Israel should hand off Palestinians
Jul 1st, 2009 by MESH
Israel America Academic Exchange (IAAE) is a new organization that sponsors educational missions to Israel for American scholars in the fields of political science, international relations, international law, international economic development, modern history, and Middle East studies. By special arrangement, participants in the inaugural mission (June 22-29) have been invited to guest-post their impressions and assessments. Michael Barnett is Harold Stassen Professor of International Affairs in the Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Policy at the University of Minnesota.
From Michael Barnett
Prior to the trip, I was of the opinion (1) that it is increasingly unlikely that there will be a negotiated two-state solution, and (2) that in the remote chance that the parties do negotiate a settlement, it will lead not to peace but rather to a new phase of the conflict. I believed that the trends were moving in the wrong direction, but I hoped that the trip would alleviate my fears. Although we did not meet a representative sample of Palestinians or Israelis, I came away from my encounters more fearful and anxious than ever before.
The prospects for a negotiated solution appear dim, at best. I see little ground for optimism from the Israeli side. Although Israelis insist that they will always try to negotiate, even the most hopeful of them express little hope. The Israelis seem convinced that they have offered the Palestinians nearly everything they have demanded, but that the Palestinians still prefer to fight it out. Perhaps they do. (Or perhaps Israel has still not offered the best deal possible. In every negotiation, Israel has always claimed that it could do no more, yet it always had more to give: Israeli offers have inched closer to the Palestinian ideal point from Oslo to Camp David to Taba to the purported plan of then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.) Israelis also seem convinced that these failed negotiations represented nothing short of a “test” of the Palestinians’ sincerity regarding the possibility of a peaceful settlement. And Israel’s unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza have not brought peace, but rather allowed their enemies to get closer to Israel’s population centers.
Moreover, and in contrast to my previous trips, I was struck by the near absence of any kind of Israeli sympathy for the Palestinians. Whereas a decade ago I heard Israelis speaking about the rights of Palestinians, the need for justice, and a genuine sympathy for their plight and suffering, this time any sort of compassion was overwhelmed by sheer frustration. Why should the Israelis continue to feel badly for the Palestinians when the Palestinians do not seem prepared to do anything to help themselves?
Because Israelis do not believe that a negotiated two-state solution is likely (though a majority continue to support the idea), they identified a mish-mash of “Plan Bs.” In nearly all cases, though, these contingency plans appears to be a jumble of inconsistencies and logical contradictions: withdrawing alongside occupying, disengaging while engaging, believing that developing the Palestinian economy is the ticket to success despite evidence to the contrary, putting their faith in a wall when Gaza tells them that good fences don’t do much good. The only thing that the Israelis seem to agree upon is that they would like to be rid of the Palestinians.
What about the Palestinians? The Palestinian representatives are certainly more polished than ever. But it was not clear what the Palestinians would accept (or, rather, what the Palestinian leadership would try to sell to their public) short of their maximum demands. I left convinced that while Israel may not have offered the Palestinians the best deal imaginable, the Palestinians might not accept even that. There are lots of explanations for why the Palestinians seem incapable of saying “yes, but,” including principled beliefs, domestic politics, and a lack of Arab support. Perhaps the Palestinian “no” is overdetermined. However, I was impressed by the Palestinian failure to imagine the conditions under which they might accept less than they demand.
Assuming that the Israelis and the Palestinians will not be able to negotiate a two-state solution, and assuming that, as one Israeli negotiator aptly said, the longer we negotiate the more “complex” the situation becomes, what should be done? Until this trip, I supported the idea of an imposed solution, putting a deal on the table (Taba-plus) and telling the parties that they will be rewarded if they accept it and punished if they do not. Some Israelis suggested that the leaders would never be able to reach an agreement on their own and that the Americans would have to apply considerable pressure on both parties. I agree that American pressure will be necessary, but I do not think that American pressure, no matter how intense, can move both parties to peace. Assuming that an imposed solution ever was a viable option, I am not sure it is anymore.
Instead, I think the Israelis should follow the British colonial strategy: withdraw and hand off the problem to the United Nations. The Israeli situation appears eerily like the one confronted by the British mandatory authorities after the Second World War. In 1947, following decades of trying and failing to find a compromise between Jews and Arabs, the British announced their imminent withdrawal and informed the UN that Palestine was now its problem. Israel might do the same. It could tell the UN that it will be “consolidating” its settlements and retreating behind the separation wall (declaring it an armistice line and not a legal border). The Israelis also could announce that they are prepared to internationalize Jerusalem once the security situation has stabilized. In short, rather than another unilateral withdrawal, the Israelis might consider working closely and coordinating with the UN.
At this point, it would be up to the UN Security Council to decide how it wanted to proceed. Ideally, the United States would lead the Security Council to authorize a Chapter VII operation, working closely with the Palestinian Authority (thus giving the moderates considerable legitimacy), replacing the Israelis forces as they withdrew from the territories, and deploying to Gaza if and when the situation became less violent. The international authority would have to be ready, willing, and able to use force if and when necessary, and it also should come bearing a significant aid package. This “strategy” has its various problems, but at least it gives the parties something to look forward to besides mutual suicide.
Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.
3 Responses to “Israel should hand off Palestinians”
Posts+Comments
Posts+Comments
Posts+Comments
Posts+Comments
Check upcoming events from the calendars of...
Michael Barnett is right in pointing out that the two-state paradigm cannot solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because the two sides cannot reach an acceptable compromise. Without saying so explicitly, he realizes that this paradigm lost its appeal in part because the Palestinians have not been capable state-builders. Probably, this is why he suggests that the UN become the de facto ruler of the areas now in the hands of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and under Israeli military control.
This suggestion shows the great gulf between diagnosis and prognosis that even respected political scientists have problems bridging. The UN is a morally bankrupt institution with automatic majorities for the most ridiculous preferences of dictatorial Third World states. Moreover, for decades the UN has shown an entrenched anti-Israel bias, singling out Israel for every type of abuse. It was the UN that declared Zionism, the Jewish national movement, to be racist, and it is the UN that hosts anti-Semitic Durban-type conferences that annually adopt hundreds of anti-Israeli resolutions.
Finally, the UN is hardly an effective organization that can issue credible security assurances. The UN peacekeeping record is very flawed. In the Arab-Israeli arena, the UN forces have played a particularly dysfunctional role. Will they fight Hamas? The recommendation to place the security of Israelis in the hands of the blue helmets vastly overestimates what the UN can do, and shows disregard for the welfare of Israelis who face Palestinian hatred and terrorism.
Moreover, the belief that a UN trusteeship would bring law and order, prosperity, and political stability to the Palestinians is divorced from Middle East realities. The Palestinians are beleaguered by problems similar to those that haunt other Arab societies, such as in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Somalia. The UN is hardly the remedy for the emerging failed states in the Arab world. Neither UN administrators nor generous outside funding can save the Palestinians from their problems.
This is probably the main reason for the Israeli desire to disengage from most of Judea and Samaria, but if the choice is between the status quo and a UN-controlled PA, a huge majority of the Israelis, including most of the Israeli Left, will prefer the uncertainties of the current predicament to the certainty of a deterioration in the security situation under a UN mantle.
Efraim Inbar is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.
Efraim Inbar’s comment nicely identifies the current dilemmas that Israel faces. It wants out but cannot get a deal to its liking from the Palestinians. It recognizes that the longer it stays, the more complex and volatile the situation becomes. It knows that every day it gets closer to the moment when the non-Jewish population is either a majority or close enough that it will ask for citizenship and thus end the idea of Israel as either a Jewish or a democratic state. So, what is the preference? Drift. Although Inbar prefers the “status quo,” the problem with such terms is that they mask the very real changes that are taking place under the surface and the movement toward a very different future.
The UN is no sure thing, but neither is it the complete mess Inbar suggests it is. The UN as a whole would not be involved. Instead, this would be run by the UN Security Council, which has responsibility for peace and security. And, there are now a multitude of different force arrangements, including UN deputizing of other military forces while providing civilian staff (because UN staff know a lot about transitions, a whole lot more than Americans). Would the transition be potentially violent, disruptive, and bloody? Any force would have to prepare for these possibilities. Would it be as bloody as the civil war we see between Hamas and Gaza or Israel’s shelling of Gaza and other parts of the region? I honestly don’t know. Instead of speaking as if we know categorically what the future will bring, and setting up one alternative to a doomsday scenario, we need to think in terms of probabilities and a range of possible outcomes. Does anyone really believe that the future is going to get better?
Michael Barnett is Harold Stassen Professor of International Affairs in the Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Policy at the University of Minnesota.
Michael Barnett rightly observes the enormous obstacles to arriving at an Israeli-Palestinian peace, but the emphasis on the UN as arbiter and enforcer unfortunately reflects a weakness altogether too common in liberal internationalist and constructivist thinking. As Efraim Inbar has already noted, this is done without reference to the grave weaknesses of the UN as an institution. This is not only a matter of systematic bias against Israel, but of the intrinsic weakness of the UN itself, its lack of authority, and its dangerous incapacity in regard to enforcement.
These weaknesses are evident not just on the politically fraught Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but recently in the case of North Korea. The much-touted UNSC Resolution 1874 calls for member states to inspect North Korean ships thought to be carrying banned weapons exports, but with the almost surreal caveat that this action be “with the consent of the flag state”—i.e., North Korea itself.
Robert J. Lieber is professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown University.