In October, Lebanon was elected to one of ten non-permanent member seats on the United Nations Security Council. Come January 2010, Lebanon will assume Asia’s “Arab League” seat, replacing Libya for a two-year term on the critical international body.

The UNSC seat was the brainchild of Lebanon’s president Michel Suleiman, who used his 2008 UN General Assembly address and his side meetings during the 2009 gathering to press Lebanon’s candidacy. The notion of a seat on the council reportedly appealed to Suleiman, who prides himself on returning Lebanon to the “international political arena.”

Washington quietly opposed Lebanon’s candidacy. Senior administration officials were concerned about potential problems for the bilateral relationship that could arise from Lebanon’s voting decisions. While the pro-West March 14 coalition won the June 2009 elections, it was clear—even prior to the formation of the government in November—that Hezbollah and its local and international allies Syria and Iran would exert preponderant influence within the new government and the state’s foreign policy. Indeed, in the current government as with the previous one, Hezbollah—via its subsidiary Shiite party, Amal—controls the foreign ministry.

It’s not difficult to envision the kind of problems that will ensue. In the coming year, for example, it is all but assured that a resolution to implement “crippling sanctions” against Iran will come before the Security Council. Given Hezbollah’s influence—and the ever present threat of violence—the best Washington could hope for during a UNSC vote would be a Lebanese abstention. More likely, under pressure from Syria and Iran, Lebanon might vote against such a resolution.

Worse still, if history is any indication, Lebanon’s ambassador to the UN, Nawaf Salam—who himself is sympathetic to March 14—could be ordered to abstain or oppose Security Council resolutions in connection to UNSCRs 1701 and 1559, if not the Hariri tribunal, which Hezbollah and its allies do not support.

An article from the Lebanese opposition daily Al-Akhbar published on November 17 hinted that a resurgent Damascus—whose influence in Lebanon, according to Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa, is stronger now than it was when it maintained troops in the country—would try to take advantage of Lebanon’s seat to promote its own interests in the Security Council. Here’s a translation of the short article:

On the sidelines of the summit that brought together the Lebanese President Michel Suleiman and Syrian President Bashar Assad in Damascus, Assad’s political and media advisor Buthaina Shaaban agreed with the delegation accompanying Suleiman to raise the level of coordination between Lebanon and Syria’s mission to the United Nation in New York, and that Syria will increase the number of its representatives (at the UN mission) to coincide with the Lebanese increase that came after Lebanon was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

So in addition to flexing its muscle in Beirut, according to Al-Akhbar, Damascus is looking to control Lebanon’s UN mission more closely.

Given the potential pitfalls, Washington discouraged the government of Lebanon from moving forward, and reportedly even asked Riyadh to forward Saudi Arabia’s candidacy instead. Saudi Arabia wouldn’t bite, and Lebanon wouldn’t back down. So in January, Beirut will take its seat on the UNSC, a position that not only promises to annoy the administration and Congress—which has to sign off on the significant aid packages to Beirut—but also to be yet another source of increased tensions at home.

Despite the inherent problems associated with the Lebanese seat, Suleiman, not surprisingly, is exceedingly pleased. Some Lebanese scholars are, too. Carnegie’s Paul Salem recently told the Daily Star: “I’m very, very happy about it.… It boosts Lebanon’s presence in the UN and the Security Council… to push the items on its agenda.”

While Lebanon’s international profile might be raised, it’s hard to see how the benefits to Beirut outweigh the downsides.

Egypt’s National Democratic Party (NDP) conference is fast approaching, but the meeting—which will formally set the stage for political succession—isn’t making headlines these days. On October 6, the Los Angeles Times reported on how the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is reacting to sales of an Artificial Virginity Hymen Kit; still other news outlets have focused on the important decision at Al-Azhar to ban the niqab (the full-body veil) in the classroom.

Less covered in the Western media, but perhaps equally consequential, is the ongoing controversy surrounding Hala Mustafa (pictured). On October 10, Dr. Mustafa will appear at hearings before the Journalist Syndicate disciplinary committee, where she faces sanctions for meeting with Israeli ambassador to Egypt Shalom Cohen in early September.

Dr. Mustafa is a member of the NDP’s elite policy committee, and a scholar at the government-sponsored Al-Ahram Center. Last month, she found herself the target of a Journalist Syndicate investigation for meeting with the Israeli ambassador to Egypt. By meeting with Cohen, she violated draconian union bylaws, which enforce the strict policy of no contact with Israelis underpinning the “anti-normalization” campaign.

In recent decades, the Egyptian professional boycott against Israel—led by Islamist-controlled syndicates—has been an effective tool in preventing a normalization of bilateral relations between the states. While the government of Egypt has made little effort to reverse the trend, it has not seemingly endorsed the boycott—until recently.

The Journalist Syndicate appears to be looking to make an example out of Dr. Mustafa. And she’s not getting any help from the government’s Al-Ahram Center. Indeed, not only has the Center established its own board of inquiry to investigate Dr. Mustafa, just weeks ago the Center announced it too would “boycott Israelis of all levels.”

Perhaps this turn of events shouldn’t be surprising given that the center was founded in 1968 as the Center for Zionist and Palestine studies. Nevertheless, it seems odd that Egypt’s leading research institution—a state-funded institute closely tied to the regime—would adhere to extra-legal anti-normalization prescriptions advocated by Islamist-led unions. Indeed, the 1978 Camp David (peace) Accords stipulated that after the Israelis withdrew from Sinai, the states would establish “normal relations” including “cultural relations.”

While there is little doubt that the Egyptian government is committed to the absence of war with its Israeli neighbor, there remains a staunch opposition to moving toward a peace between the peoples at both the popular and the official levels. In Egypt, this incongruity is rationalized by the Israeli mistreatment of Palestinians, but even when the peace process is making progress—during the heyday of the Oslo Accords (1994-98), for example—Cairo demonstrates little inclination to change the dynamic.

The resistance to normalizing relations with Israel reaches the highest levels in Cairo. To date Hosni Mubarak—who has served as Egypt’s president since 1981—has visited Israel only once, and that was to attend the funeral of former Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin. Still, in 1995, following his return from Israel, he told the Government daily Al Ahram that “I don’t consider this a visit.”

It remains to be seen what will transpire with Hala Mustafa’s case. Syndicate insiders say that the group’s board of directors is inclined to freeze her membership for a year, resulting in her removal as editor and chief of Al-Demokratiya. Sadly, based on developments to date, it appears unlikely that Mubarak regime will oppose a Journalist Syndicate dictate or intervene on her behalf.

For the Obama administration—which is trying to convince states like Saudi Arabia to normalize with Israel in hopes of encouraging the Jewish state to take “risks for peace” with the Palestinians—Cairo’s disposition is problematic. After all, if even peace partners are unwilling to normalize, convincing states like Saudi Arabia to do so stands little chance of success. In the search for Arab normalization with Israel, Washington would be best advised to take a more modest approach. Egypt, at peace with Israel for nearly 30 years, would seem a reasonable place to start.

MESH Admin: There is an Arabic translation of this post.

Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.

On June 7, Lebanon goes to the polls to elect a new government. Just over a week out, the race is too close to call. The stakes couldn’t be higher. Either the pro-west March 14th coalition, in power since 2005, retains power; or the Iranian- and Syrian-backed March 8th coalition led by Hezbollah gains de jure control over the state, and with it the Lebanese military.

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is an important, understudied and perhaps the sole respected national institution in a divided country. The LAF possesses a legitimacy and widespread support that are virtually non-existent in other Lebanese institutions. That said, there are serious questions regarding the potential of the army—and of other domestic security agencies—for enhancing state sovereignty.

Despite my reservations, since the end of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon in 2005, I have supported U.S. efforts to build a strong LAF that is loyal and accountable to the state, a project I worked on while I served at the Pentagon. Since 2005, Washington has provided over $400 million to improve the capabilities of the force, which languished during the years of Syrian suzerainty. Despite the significant infusion of U.S. assistance, however, there is little indication that, to date, the LAF—or other U.S.-funded security institutions—are moving in this direction. At best, it’s going to be a long-term project.

The LAF remains a consensus institution, only able to implement the decisions of the Lebanese government with the tacit approval of Hezbollah. A few examples provide insight into the nature of the problem, with both the LAF and other national institutions:

• Perhaps the best example of this dynamic is what happened following the Fatah al-Islam takeover of Nahr el Bared in May 2007. Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah initially opposed the operation—terming LAF entrance into the camp as a “red line”—but he later relented, according to Hezbollah sources (likely due to overwhelming Lebanese popular support for a military response following the massacre of two dozen LAF troops), allowing the operation to proceed.
• There is some pretty convincing evidence of freelancing within the LAF in support of Hezbollah during the 2006 Summer War between Israel and the Shi’ite militia. While the LAF was largely a non-combatant in the hostilities, Hezbollah fired a Chinese-made, Iranian-provided C802 land to sea missile that hit and nearly sank the Israeli SAAR 5-class missile cruiser, the Hanit. According to Israeli sources, the missile provided no early radar signature—allowing the ship to employ countermeasures—because it relied on LAF naval radar. Israel responded by destroying LAF naval radar stations.
• The LAF did not implement the government’s decision in May 2008 to remove LAF General Wafiq Chucair, the Hezbollah-sympathetic officer in charge of Beirut airport. Hezbollah had responded to the personnel decision, and the edict of the government to dismantle the organization’s dedicated fiber optic network, by invading Beirut. The government’s decision was in fact later overridden by then-COS Michel Suleiman, who later became President of the Republic.
• During Hezbollah’s May 2008 invasion of Beirut, the LAF did not oppose the organization’s military assault on the capital. In fact, evidence suggests the LAF colluded with Hezbollah in the operation, leaving areas as Hezbollah entered and returning to accept transfer of responsibility after Hezbollah withdrew. Moreover, there were complaints that the LAF did not arrive early to protect March 14th ministers from the onslaught.
• More recently, and equally problematic if true, were reports recently leaked by Cairo that Lebanon’s Sureté Générale (Al-Amn al-’Aam) provided the doctored passports to Hezbollah operatives apprehended by Egypt.

Washington’s provision of weapons is an important factor in the development of LAF capabilities. In the long term, however, it might be equally if not more useful if the United States and other western states provided civil affairs training geared toward building unit cohesion and developing a primary allegiance to the state, a loyalty that trumps sectarian allegiance.

Of course, depending how the June 7 elections turn out, the discussion could be moot. Hezbollah already exerts a preponderance of influence over the LAF, and has long been believed—in coordination with its Syrian allies—to have significant sway within the military intelligence (G2). However, should March 8th win, the U.S. Congress and the Obama administration should rethink the current level of funding for this “national institution.”

Earlier this month, the Saban Center at Brookings published a monograph by Itamar Rabinovich titled Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington: The Syrian-Israeli Relationship as a U.S. Policy Issue. Rabinovich, a distinguished Israeli academic and former diplomat, has been a longtime analyst of the Israeli-Syrian peace track. Based on the title, I had expected to read a proposal for how Washington might best advance Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations.

But the paper doesn’t make a proposal. Instead, the study focuses on the history of the Israeli-Syrian track and the U.S.-Syrian bilateral relationship since 1974, concluding with four short scenarios of how that relationship might evolve.

Rabinovich is a highly regarded historian of Syria (he has just published a very readable collection of his essays on the subject), and there is little with which to quibble in his description of U.S.-Syria-Israel dealings from 1974 to 2001. But his analysis of Bush-era Syria policy rests on a subtle presumption that the Bush administration erred in refusing to engage with Damascus. The stage is set in the preface, where Rabinovich critiques the Bush administration’s policy “neither to engage with nor attack [Syria], but to seek soft ways of penalizing it [that] failed to work.”

Rabinovich could have been a bit more charitable. After all, Israeli efforts to engage Damascus in the 1990s (in which he took part) not only failed to deliver any benefits, but resulted in the strengthened position of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the erosion of Israeli deterrence. But the main problem with this paper is that the author tends to downplay the Syrian contribution to the impasse in U.S.-Syrian relations, by a method that might be described as argument by elision and omission. Here are a few examples.

• Syria in Iraq. Rabinovich notes that in September 2008, Secretary of State Rice commended the Syrians for (in Rabinovich’s words) “taking serious steps to seal their border with Iraq.” “In contrast to Rice,” he complains, “Bush persisted with his anti-Syrian, anti-Asad view and conduct.”

In fact, Bush had good cause to “persist.” The very month when Rice made her comment, Maj.-Gen. John Kelly, Commander of MNF-West in Iraq, said this in a press conference:

The Syrian side is, I guess, uncontrolled by their side… The Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi intelligence forces feel that al Qaeda operatives and others operate, live pretty openly on the Syrian side… Syria is problematic for me but, more importantly, for the Iraqis because it doesn’t seem that there’s much being done on the other side of the border to assist this country in terms of maintaining the border and the integrity of, you know, Iraqi sovereignty.

It was immediately subsequent to Rice’s praise of Syria’s border measures that the United States launched a commando strike that killed a senior Al Qaeda operative on Syrian territory.

Syria’s role in abetting the killing of Americans in Iraq was probably the central issue in the U.S. approach to Syria during the Bush years. Bush “persisted” not because he was “anti-Syrian” or “anti-Asad,” but because progress in Iraq depended on persistence against its opponents, which Syria chose to become. Even Bush’s critics now acknowledge that such U.S. persistence in Iraq has paid off.

• Syria-Iran. Rabinovich cites the President’s September 2007 UN General Assembly address, claiming that Bush “lump[ed] it [Syria] together with Iran.” In English, one “lumps together” unlike things that should rightly be separated. But in retrospect, Bush’s rhetorical linkage of Damascus to Tehran was well warranted. The speech came just weeks after the discovery and September 7, 2007 destruction of the illegal Syrian nuclear facility in Kibar. As it turns out, if recent reports are to be believed, the North Korean-built facility was financed by Iran.

In fact, it has been Syria which has been keen to “lump” itself with Iran, and which has issued repeated assurances that it will not be “de-lumped.” As Syrian President Bashar al-Asad explained just last month, Syria-Iranian relations

are firm and continuously improving; they are strategic relations, which have proved their efficiency and importance in all of the issues which our region has been passing through since the Revolution in Iran in 1979. They are not transitory relations.We have no option but to be in a stable and enduring relation[ship].

Last September, Press TV reported that Asad compared Syria’s relations with Iran to Israel’s relations with the United States. “Israel’s demand [that Damascus cut ties with Tehran] ,” he said, “is the equivalent of Syria requesting Israel to break its relations with the United States.” Could Syrian and Iran be more closely “lumped” together?

(Parenthetically, Rabinovich misattributes the reason the Bush administration revealed the details of the Kibar operation in spring 2008. He says the administration released this information to “embarrass the Syrians and their North Korean suppliers.” But the Bush administration didn’t embark on a gotcha effort to embarrass anyone. The precipitating cause of the revelation was Congressional demands for information on the Israeli strike. If there was a secondary motive, it had to do with putting pressure on Iran.)

• Pelosi visit. When Rabinovich discusses House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s pilgrimage to Damascus in 2007, he merely notes that it provoked President Bush, and caused “a brief strain in the relationship” between the United States and Israel, which endorsed the trip. He doesn’t mention the regrettable and predictable aftermath of the visit: the incarceration of several leading members of Syrian civil society. The Bush administration didn’t oppose such legitimizing gestures out of pique, but in the full realization that the price would be paid by Syrians.

Omissions in the monograph extend beyond presentation of Bush policy, to two other crucial points: Syria’s relationship to Hezbollah, and Israeli opinion on the Golan.

• Syria-Hezbollah. Rabinovich treats the 2006 war with Hezbollah as an isolated incident, as though Syria were uninvolved. There is no mention whatsoever of the weapons that Syria provided directly from its own arsenal to the Shiite militia, including, most prominently, the Syrian-produced 220 mm rocket—one of which hit the main train station in Haifa, killing ten Israelis—and the Syrian provision of top-of-the-line Russian anti-tank Kornet missiles to Hezbollah that disabled several IDF Merkava tanks, killing several IDF soldiers. Damascus played a crucial role in building Hezbollah’s impressive arsenal, eventually deployed against Israel during the 2006 war. One wouldn’t know that from this paper.

• Golan. Rabinovich notes that in Israel’s most recent election campaign, “right wing parties were vociferous in their opposition to withdrawal from the Golan Heights,” as though such opposition were a fringe sentiment. He does not mention that this is widely believed to be the predominant opinion of Israelis. In fact, according to polling, the vast majority of Israelis would rather divide Jerusalem for peace with Palestinians than return the Golan for a Syria deal.

The concluding section on “Lessons for the Obama Administration” similarly seems to argue by omission. Instead of discussing the elephant in the room—the nature and likelihood of a potential Syrian reorientation or the kind of changes Syria would have to effect to make a deal with Israel feasible—Rabinovich refers to unnamed Syrian officials who have “alluded to the position that Syria’s alliance with Iran is not fixed and that it is mostly a result of Washington’s rejection of Syria.”

It’s a remarkable line—blaming Syria’s relationship with Iran entirely on Washington—yet Rabinovich lets it stand uncontested. He could have identified dozens of other quotes by the same officials—even by President Asad himself—claiming that the alliance is fixed, and is based on shared objectives. “We do not belong to those states which build temporary, transitional or circumstantial relations,” Asad told Iranian TV in September. “We do have our principles, and interests; thus the factors binding Syria and Iran are increased and more solid day by day.” Why isn’t that also worth quoting?

In summation, the triangle of relations that Rabinovich attempts to describe is enormously complex. Yet from reading this paper, one gets the sense that Israel and Syria might already have a peace treaty, were it not for President Bush. Rabinovich knows far too much about Syria not to know better. One hopes that his next paper will shift the focus to decision-making in Damascus.

Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.

As everyone who follows the Middle East knows, in recent years there’s been a veritable explosion of Arabic language news sources on the region. The proliferation of satellite news channels, blogs, and websites offers Middle Easterners and outside scholars a lot of choices.

Traditionally, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has been focused on providing timely information and analysis for U.S. policymakers. Recognizing the importance of the Middle East audience, however, in early January, the Institute rolled out its new Arabic language website, here.

The site features translations of the analysis of Institute scholars, including articles from its Policywatch series and op-eds from U.S. newspapers. Translations of archived materiel will be added over time.

The site is an important new resource. Please take a look, and let your Arabic-speaking colleagues know that the Institute’s site is now available in the language of the ḍād.

With the fighting over in Gaza (at least for now), many see Hamas emerging as the victor in the same way that Hezbollah did in the war it fought with Israel in the summer of 2006. But did Hamas really win? Is it better off now than before the fighting began?

Just like Hezbollah in 2006, Hamas has survived its January 2009 conflict with Israel. Also like Hezbollah, Hamas has retained—and perhaps even increased—its control over its core constituency. In another similarity with Hezbollah in 2006, the 2009 conflict with Israel has increased Hamas’s status throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Also like before, criticism in the West and elsewhere has focused on the damage caused by Israel, and not the damage done to it.

Further, Hamas can probably still launch missile attacks on Israel just like Hezbollah can. Finally, Hamas has reportedly begun to rebuild the Israeli-damaged tunnels it uses to smuggle weapons from Egypt into Gaza.

But just how impressive are these achievements? Like Hezbollah, Hamas survived an Israeli onslaught. But also like Hezbollah, Hamas was unable to prevent or stop Israel from causing enormous damage to its supporters as well as the population it claims to protect. It is true that the conflict has increased the stature of Hamas in the West Bank. But this was something that was already occurring anyway through the incompetence and corruption of Fatah, which has made Hamas look better to many Palestinians.

Like Hezbollah in 2006, Hamas has won enormous sympathy and support in Arab and other Muslim countries. But if anything, Hamas has received even less support from their governments than Hezbollah did. America’s Muslim allies have not broken relations with Washington (as many did in 1967) or sent men and materiel to help their Palestinian brothers fight Israel. Even anti-American forces have kept their distance from Hamas. While expressing solidarity, Hezbollah has not launched a missile onslaught from Lebanon that might have forced Israel to divert its attention away from Gaza. Indeed, Hezbollah was quick to disclaim responsibility for the few missiles that were fired into Israel from Lebanon. As for Syria: while encouraging Hamas to resist, Damascus has done little to help it do so.

Tehran has actually become frightened over the genuine anger toward Israel that has welled up among Iranians. As Azadeh Moaveni’s Washington Post Outlook piece of January 25 noted, “Early this month, Khamenei appeared on national television to temper his previous declaration encouraging martyrdom on behalf of the Palestinians. He thanked the young people who had offered to go die in Gaza but said that ‘our hands are tied in this arena.’ Khamenei didn’t really want anyone’s hands to be untied, however; the whole Gaza incident was meant to distract Iranians, not to jeopardize Iran’s role in the region.”

However impressive the volume of outrage expressed in the Arab and Muslim world over Gaza, the Palestinians living there—and Hamas itself—may well have been more impressed by the fact that they received no meaningful support from these quarters in their struggle.

Also like Hezbollah, Hamas could not take much comfort from European criticism of Israel, as this did not result in effective action to halt Israeli military activity—much less any material support for the Arab side. Most importantly, whatever strains the 2006 and 2009 conflicts may have put on the Israeli-American relationship, U.S. support for Israel clearly remains strong. While criticism of Israel and sympathy for the Palestinians may be growing in the United States, this has not led to sympathy or support for Hamas. Nor is it likely to.

Finally, it should be pointed out that a large part of the reason why Hezbollah was perceived as victorious in 2006 is that it was the Israelis themselves who, in their disappointment at not having destroyed it, declared Hezbollah to have been the winner. Yet while Hezbollah’s political strength within Lebanon certainly increased as a result of the 2006 conflict, it is noteworthy that Hezbollah has been extremely careful not to provoke another Israeli attack since then.

It remains to be seen whether Hamas will follow Hezbollah’s example in refraining from firing missiles into Israel after such an intense conflict with the Jewish state. If it does, then Hamas’s behavior might more reasonably be described as prudent rather than victorious. If, instead, it resumes missile attacks, Hamas risks not only triggering another Israeli intervention in Gaza, but also being blamed by Gazans for having needlessly brought them more pain without any gain. And this would open the door for another Palestinian movement to displace Hamas through taking advantage of Hamas’s mistakes (just as Hamas did with Fatah). Hamas cannot afford a “victory” such as this.

Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.

Earlier this week, U.S. helicopters killed a high-value Al Qaeda target in Syria. While the attack shocked some observers, the presence of Al Qaeda operatives on Syrian soil has surprised few. According to CENTCOM, since 2003 Syria has been the leading point of entry of insurgents—Al Qaeda and others—into Iraq. Damascus allowed these insurgents to establish training bases and facilitated their movement across Syrian territory, not only to Iraq, but to Lebanon and Jordan as well.

Predictably, Damascus condemned the strike as unprovoked U.S. aggression. One might have thought, given the Asad regime’s documented ties with Al Qaeda, Baghdad would have had less of a problem with the U.S. cross-border raid. Yet Iraq—like North Korea and many Arab states—roundly condemned the operation.

In the days following the strike, there have been large government-sanctioned demonstrations in Syria protesting the U.S. military action. No doubt, popular outrage over the loss of innocent civilians is genuine. Seemingly lost on the protesters, however, was the fact that the target was Al Qaeda—which was widely believed to have been behind an early October car bomb that killed 17 in Damascus. Of course, this oversight is understandable: the Syrian government-controlled print media neglected to mention the Al Qaeda connection to the strike.

The Asad regime’s response to the attack stands in stark contrast to its reaction to the September 2007 Israeli strike on Syria’s nuclear weapons facility in Al Kibar. Relatively speaking, Israel’s audacious raid hardly elicited a protest. Indeed, although Syria accused Washington as having been “party to the execution” of the Israeli attack, unlike this week, the United States did not have to close the embassy, nor did the Asad regime respond by shuttering the American School and cultural center in Damascus.

Many analysts both in the region and in Washington are saying that the strike was politically motivated, with some even speculating it was authorized by the few remaining “hawks” in the administration intent on rolling back the seemingly inevitable march toward U.S. diplomatic re-engagement with Syria. Given the Bush administration’s long-standing policy of hot pursuit, however, this line of thinking seems rather conspiratorial. More likely, the decision to cross the border was made by commanders on the ground eager to take advantage of actionable intelligence on a high-value target.

In the short term, the strike may derail eleventh-hour Bush administration efforts to engage the Asad regime, but it is unlikely to have any lasting impact should either President Obama or McCain determine to initiate dialogue with Damascus. The U.S. strike will also have no bearing—as some have argued—on whether Damascus will ultimately split from Tehran. Even the most ardent advocates for U.S. diplomatic re-engagement with Syria no longer believe this type of strategic reorientation is possible.

What’s more, there is very little evidence to suggest a correlation between Washington’s posture and Syrian behavior. Syrian behavior is not necessarily any more appealing—either domestically or in regard to its neighbors—when Washington takes a conciliatory tack.

Just compare events of this week to what happened in April 2007, shortly after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi traveled to Damascus for a cordial meeting with President Asad. The similarities in the headlines are uncanny. Days after the U.S. airstrike, the Asad regime sentenced twelve Syrian liberals to two and a half years in prison for signing the Damascus Declaration—including Riad Seif, who suffers from advanced prostate cancer. In 2007, judging from the pictures of Asad and Pelosi strolling and shopping in Suq al-Hamadiyeh, conciliation was in the air. Yet days after Pelosi’s departure, Asad sentenced six leading dissidents to harsh jail terms of three to twelve years.

Nearly five years after the invasion of Iraq, the fact that high-value, high-profile Al Qaeda figures continue to operate on the Syrian side of the border—even after Damascus dispatched an ambassador to Baghdad—should be instructive. If the past thirty years are any guide, regardless of what Washington does, Damascus will likely remain a problem. Whether Obama or McCain comes to the White House in January, it would be advisable for the next administration to diminish expectations of what diplomatic engagement with Damascus can achieve.

Peter Rodman, a member of MESH, passed away on Saturday. I met Peter in 1980 in Santa Monica. I was very junior, he had already worked at the highest levels in government, and was just back from a long trip. But he immediately joined into a serious conversation and worked to include me in it. This seriousness and decency would be visible to me for the next 25 years. In Washington, no matter how high he rose, or what difficulties he faced, he kept the human qualities that made him admirable. He will be sorely missed.

Remembrances are invited from colleagues.

This is a great video. The scene: the end of the Bastille Day festivities following the Mediterranean Union meeting in France last weekend. Syrian President Bashar Asad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stand just meters away. It’s an awkward moment. (Click here if you do not see the embedded clip.)

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Olmert moves toward Asad, but is temporarily thwarted when he is forced to shake hands with dignitaries. Asad senses the impending contact and moves away. But Olmert persists in the quest for the historic handshake. He stops to say hello to Egyptian President Mubarak.

Meanwhile, Asad remains just out of reach, chatting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and Qatari Emir Hamid bin Khalifa bin Thani. Moon breaks himself away from Asad to greet Olmert, perhaps relaying to the Israeli Prime Minister that Asad does not seek contact. Asad is shepherded past Olmert by the Emir. He stands alone, but out of the danger zone.

The scene really seems to capture the dynamic of the Turkish-sponsored Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Israel pursues, Syria plays hard to get. From the video clip, one might reasonably infer that Asad isn’t particularly interested in the peace endeavor. Or maybe Asad just believes that direct engagement now would be premature—some kind of reward for Israel.

We don’t know what Asad was thinking when he was ignoring Olmert. But we do know what he was saying during the meeting about the kind of deal he envisions with Israel. According to the summary of Asad’s interview with Al Jazeera that appeared on the Syrian Government Champress (thanks to Tony Badran of FDD for the link), Asad apparently does not envision “normalization”—‘alaqat tatbi’iya, the formulation in the Arab Initiative—but rather, ‘alaqat ‘adiya, or “routine” relations with Israel.

Although this likely won’t be a deal-breaker, this is already setting the bar pretty low. In any event, it certainly won’t generate confidence that Damascus will meet the Israeli quid pro quo of distancing itself from Tehran. But given the effort in Paris that Olmert was making to just touch Asad, one wonders whether this, too, might be negotiable.

Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.

A lot of people have asked me lately about U.S. funding of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The current interest in U.S. assistance to the LAF comes as little surprise: Congress is currently reviewing the FY09 budget, which is said to include a significant aid package for the LAF.

From 2005 to 2008, the U.S. Government provided over $1 billion to Lebanon, including nearly $380 million in assistance to the LAF. During this time, Washington’s generosity toward the LAF made Lebanon the second-largest recipient of U.S. foreign military assistance per capita, after Israel.

Several recent developments have sparked the debate about this previously uncontroversial U.S. assistance provided to the military of the only pro-West, democratically elected Arab government. First, as a result of Hezbollah’s May 2008 blitz on Beirut, the Shiite militia cum terrorist organization has rejoined the Lebanese government, with important de jure powers (i.e., the blocking third in the parliament). Questions are also being raised about the utility of funding the LAF, particularly following the organization’s actions—or inactions—this past May. Essentially, the LAF was missing in action. At a minimum, the army did not protect national institutions; some accuse the LAF of colluding with Hezbollah in the raid.

At the same time, statements made by March 14th ruling coalition leaders in July regarding Samir Kuntar have eroded some of their government’s appeal. In particular, in the run-up to the impending prisoner exchange between Hezbollah and Israel, several top leaders of March 14th have indicated that they will join Hezbollah at the hero’s welcome for Kuntar—the terrorist best known for crushing the skull of a four-year-old Israeli girl in 1979. In the process, March 14th has seemingly blessed Hezbollah’s continued possession of weapons.

The debate regarding U.S. support for the LAF has been fueled by a contentious and factually inaccurate op-ed in the New York Times written by Nicholas Noe in mid-June. In his article, “A Fair Fight for the Lebanese Army,” Noe claimed that Israel was preventing the LAF from acquiring the type of armaments—advanced anti-tank weapons, armed attack helos, and intelligence gathering equipment—it requires.

Because the Bush Administration caved to Israeli demands, Noe claims, “the army was left without the equipment that would have enabled it to be a more forceful mediator in the street battles involving Hezbollah and its rivals” in May. Noe likewise claims,

this lack of equipment also contributed to the military’s inability last summer to quickly roust a group of [Fatah al-Islam] Islamist militants from a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon.

Finally, Noe argues that if the LAF receives this kind of advanced equipment in future, it will help Lebanon to solve the problem of Hezbollah’s weapons:

Give the Lebanese an army able to meet the perceived threats emanating from Israel (primarily involving water, territory and a possible future expulsion of Palestinians to Lebanon), and then, Hezbollah has said, its independent weaponry can be tackled.

No doubt, the Times received a flood of critical letters about Noe’s article. Not surprisingly, it did not run any. Nevertheless, I still think it’s worth debunking some of the more egregious inaccuracies and bad thinking in Noe’s piece.

Prima facie, Noe’s article neglects to even mention the deep divisions in the LAF that are the primary constraint on the long-term prospects for making the military an effective national institution. Yet despite these limitations, Washington has fully backed the LAF. Indeed, contrary to Noe’s assertion, the United States expedited the shipment of over 40 C-130 transport planes brimming with military materiel to Beirut immediately after the outbreak of fighting in Nahr el Bared. This was no mean feat. It required a lot of creative thinking—the United States used an ACSA mechanism to dispatch the weapons and ammo quickly—and a real effort to cut through standard timelines and procedures.

The materiel provided by the United States was what was required for the operation and what could be absorbed by the LAF. Shipments at the time included over 10 million rounds of all types of ammunition, as well as—according to the State Department—”the same front-line weapons that the U.S. military troops are currently using, including assault rifles, automatic grenade launchers, advanced sniper weapons systems, anti-tank weapons, and the most modern urban warfare bunker weapons.” This and subsequent assistance has not been subject to Israeli veto, but rather is based on a careful assessment of LAF operational requirements carried out by the United States and France.

Moreover, Noe falsely claims that the United States blocked the transfer of rockets to be employed by UAE-donated Gazelle attack helicopters, and that, “As a result, soldiers were forced to drop shells from the helicopters by hand, destroying much of [Nahr el Bared].” What actually happened was that the LAF ingeniously retrofitted their U.S.-made Bell UH-I “Huey” helicopters—with Washington’s blessing—with hydraulic systems to drop their own retooled bombs targeting Fatah al-Islam terrorists. Here is how it was done (click on thumbnails for images):

So Noe gets it wrong on the helos and the arms transfers. His assessment that, once the LAF is “able to meet the perceived threats emanating from Israel,” Hezbollah’s weapons “can be tackled,” also strains credulity. Hezbollah has an ever-expanding list of prerequisites for disarmament, ranging from the liberation of Jerusalem to the end of Lebanese government corruption. Noe’s supposition that Hezbollah’s weapons will be on the table when the LAF is better armed is more wishful thinking than reality.

No doubt, Israel has some concerns about the LAF. Based on the LAF’s apparent collusion with Hezbollah in the firing of the Chinese-made Iranian-provided C-802 land-to-sea missile—which hit and almost sank an Israeli SAAR 5-class warship during the summer 2006 war—these concerns are well founded. But the fear that the LAF would somehow transfer U.S.-made weapons to the Shiite militia is likely not at the top of the Israelis’ list. First, the LAF has a very good record in this regard; and second, Hezbollah has received an arsenal from Moscow, Syria, and Iran that is so highly advanced, that it need not covet LAF stocks.

In the coming weeks, Washington may choose to modify its aid package to the LAF. If this occurs, it will be because of Hezbollah’s recent political and military gains, not Israeli complaints. By blaming Israel for a weak LAF, Noe is essentially repeating Hezbollah’s justification for retaining its army and arsenal.

It is in Washington’s long-term interest to see the LAF develop into a strong national institution. But it’s important to understand that the strength of this institution does not primarily rely on its capabilities, but rather on its will to take on difficult missions on orders from the democratically-elected government of Lebanon. No amount of U.S. military assistance will change this current dynamic.

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