If this is understood to mean that Kahn thought that the idea of the United States starting a nuclear war was a serious option, or something he would advise, it is a misunderstanding of Kahn’s views. He thought very well about the unthinkable, and understood very well the inevitable uncertainty of such thinking. He would never have had enough certainty about his calculations to recommend starting a nuclear war.

Dowty’s description of Kahn’s position on nuclear deterrence is only partly correct. First, Kahn regarded deterrence as an unreliable but probably necessary way to protect ourselves. Second, Kahn thought that one could not understand an enemy’s deterrence calculation without considering what might happen if he actually started such a war, because that is what he might think about were he in a desperate situation. Third, Kahn thought that it would be better if nuclear war could be avoided without the United States having to face the possibility of being hit by many hundreds of large nuclear weapons.

“War fighting” was something you had to think about in order to avoid vulnerabilities that might tempt an enemy in a crisis; and because an enemy might start a war; and because a war might be started by accident. It was not something you thought about because the United States would ever want to initiate a nuclear war.

Max Singer was a founder with Herman Kahn of Hudson Institute in 1961 and its president until 1973.