The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran are two of the trickiest countries with which the United States now has to deal. I’ll begin by covering two commonly discussed points of comparison and then turn to what I think are as important, the differences, before concluding with a brief look at Sino-Iranian relations and a question for U.S. policy makers. As a preview, I will argue that Iran and China, notwithstanding their distinctive strategic approaches and very different levels of power, have overlapping interests and are likely increasingly to cooperate in ways that create challenges for the United States. This is because China is seeking to expand its “international mobilization capacity” and Iran is disposed to work with external actors to enhance its perceived strength.

Perhaps the most obvious point of comparison between China and Iran is that both are revolutionary regimes, although one is Shi’ite and the other began as Maoist and remains nominally Communist. A classical political science approach would suggest that we examine the two from a generational perspective. Iran, therefore, would be in the same category of “revolutionary regime” as China, but just behind the PRC, or, if you will, younger in terms of its stage in a revolutionary regime cycle, only having emerged or been born in 1979. In China’s case, there was huge tumult, from the end of the Civil War in 1949 through the Korean War and Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution, before Deng initiated the Reform and Opening period and welcomed trade and investment from the West. If the revolutionary regime perspective were illuminating, then, we could expect a kind of “calming down” effect, as a young Iranian revolutionary regime transitions into a more bureaucratized adolescence or even middle age.

This is connected with another common line of comparison that argues that in both the case of China and the case of Iran, engagement is the wisest course for the United States. Through engagement, it is argued, we can hasten the day when both powers act as “responsible stakeholders,” socializing the regimes through our interactions with them.

Would it be best for us to engage? Is Iran’s period of “calming down” just around the corner? Both perspectives are problematic. At the very least, proceeding on either basis should be done with an understanding of the very real, important differences between the Iranian and Chinese strategic traditions, and between the current geopolitical positions of Iran and China.

The differences between the Chinese and Iranian strategic traditions flow from the internal logics of their respective regimes—internal logics that seem to have staying power. To be sure, the leaders of both states share an overriding concern with domestic stability and the maintenance of their own authority. Both traditions also feature classic texts—the Sunzi Bingfa and other texts dating back to the Warring States period in China’s case, and medieval mirrors for princes in the Iranian case—that prescribe indirect approaches to conflict. These texts and the strategic traditions they reflect place a common emphasis on information, managing perceptions, and deception. Finally, both the Chinese and Iranian regimes may be characterized as legitimacy-deficient by comparison with Western liberal representative governments.

Nonetheless, important differences should not be overlooked. China’s strategic tradition is based on the perspectives of Daoism, bureaucratic Confucianism, the Mandate of Heaven, and Marxism, all of which point to a need to monitor global trends and try to be in synch with them. What stage of history are we in? or what is the trend of the time? The tradition teaches that when a regime appears to be out of step, seizing the initiative and acting boldly at such a decisive moment can not only head off disaster but guarantee victory. Therefore, China has often seen fit to initiate war, typically through surprise attacks. The Harvard political scientist Iain Johnston has pointed out that given China’s place in the international system, the PRC was especially likely to be involved in militarized interstate disputes in the latter half of the twentieth century. So there is an element of insecurity that leads China to be war-prone from our point of view. But, at the same time, compared with Iran, China has more ingrained institutions or trust among elites. A set of families qualified by wealth or scholarship or local status in a particular region form a fairly stable class of power-brokers invested in the maintenance of the current regime.

By comparison, the Iranian strategic outlook looks at once more mistrustful and more superstitious, and this inclines Tehran to rely on third-party actors or proxy forces to implement its strategic agenda. Like China’s, this agenda is founded on the need for regime survival, but what is interesting is what is considered necessary to ensure the regime and the measures that are deemed appropriate to take to that end.

Reflect briefly on recent Iranian history. Regimes came and went with some alacrity in the last century, and outside powers had a hand in their rise and fall. For instance, Reza Khan, the Shah’s father, ascended quickly but was then pushed aside by the British, who backed his son, the Shah, before he was overthrown by his own prime minister, Mossadegh. And then we played a role in ousting Mossadegh, only for our choice to be overthrown by Khomeini, in part, it was argued, because we failed to show enough support for him.

Iran’s salient historical experiences center on intervention by other powers and the upheaval that this has provoked—not only in recent decades but also longer ago, from the conquests by Arab and Turkic tribes to wars with Europeans and Russians in the 18th and 19th centuries. Of course, other countries have suffered external intervention in their internal affairs (as the Chinese would say), and been subject to Western colonialism. But in Iran’s case, these experiences proved especially resonant because they overlay much deeper, older Zoroastrian Persian and Shiite traditions of crediting unseen forces with agency and efficacy in earthly political matters.

Iran has its own history of not only blaming outside powers but also of entrusting proxies, or third-party forces, and working through them to achieve strategic aims. The regime can take credit, and benefit from plausible deniability in the event of failure, if enemies are attacked by third-party groups. And operating this way makes sense in light of the generally paranoid state of the leadership. Why are the leaders chronically concerned? It’s not just because some unseen celestial force could act to eliminate them. But, to modify the old saying, even paranoids have earthly enemies. In all the above cases of regime change with foreign involvement, local actors conspired or cooperated with the external powers. There is a chronic domestic loyalty problem in Iran.

Why might this be the case? As the economist Homa Katouzian has pointed out, Iran does not have a tradition of the rule of law or of any other stable institutional infrastructure within which stable classes are formed and individuals can engage in repeated interactions that create reputations, which require maintenance, so that honesty is rewarded. Therefore, alliances and power are fragile. Infighting prevails, as was demonstrated in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, and it is no accident that in Iranian literature, one’s closest relatives can cause the most damage through their betrayals. Accordingly, the tradition prescribes deception, the magnification of capabilities to create an appearance of strength, while preempting conspiracies and operating through third parties wherever possible. The expectation that others will deceive and conspire, meanwhile, reinforces the belief that political ascendancy is very fragile.

Given the relative fragility and insecurity of the Iranian regime, perhaps the most important China-Iran question for American policy makers to consider is how Iran figures in China’s calculus. Beijing, as a measurer of trends and an aspirant to superpower status, would like to improve what it calls its “international mobilization capacity,” according to the writings of senior Chinese Communist Party intellectuals. Given energy considerations, the Middle East is a region in which China has been seeking increased influence. The PRC has a history of supplying arms (missiles) and other kinds of technology to both Saudi Arabia and Iran, a way of improving ties, even rendering these states dependent on relations with China, which, in turn, depends on their energy supplies. The logic of my argument is that China might also aid Iran with its internal security. All of which suggests a final question for consideration: If we already speculate that nuclear weapons will embolden Iran and increase its coercive power, what ought we to expect from a nuclear Iran in receipt of Chinese aid and support?

Jacqueline Newmyer delivered these remarks at a symposium on “Iran: Threat, Challenge, or Opportunity?” convened by MESH at Harvard University on April 30.

As someone who normally focuses on the Middle East, why would I spend time thinking about China? The reason is simple: It is hard to imagine a future in the Middle East in which China does not play a more substantial role.

The Middle East emerged as a U.S. bailiwick in the early Cold War, and after the fall of the Soviet Union, no extra-regional state has thought to challenge U.S. preeminence. European nations have acquiesced to the U.S. lead, in part because they recognize that they cannot secure their interests in the ways that the United States does.

China, however, has felt less of a burden to comply with U.S. wishes, and the government often sees a range of reasons to depart from the U.S. script. Far more than the United States, China is dependent on Middle Eastern oil. More than 50 percent of China’s imported oil comes from the Middle East, versus some 25 percent in the United States. Further, China’s oil needs are growing, while U.S. oil consumption has flattened. China’s strategic thinkers see the country’s continued reliance on Middle Eastern oil to be a strategic liability, not only because the Middle East itself is an unstable region, but also because they have little faith in their own ability to secure the sea lanes needed to transport the oil in the event of tensions with the United States.

As China looks to U.S. management of the Middle East, the country’s leaders grow concerned. The Iraq war and continued sparring with Iran have heightened tensions in the Gulf and helped drive up oil prices around the world. China is largely indifferent to issues of domestic governance among its trading partners, and it appreciates their indifference when it comes to internal conditions in China. China judges that whomever is in power in these countries will sell them oil, and they need not be concerned beyond that. After decades as an avowedly revolutionary power, China has become an intensely status quo power, and Chinese see the United States as tilting the world dangerously toward instability. The notion of spurring internal change in hostile countries such as Iran, or even in friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia, is anathema.

For all of its skepticism toward U.S. actions in the region, however, China is not indifferent to the U.S. lead. Indeed, the Sino-American relationship is the premier strategic question in China, and there is great sensitivity to the possibility of alienating the United States in a region that is clearly of strategic importance to both countries.

Up to now, China and its Asian neighbors have been the beneficiaries of U.S. efforts to secure the Gulf and its rich oil supplies. The United States has supplied the troops and the ships, and the Chinese have bought the oil. Some estimates price U.S. expenditures to secure Gulf oil at more than $30 billion per year—and that was before the military campaign in Iraq. The United States has borne those costs as part of its efforts to build global security.

Critics charge that China has been content to be something less than a full partner on Gulf security, entering into deals for Iranian oil and gas in the face of U.S. efforts to isolate the Iranians. While China certainly thinks that efforts at isolation are unwise, it has often yielded to strong U.S. protests (prolonging negotiations with U.S. adversaries rather than walking away from the negotiating table). Such strong U.S. demands have also prompted China to trim its weapons sales to Iran. Similarly, China has gone along with U.N. Security Council efforts to try to persuade Iran to be more transparent about its nuclear program, although it has often been reluctant to impose additional sanctions and has counseled much more patience. This is not a hopeless case.

Cooperation up to now has been incremental. Now, it is in the interests of both China and the United States that it become more systematic. The CSIS Middle East Program has just issued a book, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States and the Middle East (purchase here; free download here) that explores these questions more deeply. (John W. Garver and I are co-authors.) The bottom line is this: The United States and China share a wide range of interests in the Middle East, and efforts by either the United States, China or Middle Eastern countries to freeze out any of the others will surely lead to all parties emerging as losers. Small steps toward burden-sharing—cooperation on naval measures in the Gulf, such as ship identification protocols and disaster response coordination—can help steer China’s deepening interest in the Middle East in a positive direction. More robust diplomatic coordination can go a long way as well. There is an opportunity here, and the alternative to success is not a happy one.

The Chinese national oil company Sinopec has signed a contract to develop Iran’s Yadavaran oil field, according to articles in today’s Financial Times and International Herald Tribune. From Iran’s point of view, the deal is a triumph. It exposes the inability of the United States to build a global coalition to impose economic sanctions on Iran.

By the terms of the contract, Sinopec will have to subcontract with Iranian firms, which will as a consequence, at least in theory, acquire much-needed expertise. But the PRC’s record in Africa and other areas of overseas investment suggests that the Chinese will be quicker to use Iranian firms for manual labor than for sophisticated processes that would involve technology transfer.

From China’s point of view, the award constitutes another step in Beijing’s effort to secure energy supplies from the ground up, supplies that the PRC is acquiring the means to protect en route to the mainland through its program of military modernization. The contract may also be seen as progress in China’s campaign to secure influence in the Middle East at the expense of the United States. The deal, coming on the heels of last week’s NIE downplaying the imminence of an Iranian nuclear weapon (see Steve Rosen’s post on the subject), promises to complicate U.S. efforts to secure Chinese support for economic sanctions should evidence emerge that the Iranians have re-started their weapons program.

Issues left outstanding in this initial contract need to be resolved, including the distribution of oil recovered in the second phase of production. The relationship between the Iranians and the Chinese could sour as Sinopec enters into development of Yadavaran. But at this point, the thought is small comfort.