticks, and engagement must therefore be backed up by the certainty that Iran will pay a heavy price. Iran, however, is deeply committed to its nuclear program, and it is unlikely that any combination of carrots and sticks will suffice to change its strategic calculus. Moreover, Iran will undoubtedly use the talks as a means for playing for further time, so any engagement must carry a clear deadline.
In addition to the alternative option of a direct military strike, it is also worth considering the option of a naval blockade. Given Iran’s total dependence on its exports of oil, a blockade would bring the Iranian economy to its knees, and may ultimately prove to be the only means of putting an end to the nuclear program, short of actual military action. Iran, again a basically rational actor, is unlikely to respond against the United States in a significant manner. It may have to fire a few shots in response, or undertake some terrorist act, to make it look good, but Iran will not wish to engage in a real “shooting war” with the United States.
Chuck Freilich is a member of MESH.
Chuck Freilich makes two points with which it is difficult to disagree, but I will try.
• First, engagement plus strict sanctions, including a naval blockade, should be seriously considered.
• Second, an overt Iranian nuclear weapons test will create problems for Iran, so Iranian leaders might wish simply to hint that they could have a bomb if they needed it, like the Japanese.
I have for some time been puzzled by the second idea. Whatever else we may argue about, surely we can agree that the Iranians are not the Japanese. Iran is not a wealthy, old, stable, pacific country protected by the world’s only superpower, with a desire to have a nuclear hedge against the day they might be foresaken. Iran has a massive demographic bulge of youths aged 10-20, hungry for instant gratification. Iran is led by men who have subordinated the economic welfare of their subjects to a policy of confrontation and support of insurgencies, and who have a deep and conflicted attitude toward western technology, which they alternately disdain and covet. They are more like Khrushchev—who felt he had to display massive missiles and super bombs to redress the technological inferiority he felt the Soviet Union had—than the Japanese. The temptation will be strong to display the fact that they have equaled the west in the only area where they worry that the west is their better.
The two points are not unrelated. I am curious whether one thinks strict sanctions plus a naval blockade increase or decrease the incentives Iran would have to test a nuclear weapon. To me, an executed blockade seems to make a test more likely, since it is the prospect of a blockade that may be part of what deters the test. So for me, the blockade should be prepared along with actions to be taken in the event of a nuclear test.
Stephen Peter Rosen is a member of MESH.
In order to avoid an unending escalatory cycle with a distinguished colleague, with whom I am basically in agreement, I will make one more comment, but then allow Steve Rosen to achieve “escalation dominance” by having the last word.
I most certainly did not wish to indicate any similarity between Iran and Japan for all of the reasons Rosen notes. I meant merely to suggest that like the Japanese, they might wish to remain a “turn of the screwdriver” away from an explicit capability. I believe that the most likely outcome is that Iran will indeed adopt an explicit nuclear posture, most likely without testing, but the “Japanese model” remains a possibility nonetheless.
I certainly agree that a blockade would be an appropriate response in the event of an Iranian nuclear test, but again wish to cast doubt on whether Iran will indeed decide to test. Even in the context of a “provoked test,” following imposition of an embargo, an Iranian act of this sort would simply serve to prove what the United States and others have charged from the beginning, that Iran has indeed pursued a military nuclear program, despite all of its protestations to the contrary. If Iran were to act in such an audacious and provocative manner, I believe that most Western allies would have little choice but to fully support the American move, even if some would accuse the United States of having provoked the crisis unnecessarily.
In any event, the option of a naval blockade is one which I do not raise l lightly. It will undoubtedly create a host of problematic responses and should only be pursued if and when a combined “engagement and sticks” approach has failed. It would, however, likely be the only truly effective option short of direct military action and is thus worthy of consideration, in order to assess the various possible consequences.
Chuck Freilich is a member of MESH.
Chuck Freilich’s arguments are reasonable, and he may be right. I very much doubt that there will be either an air strike on Iran or a blockade, so the appropriate response then is to ask, “if Iran does not test, what have we learned about the character of its regime?” Basically, if Chuck is right and I am wrong, the Iranian government will have shown itself to be more sensitive to international sentiment, the welfare of its people, and its long-term interests than I think it is. This will be very good news, and we can proceed to work with Iran, not as a friendly power, but as one that may increase the stability of the region. If Iran does test, I think, as I first argued, that we will then face very serious problems of intra-war crisis stability between Israel and Iran.
Stephen Peter Rosen is a member of MESH.
The assumption of stable nuclear deterrence between Israel and Iran is questionable before both states acquire second strike capabilities. As Albert Wohlstetter noted fifty years ago in “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” securing second-strike capabilities to ensure a modicum of stability is an ongoing expensive process which is dependent upon geographical, technical, doctrinal and political parameters. Assuming Iranian rationality and reasonable sensitivity to cost is simply not enough. Moreover, it is not clear the opaque Israeli posture is sufficient for creating stable nuclear deterrence. Jerusalem will have to augment its launching capabilities and take additional steps to protect its nuclear force.
Therefore, Stephen Peter Rosen has every reason to be concerned about a nuclear exchange in the immediate period after Iran goes nuclear. I am not sure that an Iranian nuclear test will make a difference for Jerusalem, although I believe that Iran follows the North Korean path and will not hesitate to publicly go nuclear. After all, by that stage the despised and decadent West will have shown its impotency to prevent a nuclear Iran.
Even if a nuclear Islamic Iran will show restraint versus Israel, conditions will change in the case of a successful counter-revolution. Under such circumstances, the fanatics who can push the button may decide to go down in a grandiose way, taking with them parts of the abysmally hated Jewish state.
What worries me most in the debate over a nuclear Iran is the preoccupation with Israel, rather than with America and its national interests. A nuclear Iran will unquestionably become a stronger and more assertive international player, with a greater ability to project force. Since the use of force is part and parcel of the Middle Eastern rules of the game, a nuclear Iran will wield more fear over its neighbors. Fear is one of the best political currencies in the greater Middle East, as political leaders share a realpolitik approach to international affairs and constantly engage in a power calculus.
In most cases, the states of the Middle East will probably not try to create a counter-alliance to balance Iranian power, but will bandwagon. Such a posture might prevent a feared outright Iranian military aggression in the short term.
Under these circumstances, the United States might offer a nuclear umbrella (extended deterrence) to its current pro-Western allies in order to keep them within its orbit and to prevent the bandwagon effect. This is unlikely to be effective. The French rationale for going for an independent force de frappe, which essentially questioned the credibility of American nuclear assurances in the 1960s, will prevail. The levels of suspicion toward Westerners in the Arab world are not conducive to believing American promises.
Therefore, a nuclear Iran will bring about the collapse of Western influence in the greater Middle East. Countries geographically closer to Iran will feel a stronger Iranian influence. Such a process will be reinforced by the Shi’ite identity present in several neighboring political entities, such as Bahrain, Iraq and Azerbaijan. The eastern province of Saudi Arabia, rich in oil, is also predominantly Shi’ite, which means that this region will be susceptible to Iranian influence.
The Iranian national strategy will focus on control over energy resources, which dovetails with the apparent Russian strategy. “Finlandizing” energy-producing countries could be a first step in Iran’s denial of Western access to energy resources, or alternatively bringing about much higher prices for this strategic commodity. Iran’s geographic location along the Persian Gulf as well as along the Caspian Sea will facilitate its control over the energy ellipse. A nuclear Iran will intensify its efforts to politically penetrate Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, both Muslim states rich in energy resources and adjacent to Iran. These states might decide to ask for protection from Russia, their neighbor and former ruler. In any case, it is unlikely they will preserve their pro-Western orientation for long.
Another foreign policy thrust of a nuclear Iran concerns important Middle Eastern regional actors that compete over influence in the region: Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. In contrast to the Jewish stat—that has to be delegitimized, isolated and eventually annihilated—the other regional powers have to be changed from within. We have recently already seen Iranian attempts (via Hezbollah) to destabilize the Mubarak regime in Egypt. A nuclear Iran will be much more aggressive in helping radical Islamists take over Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
A nuclear Iran will be less intimidated to conduct terrorist activities directly or via proxies such as Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamist organizations (Hamas and Islamic Jihad). This will result in a greater frequency of terrorist attacks against Western targets, particularly in the Middle East. Iran may even transfer nuclear technology and/or fissile materials to actors wanting to harm the US above all.
In the long run, the major actors of the region, if not overrun by Islamists with links to Iran, will attempt to acquire similar capabilities, to prevent nuclear blackmail. This is particularly true of Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East will constitute a strategic nightmare not only for the natives, but also for Europe and the United States as well.
Unfortunately, the foreign policy of the current U.S. administration is characterized by unfounded optimism and naiveté. This is bad news for the world.
Efraim Inbar is director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University in Israel.