Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s most recent statement that the Holocaust is a myth and denouncing Israel is an indication that he does not see U.S. President Obama’s call for dialogue and improved relations with Iran as desirable from his perspective.

While Moscow has applauded the Obama administration’s decision not to execute the Bush administration’s plan to deploy a ballistic missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic aimed at Iran, Tehran is undoubtedly focusing on the Obama administration’s plan to instead deploy sea-based ballistic missile defenses closer to Iran. Ahmadinejad is highly likely to see this not only as more threatening to Iran than the Poland/Czech Republic option, but also to see the Obama administration’s foregoing the latter as an attempt to curry favor with Moscow in the hope of enlisting its cooperation against Tehran.

Finally, with Ahmadinejad seeing the United States as somehow orchestrating the continued Iranian democratic opposition protests against his claimed re-election victory, it all must seem to him that the Obama administration is even more of a threat to him than the Bush administration ever was. Issuing strident statements about Israel, then, is a desperate attempt by Ahmadinejad to rally support both at home and in the Muslim world.

Moscow, though, is making it clear that the Obama administration’s abandoning the Poland/Czech Republic BMD deployment plan will not result in a quid pro quo from Russia vis-à-vis Tehran. While there really are forces that threaten Ahmadinejad and the Islamic Republic, Moscow is making clear that Russia is not one of them.

From Steven R. Ward

Immortal grew out of my nearly quarter-century of covering Middle East military issues as a CIA intelligence analyst. I had looked for years without success for a book covering the broad sweep of Iran’s military history, and had occasionally thought that perhaps I should try to fill that gap. There were three factors, however, that pushed me from thinking about writing to actually doing it: ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, my experiences with the Afghan and Iraq wars, and the utility of having such a history available for analysts joining the intelligence community since September 2001.

When I started working on Immortal in late 2005, the potential for hostilities between the United States and Iran was a concern for Washington because of Iran’s role in post-Saddam Iraq and its provision of weapons and training to armed groups opposing Coalition forces there and in Afghanistan. Given Iran’s history of supporting provocative lethal activities against U.S. interests I was concerned that, totally distinct from the U.S. policy debate, the Islamic Republic was capable of triggering a conflict.

Admittedly, the improved situation in Iraq lowered tension as I moved my manuscript into the publication process in late 2007 and early 2008. More recently, President Obama’s offer of an open hand to Tehran may have further decreased the likelihood of hostilities. I still think, however, that Iran remains a potential military opponent for the United States as it seeks to elevate its influence and change the regional status quo at America’s expense. Should events take us back toward more hostile relations, Immortal can help show how Iran has been shaped by its history and, in turn, improve our understanding of Tehran’s security outlook and strategies. And, not to be too negative, I think that knowing Iran’s military history, which covers a lot of the grievances the Iranian regime has asked the U.S. government to address, can be useful in any efforts to improve relations between our countries.

Back-to-back assignments working on the intelligence side of Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and Operation Iraqi Freedom against Saddam Hussein were the events that made me think seriously about writing Immortal in preparation for potential military encounters with Iran. In both cases, as intelligence community analysts were shifted from their primary country accounts to support these U.S. military operations, I saw the great need others had for help in understanding Afghanistan and Iraq and in putting current events into their larger historical context. Analysts with more time on these accounts, I noted, were able to do some of the best work because they were familiar, not only with the Soviet experience in Afghanistan or the Iran-Iraq war, but with the role of Afghanistan’s ethnic and tribal traditions in combating the British in the 19th century or with the British occupation of Iraq in the 1920s. So, it was not much of a leap to decide that a book on Iran’s military history would be very useful to have on hand in the event of a conflict.

The traumatic events of the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the emotions that surrounded the run up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, also reminded me that a stronger grasp of the history shaping these foreign cultures was one of the best protections against analysis distorted by our own heightened nationalism and ethnocentric views. I wrote Immortal, in part, in the hope that a better understanding of Iran’s history would prevent preconceptions, misconceptions, and ethnocentric bias from clouding our view of Iran’s true capabilities and likely intentions. As an intelligence analyst, I was aware that, at least since the days of Sherman Kent and start of the U.S. intelligence community, one of the primary objectives of strategic intelligence has been an empathetic understanding of foreign countries. My history aims to contribute to such an empathetic understanding of Iran, helping us to avoid problems (as discussed in Kenneth Booth’s Strategy and Ethnocentrism) that deprive an adversary of intentions other than hostility, but also deprive our policy of constructive possibilities on which to build a more stable relationship.

Finally, I am a strong believer that history matters, and this is something I wanted to share with the new analysts joining the intelligence community to work on Iran and other critical national security issues. As historians and strategists have noted over the years, our experience with the past provides the only real empirical data we have about how people conduct war and behave in crisis. New analysts and others dealing with Iran also can benefit from Immortal’s presentation of the role of Iran’s military history and ethnic, tribal, and religious heritages in shaping contemporary issues such as civil-military relations, military professionalism, and innovation. Its military history also helps distinguish Iran’s war-fighting style from that of neighboring Arab militaries, and can add nuance to analysis of regional power balances.

Knowing Iran’s history, of course, does not provide easy answers for such a complex country. But my fondest hope is that Immortal will help intelligence analysts, military personnel, policymakers, and other interested Americans isolate the important questions about Iran that affect peace and stability in the region.

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the CIA or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or Agency endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

Understanding the reasons why Americans are more willing to wage wars than Europeans is of historical interest, but not only. It has been asserted, for example, that Americans were willing to wage war against Saddam Hussein because of the manipulation of the American political system by a lobby that was more loyal to Israel than it was to the United States. It has also been speculated that after the latest Iraq war, the American public will become more like Europeans, and less likely to employ war abroad.

Bob Kagan has argued that Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus. Yes, but why? In my article in The American Interest, “Blood Brothers” (sorry, editor’s choice), I discuss how the large immigration to British North America from the English-Scotch border area, and the subsequent endemic and brutal warfare against the North American Indians, created a political culture in the United States in which failures to respond violently to challenges were seen as the mark of weakness that would lead to predation against the weakling, and in which willingness to fight was part of the duties of a citizen. We are a warlike people. We fought in Iraq because we rise, violently, to violent challenges, and we will remain a warlike people for the foreseeable future.

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There has been an ongoing debate here at MESH and elsewhere about whether Israel can, will, or should launch an attack against Iran to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons. One possible method by which such an attack might be degraded or even deterred is if Russia sells the advanced version of its S-300 missile defense system to Iran. But while Tehran has actively sought this weapons system from Moscow and press reports pop up from time about how Russia has agreed to provide it to Iran (or even that Moscow is doing so), the Kremlin has not yet done so. Further, there is reason to believe that it will not do so in future either.

Moscow now has good relations with Israel, which the Kremlin values for several reasons: the growing Russian-Israeli trade relationship, Israeli security assistance in dealing with Muslim opposition forces inside Russia, and the addition of Israeli technology which greatly enhances Moscow’s ability to sell arms to India in particular. In addition, with over a million Russian-speakers now living in Israel, there are close cultural contacts between Russia and Israel—which the Israeli government sought to increase in 2008 when it ended visa requirements for Russian tourists.

One of Israel’s highest priorities in terms of what it wants from Russia is for Moscow not to assist Iran in ways that could help it to harm Israel. The suspicion that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, combined with Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s repeated statements expressing the desire to wipe Israel “off the map,” have had an especially powerful impact on the Jewish state. Many conservative Israeli political leaders—including the current prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu—have expressed the belief that Iran will attack Israel with nuclear weapons if Tehran develops them, and have indicated that Israel will use force in order to prevent Iran from doing so.

Israel has long wanted Russia to halt all actions helping Iran acquire nuclear weapons or missiles that could deliver them. But while any such move on Moscow’s part would be welcome, Israeli intelligence has basically concluded (as noted by Romen Bergman in The Wall Street Journal on May 16) that it is now too late to dissuade Iran from acquiring the bomb. What Israel wants most urgently from Moscow, then, is not to provide Tehran with the S-300 missile defense system which might thwart or minimize the effectiveness of an Israeli attack against Iranian nuclear facilities.

For many years, Russia has hemmed and hawed about its willingness to sell S-300s to Iran. At times, the indications that Moscow would sell them have been so strong that Tehran has announced that an agreement had been reached and even that Moscow had begun to deliver the weapons. Whenever this has occurred, Moscow has stated that it has not sold or delivered S-300s to Tehran, but insisted that it has the right to sell defensive weapons not prohibited to Iran by the Security Council.

On December 17, 2008, for example, RIA Novosti reported not only that Moscow and Tehran were negotiating over the sale of medium-range SAMs, but that Russia was “fulfilling the contract” to supply S-300s to Tehran. The deputy head of the Iranian Majles’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee also claimed that Moscow and Tehran had finally reached an agreement over the delivery of S-300s. On December 22, however, Russia’s Federal Military-Technical Cooperation Service (the agency overseeing Russian arms sales) stated that reports about Russia selling S-300s to Iran “are wrong.”

Just how much Moscow’s desire for good relations with Israel has in the past affected its reluctance to sell the S-300 to Tehran is unclear. There is reason to believe, though, that maintaining good relations with Israel has recently become a very important consideration for Moscow. In April 2009, Israel reportedly agreed to sell $50 million worth of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia. At about this time, Russian sources made clear once again that Moscow was not selling S-300s to Iran. While Moscow did not give Israel a firm promise not to sell these weapons to Iran, an informed Israeli source indicated that Russian officials did give “a vague assurance that the deal is not going ahead” (according to Reuters).

Why would the Russian military’s purchase of a mere $50 million worth of UAVs from Israel influence Moscow not to sell S-300s to Iran? An unattributed commentary published April 20, 2009, in Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye pointed toward a powerful incentive. After noting that the $50 million deal was for 10 Israeli UAVs, the article indicated that Moscow might buy as many as 50 to 100 UAVs from Israel, plus other weapons systems from it. The reason for importing these Israeli products, the article made clear, is because the Russian “military cannot wait indefinitely until our highbrow designers condescend to the army and cease to pull money from it, supplying the field with, instead of modern combat-support systems, merely promises and unsubstantiated advertising arguments.”

The Russian Defense Ministry, then, appears to be purchasing weapons and other materiel from Israel because the Russian defense industry either cannot produce them as well, or cannot produce them at all. To the extent that this $50 million deal represents the beginning of Russian acquisition of—and dependence on—Israeli military technology, Israel is very likely to be in a stronger position than before to discourage Moscow from providing Tehran with S-300s or similar goods that could deter or degrade an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Whatever other obstacles there may be to Israel launching an attack against Iran, it does not appear that the Russian S-300 missile defense system will be one of them.

From Oren Barak

The puzzle that my book grapples with might be familiar to those who have seen Monty Python and the Holy Grail, a movie that came out in 1975, the same year that Lebanon’s civil war broke out:

Cart Master: Bring out yer dead.
[A customer puts a body on the cart]
Customer: Here’s one.
Cart Master: That’ll be ninepence.
Dead Person: I’m not dead.
Cart Master: What?
Customer: Nothing. There’s your ninepence.
Dead Person: I’m not dead.
Cart Master: ‘Ere, he says he’s not dead.
Customer: Yes he is.
Dead Person: I’m not.
Cart Master: He isn’t.
Customer: Well, he will be soon, he’s very ill.
Dead Person: I’m getting better.
Customer: No you’re not, you’ll be stone dead in a moment…

The “Dead Person” is Lebanon and the puzzle is how did this state, which so many observers had referred to as a “non-state state” (or a “failed state,” to use a more up-to-date term), manage to endure despite the long and devastating conflict (1975-90) and be resuscitated in its aftermath. The book suggests that the Lebanese Army has played a significant role in Lebanon’s survival.

Initially, I planned to write a more general account of Lebanon’s process of state formation, the causes for its “failure” in the 1970s and 1980s, and its reconstruction in the 1990s. But after some deliberation, I decided to focus on the Lebanese Army, which encapsulates these dramatic developments. After all, this was a military that was weak before the conflict, which had become paralyzed and nearly disintegrated along the lines of ethnicity, clan, and region in the initial stages of the war, but which managed to stay intact throughout this period and be successfully reconstructed in the postwar era. Indeed, today the Lebanese Army enjoys an unparalleled position in Lebanon, demonstrated not only by the widespread public support for its activities, such as the military operation that it launched against Fatah al-Islam, the radical Islamic faction in Tripoli, in 2007, but also in the election of the army commander, General Michel Suleiman, as Lebanon’s president in 2008.

It is important to note that this trajectory is markedly different from that of other military institutions in divided societies that witnessed intrastate conflict. In Yugoslavia, for example, the Yugoslav People’s Army disintegrated along with the state, and some of its men joined the various ethnic militias. Some of them, including high-ranking officers, soon perpetrated war crimes against their former compatriots. Although some Lebanese soldiers, too, joined various militias during the civil war, the bulk of the army’s personnel did not.

In order to solve the puzzle of the Lebanese Army’s endurance during the conflict, I decided to trace its origins from the creation of the first Lebanese military units by the French Army during the First World War until the attempts made by the Lebanese Army to restore Lebanon’s authority in the postwar era. Yet, when going through the vast resources that I gathered—the army’s bulletins, the Lebanese official gazette, memoirs and biographies of numerous Lebanese soldiers, Western archival material, the Lebanese and Arab press, and secondary works on Lebanon—I realized that any discussion of the history of the Lebanese Army (and of any military institution for that matter) must not limit itself to “objective” facts, but also relate to the ways that the army and its leaders—always conscious of the critical importance of history in the process of state formation—wished this past to be remembered.

Writing about a military institution in the Middle East, a region where security matters are still paramount, is no easy task. Yet, in the Lebanese case, I was struck by the wealth of resources on the army, most of which were previously untapped. Among others, this enabled me to collect biographical material on 4,453 officers who served in the Lebanese Army from its inception to the present in order to identify change and continuity in patterns of recruitment and military service. In this way, I was able to show that the Lebanese Army has gradually become more representative of the various sectors of Lebanese society—ethnic groups (or communities), large families (or clans), and regions—and this transformation preceded the political reforms that facilitated the ending of the conflict. Military institutions in divided societies, in other words, can be, and perhaps ought to be, representative institutions! I believe that this finding is relevant to other divided societies, including present-day Iraq.

In The Lebanese Army, I hope to achieve three main goals. The first is to call attention to the significant developments that have taken place in Lebanon in recent decades, and especially to the strengthening of the state’s institutions not only in the coercive sense but also in terms of their legitimacy. In my view, this process has considerable implications for Lebanon’s close neighbors, and especially for Israel, where many still treat Lebanon as a “non-state state.” A second goal is to encourage additional studies on military institutions—and on the realm of security generally—in divided societies, including most Middle Eastern countries. Finally, the book challenges scholars to rethink existing explanations for the “weakness” and “strength” of states in our times, as well as these concepts themselves. Lebanon, for one, is certainly not “dead” and there are many lessons to be learned from its experience.

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A spike in violence against Iraqi civilians reinforces pressure on President Obama to maintain a force level that would allow for the maintenance of security during the drawdown.

President Obama announced a troop drawdown strategy from Iraq in February 2009, based on responsible removal of U.S. combat brigades. After removal of combat brigades, the U.S. mission is to change from combat to supporting the Government of Iraq (GOI) as it takes the lead in providing security. The United States, however, is to draw down from the approximately 142,000 troops in Iraq as of March 2009 and retain a transitional force of some 35,000-50,000 troops to train, equip, and advise Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), so long as they remain non-sectarian; conduct targeted counterterrorism missions; and protect American civilian and military operations within Iraq.

President Obama chose a 19-month phase-out over an option of 23 months or his campaign pledge of a 16-month drawdown, which he based on withdrawing one combat brigade per month when there were 16 U.S. combat brigades in Iraq.

In connection with the presidential goal of removal of U.S. combat brigades, field research in Iraq during October 2008 offers new insights, published in my 2009 book, President Obama and Iraq: Toward a Responsible Troop Drawdown. Interviews with Iraqis across the political spectrum reinforce the President’s decision to slow the pace of the drawdown, and suggest consideration of an even slower timetable. Political gains of the U.S. military surge and the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program, which took away about 100,000 Sunni Iraqi fighters from attacking coalition forces—a political surge—would be jeopardized with a 19-month drawdown.

Regarding reconsideration of withdrawal timetables, it is instructive to compare the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Quarterly Reports to gauge security progress. The April 2008 SIGIR report stated:

Progress on the security front this quarter was significant but uneven. No new provinces were transferred to Iraqi Security Forces control, but the overall level of violence was substantially lower as a result of the [U.S. military] surge.

Compare this 2008 assessment with the more negative April 2009 SIGIR report, in the aftermath of the transfer of security responsibilities to the ISF for the entire country:

Although average attack levels are at post-invasion lows, recent upticks in violence in Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa provinces exemplify the fragility of the current security situation. Notably, bombs in Baghdad and Diyala reportedly killed more than 75 people on April 23, 2009, marking the highest one-day civilian casualty total in more than a year. Some of the recent attacks arose from arrests by Iraqi (Shia) police of (Sunni) Sons of Iraq leadership. These violent eruptions underscore the need to ensure that SOI personnel are re-integrated into new positions within the Iraqi system, pursuant to the GOI’s agreement to do so.

President Obama stated in April 2009 that he has “a responsibility to make sure that as we bring troops out, that we do so in a careful enough way that we don’t see a complete collapse into violence.” But with the takeover of management of the American-sponsored SOI program by the GOI, it has not incorporated these Sunnis fighters into the ISF in the proportions anticipated. As of April 2009, only some 5,000 SOIs had been inducted into the ISF out of a planned 20,000 former fighters. And in late March, firefights broke out between SOI and ISF in Baghdad.

Indeed, American officers continue to be skeptical of the Government of Iraq’s potential to integrate Sunni Sons of Iraq. Failure to do so jeopardizes the ability of the ISF to maintain stability, and it may be necessary to slow the U.S. troop drawdown further until the ISF makes progress integrating the SOI.

One particular group of civilians the United States is obligated to protect is comprised of approximately 3,500 Iranian dissidents with “protected persons” status under the Fourth Geneva Convention. My interviews with SOI tribal chiefs in Iraq provide conclusive evidence that these Iranian dissidents in Iraq helped form and expand the SOI. Accordingly, the tribal chiefs stated that they perceive their own security to be linked to the safety of the Iranian dissidents in Iraq.

The American military has protected these approximately 3,500 Iranian dissidents, housed in a compound in Ashraf, Iraq, since they voluntarily relinquished their arms in exchange for such protection in 2004. And despite the Status of Forces Agreement of January 2009, the U.S. obligation to continue such protection remains so long as the American military is present and combat operations are ongoing, or at a minimum, to monitor ISF operations around Ashraf.

At issue is whether the pace of the American troop drawdown is consistent with the requirements of continued protection of the Iranian dissidents, especially in view of their ability to counter efforts of the Iranian regime to subvert Iraq. These dissidents have provided valuable intelligence regarding Iranian regime infiltration of Iraq and operate as a political counter to Tehran’s pressure on Baghdad. The dissidents have also acted as an interlocutor between Sunnis with influence over the insurgency on one hand, and the U.S. military on the other hand, helping to peel Sunnis away from the insurgency and encouraging their peaceful participation within the Iraqi political system.

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That Turkish-Israeli relations are experiencing a crisis became apparent to all the world at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland where Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Israeli President Shimon Peres exchanged harsh, emotional, and even insulting words Such public and personal recriminations between ostensible allies are virtually unheard of. In the immediate wake of the incident, both sides took modest steps to downplay and contain, albeit not reverse, the damage incurred at Davos.

This led some observers to conclude that ultimately the blow-out at Davos would amount to little. After all, the lynchpin of Turkish-Israeli relations is military cooperation. Both the Turkish and Israeli militaries have derived significant benefits from their cooperation. And as everyone knows, the Turkish military is highly autonomous in setting Turkish security policy and it has little sympathy for Erdoğan or the party he leads. Thus, according to this line of thinking, even if Erdoğan’s outburst was in fact more than a clever ploy to boost his party’s chances in the upcoming Turkish elections this March, the core of Turkish-Israeli relations, military cooperation, would still be preserved.

This is, I think, far too complacent an interpretation. As I suggested here, the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations that was revealed at Davos is rooted in part in structural changes, and the causes behind Turkey’s alienation from Israel are broader than Erdoğan’s personal inclinations or the religious sympathies of his party’s base, however important those may be.

This weekend Turkish-Israeli relations took another tumble. The Commander of Israeli Ground Forces Avi Mizrahi was quoted in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz as saying that Erdoğan “should look in the mirror” before he criticized Peres at Davos for “knowing very well how to kill”—words described by the newspaper as “a clear allusion to the massacre of the Armenians [in World War One] and the suppression of the Kurds.” Mizrahi added also that Turkey’s invasion of northern Cyprus deprives it of any basis by which to criticize Israel as an occupying power.

The following day, February 14, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Israel’s ambassador to Turkey and demanded an “urgent explanation” for General Mizrahi’s words. That same day the Turkish General Staff (headquarters pictured above) issued a statement declaring Mizrahi’s remarks to be factually distorting, inappropriate, unfortunate, unbefitting for someone of Mizrahi’s authority and responsibilities, and potentially damaging to the national interests of the two countries. The General Staff expects an explanation from the Israelis. The Israeli General Staff has said that Mizrahi’s remarks do not represent its own views.

Undoubtedly, strong incentives to preserve cooperation remain on both sides. Yet now with senior Turkish and Israeli generals on the verge of a public quarrel, cracks are appearing in the very lynchpin of Turkish-Israeli relations. Given the categorical nature of the assertions and demands being made by each side, the damage can be smoothed over, but it cannot be undone. Neither side can completely satisfy the other without backing down and backtracking in some form. And swallowing humble pie is something for which no military trains its officers.

Following on Scott Carpenter’s excellent post on the state of the Iraqi elections, it is also worthwhile to consider the security situation in Iraq. A year ago, I asked if 2008 would be

the year when the gains in security are met by gains in stability, or will the tremendous tactical gains achieved by our troops be withered away because of a lack of political consensus and the lack of political reconciliation? (Will those) gains in security translate into gains in stability? The next phase (of the Surge) will be far more difficult as it depends more on the Iraqis themselves to show progress on key legislation, show progress in their economy and to show progress in reconciliation.

As 2008 demonstrated, there were tremendous gains in internal security, and the recent elections demonstrate that there is a flicker of hope for political consensus and reconciliation. The economy is in good shape and in many ways the envy of the region, despite the low price of oil. Regional governments, while not embracing Maliki, at least are no longer rejecting “that Iranian in Baghdad.” Overall, both the political and security situations are far better than one might have hoped in early 2007 when the “Surge” decision was announced. As a wag recently noted, the ultimate metric of success—the fact that the war in Iraq rarely merits front page news—has been achieved.

However, the situation still remains tenuous and there is no reason for complacency or casual dismissal of the challenges. As I did in early 2008, let me offer a checklist of leading indicators for 2009.

1. Keep an eye on potential flashpoints: Kirkuk, the pace of integration of the Sons of Iraq into Iraqi Security Forces, and post-election violence as results are announced.
2. Keep an eye on Iran, Syria, Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups. How will they see 2009? An opportunity to step into a perceived vacuum created by the departing U.S. forces? An opportunity to create mischief for the new U.S. administration? An opportunity to interfere in the wake of the recent Iraqi elections?
3. What will be the effect of a 16-month withdrawal policy for the U.S. combat brigades? As this will require the return of a brigade per month, will this lead to a security vacuum in those regions now covered?
4. Will the U.S. administration adhere to a 16-month schedule, or will there be some flexibility in this timeline?
5. Will the Iraqi government stick to the requirement for all U.S. forces to be out of the country by the end of 2011? Will there be provisions made for trainers, enablers, CT forces and the protection of U.S. facilities?
6. Are the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) ready to take over the responsibility in each of those brigade areas? While the ISF have proven willing and able to handle the direct fire engagements, they have been dependent to a great degree on U.S. intelligence, air support, logistics, fire support and communications. Is the ISF ready to fight a full-spectrum counterinsurgency on its own?
7. What will be the operational consequences of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)? Will insurgents and extremists attempt to leverage perceived restrictions on U.S. forces to increase their activities?
8. What will be the commercial consequences of the Status of Forces agreement on contractor organizations? Will contractors—which now number well over 100,000 and handle much of the logistical and commercial activities—depart en masse given the transfer of legal jurisdiction from the parent country to the Iraqi judicial system and the departure of large numbers of U.S. forces?
9. Is the Iraqi Government ready to take responsibility for the large number of detainees that the SOFA hands over to them? Will the pressures of local politics demand the release of large numbers of detainees? How will the Iraqi government treat those detainees it retains? Will they cure or create the next generation of insurgents?
10. Will the downturn in oil prices have an effect on the budgets of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Intelligence? It was hoped that the Iraqi budget would include $12 billion for the ISF, and that these funds would pay for salaries, operations and procurement. Will the procurement budgets remain sufficient to buy the equipment necessary to pick up where the U.S. forces have left?

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Some of the many interactive geography quizzes on the web ask visitors to identify the countries and capitals of the Middle East. We assume MESH readers have no problem there, so we’ve collected links to more challenging quizzes. There’s no end to learning.

• Iraq. The United States has been at war in Iraq for five years, but only one in three young Americans can even find it on the map. You can find it, but can you identify all of Iraq’s governates and their capital cities? There are two good versions of the governates quiz, here and here. And once you’ve aced that, move on to the capitals quiz.

• Iran. This weblog has devoted much attention to Iran, the rising power. An Iranian who purports to know something about the United States can probably identify the great State of Texas on a map. So can you identify the great province of Fars? Try your hand at this quiz.

And there is also much talk about how Iran’s ethnic groups might be turned against the Islamic regime. Take this quiz and see whether you can find them.

• Afghanistan and Yemen. U.S. forces have been in Afghanistan even longer than they have been in Iraq, and the President-elect wants to send more. Take the same rigorous test for provinces of Afghanistan, in two versions, here and here. And for the truly expert (or for Yemenis), see if you can navigate another hot spot in the GWOT, by identifying the governates of Yemen, here.

• More fun/frustration. Forget about those simple interactive quizzes that ask you to identify leaders or flags, and try these instead. Here are ten Middle Eastern countries; order them by population size. And here are another ten; order them by total military expenditure. (The answers are supposedly based on the CIA World Factbook.)

From Peter R. Mansoor

When I deployed to Iraq in June 2003, I decided to keep a daily journal as a personal memoir for my family. This was, after all, my first experience in combat, and my experiences as the commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division (aka the “Ready First Combat Team”) would be a defining moment in my life. For 13 months I wrote faithfully in my journal every day (or, more usually, late at night), no matter how tired I was. When I returned home in July 2004, I considered expanding the journal into a book-length manuscript, albeit still with the idea to present it as a personal memoir for my family. After some reflection, I decided that a more expansive treatment of my experiences in Iraq could fill a broader need by explaining what went right and wrong during the crucial first year after the fall of Baghdad in the spring of 2003.

Currently, the Iraq War genre is filled with books written by junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers recounting their experiences on the streets and in the deserts of Iraq. Although a few of these works are quite good, on the whole they lack context at the higher operational and strategic levels of the war. Books written by reporters fill some of this void, but these works are written by those on the outside of the military peering into headquarters to which they did not belong. Memoirs by very senior political and military leaders are more or less self-exculpatory, and too often attempt to deflect blame for what went wrong. A significant void currently exists in the history of the war, one which I try to fill with Baghdad at Sunrise. By explaining the conflict from the perspective of a senior commander who served in Iraq, the book fills a critical gap in the public’s understanding of the war.

Beyond giving the public a better idea of what happened on the ground in Iraq in the war’s first year, the broader goal of Baghdad at Sunrise is to provide lessons for the future as the United States and its allies continue the struggle in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. A lot has been written about our political and strategic failings, but the story of U.S. Army operations in Iraq has been told mainly through the eyes of people outside the institution. My hope is that the book is also a good read—a story not just worth telling, but a story well told.

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