Iranian regime goals of Islamic and Shia domination are not secret; these are the explicit raison d’être of the regime, not to be negotiated away to build “confidence” and a “more prosperous and productive relationship with the international community.”

On the basis of a study of thousands of Iranian statements over most of revolutionary Iran’s existence, a book I coauthored, What Makes Tehran Tick: Islamist Ideology and Hegemonic Interests, provides evidence to support Salzman about the central role of ideological aims for Tehran and its pursuit of hegemonic interests.

We conclude that ideology is a driving force in the Iranian regime’s decision making and makes American-style carrot-and-stick diplomacy unlikely to succeed. The nature of the regime in Tehran is important because it explains why the Iranian leadership perpetually seeks to confront Israel and the United States despite deterrent threats from both and offers to cooperate from Washington. Threats and promises have little effect on a regime whose leaders perceive the very existence of those two nations as a danger to continuation of their theocratic regime. Our study finds that the Islamic Republic perceives itself as engaged in two struggles: one for leadership of the Islamic world and the other a clash of civilizations with Western values of democratization, secularization, and globalization as embodied by Israel and the United States.

In addition to considering Israel as part of the West and thus a regime threat, quest for leadership in the Islamic world may be responsible for vitriolic rhetoric toward the Jewish State. There is no historical reason why Persians should engage in antagonistic behavior toward Jews, such as President Ahmadinejad’s appointment of a leading holocaust denier as deputy culture minister for media affairs in the Iranian cabinet. And because of the perceived ideological confrontation with the West, it is not surprising that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei spoke so harshly about the United States in a speech in which he characterized as “arrogant” the American attitude toward nuclear talks.

The bottom line is that Salzman is correct about the key role of ideology in Iran. Those who view the Islamic Republic as a normal state with which we can do business are unlikely to succeed because of the ideological nature of the regime.

Raymond Tanter is a member of MESH.

There are, of course, many Russified Muslims in Russia. As I tell my students, a typical Muslim one encounters in Russia and Central Asia is a Tolstoy-reading, vodka-drinking, mini-skirt wearing young lady who is deeply frightened by the prospect of Islamic fundamentalism and who regards Russia as a branch of Western civilization which offers her both protection and opportunity. The rising xenophobia inside Russia, however, is alienating many Russian Muslims as well as those who come to work there from Central Asia. Outsourcing Chechnya to the Kadyrov clan—former rebels who have imposed their own thuggish version of Islamic law and who increasingly appear to see Moscow as dependent on them and not vice versa—is hardly a recipe for stability.

Moscow’s willingness earlier this year to allow the United States to ship weapons across Russia to Afghanistan indicates that the Kremlin understands that if the United States fails in Afghanistan, it is Russian-backed regimes in Central Asia and Russia itself that will suffer most from a resurgent Taliban. But even if the United States increases its commitment to Afghanistan and successfully pushes back against the Taliban, this will not do much of anything to salvage the deteriorating security situation that Moscow faces in the North Caucasus.

A large part of Moscow’s problem in dealing with the North Caucasus relates to Laqueur’s observation about Russia being obsessed with imaginary dangers and neglecting real ones. To even acknowledge that Russia is facing an increasingly serious challenge in the North Caucasus would require acknowledging that Russia has not reemerged as the great power that the Kremlin loudly proclaims it to be. A logical consequence of acknowledging the seriousness of the threat in the North Caucasus would also require Moscow to acknowledge that it needs help from America and other nations—badly—in order to counter it. While doing this might actually enhance Russian security, it would also deeply undercut the image of Russia as a great power that the Kremlin has sought to project abroad, at home, and—not least—to itself. This something that the Putin/Medvedev “leadership” may not just be unwilling, but actually unable to do.

Mark N. Katz is a member of MESH.

To be fair, Hala’s colleagues within the Journalists’ Syndicate are not whipping up outrage over nothing. To many in Egypt, the peace with Israel is shameful because it is a separate peace, having abandoned the Palestinians to fend for themselves in what is anything but a fair fight against the mighty IDF and the resources of the state of Israel. Over the course of the 30 years since Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin inked the peace treaty, Israel invaded Lebanon (a couple of times), poured hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers into the West Bank and Gaza Strip (until the withdrawal from the latter in 2005), imprisoned tens of thousands of Palestinians (including women and children), and killed untold numbers. All the while, Egyptian sat on the sidelines and did very little other than “strongly condemn” or “refer to the United Nations,” while continuing to host Israeli leaders in Cairo or Sharm el Sheikh. When President Hosni Mubarak recalled his longtime ambassador to Israel, Mohammed Bassiouny, in protest over Israel’s handling of the al-Aqsa Intifada it was a big deal, but the peace treaty was never in jeopardy.

Yet, even if we stipulate that Egyptians have every right to hate Israelis, shouldn’t it be up to Hala to decide whom she entertains in her office? I don’t hold a brief for Hala. I know her, but not well. I’ve written about her journal in Foreign Policy’s “Global Newsstand.” I have heard her say some wacky things like her call for secularization of the Arab world along the lines of Mustafa Kemal’s reforms in Turkey in the 1920s, but we’ve all written and said things that weren’t necessarily analytically sound. My point is, regardless of how one feels about Hala and her work, there is a principle here. The journalists and writers who have attacked Hala are, I am told, at the forefront of agitating for personal and political freedom in Egypt. Yet, in enforcing a code of “no normalization,” they are in effect doing the bidding of a regime they ostensibly revile. They may not like what she has done, but whether she meets with Shalom Cohen, Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, Yossi Bellin, Tzip Livni or Zohan Dvir should be left to Hala’s professional judgment and her own conscience.

Of course, being perceived to play into the regime’s double game on Israel is no doubt not a reason for Egypt’s intellectuals to meet with Israelis. After all, many who support democracy in Egypt believe that a government more responsive to its citizens will be better equipped to resist the predatory policies of Israel and the United States. Still, this boycott thing seems to have gone a bit beyond reason. Writing in al-Masri al-Yawm, Ammar Ali Hassan called Hala’s meeting with Ambassador Cohen “a crime.” Others have been equally nasty and overwrought in their condemnations of Hala. It’s all a bit over the top.

The whole sad episode is rather revealing of the state of journalism in Egypt and, as Fouad Ajami might say, of “Egypt’s men and women of letters.” To be sure, there have been some bright spots in the last five years or so. The launch of al-Masri al-Yawm in 2004, despite Ammar Ali Hassan’s diatribe referenced above, the work of al-Dustur and a variety of other publications, as well as the hard work of any number of bloggers have successfully altered the prevailing political discourse in Egypt in a variety of positive ways. For example, despite the regime’s effort to embed their notions of “stability and development” in the Egyptian population, many are focused on reform and change instead, thanks in part to Egypt’s journalists.

That said, there is a sense that the Egyptian media is falling behind it peers elsewhere in the region. Whereas al-Ahram (which Lebanese Christians founded) and other Egyptian publications once were serious publications, they are now for the most part tendentious, predictable, and entirely uninteresting. Much of this, of course, has to do with the authoritarian political system in which Egypt’s journalists must operate, but the fault does not lie entirely with President Mubarak and his colleagues.

A number of years ago, the State Department dragooned me into a two-week tour of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to discuss U.S. Middle East policy. I did the rounds in Cairo and then headed off to Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dhahran. Somewhere along the way I came to a stunning conclusion: The Saudi journalists, writers, and academics seemed far more sophisticated, worldly, well-read, and willing to wrestle with alternative ideas than the Egyptians. I got my fair share of Saudi conspiracy mongering about the “Jewish lobby” and how Washington wanted to replace Saudi Arabia with Iran as its primary interlocutor in the Gulf, but I was on the receiving end of similar ideas and much more in Cairo. The Saudis, like their Egyptian counterparts, are forced to operate in an authoritarian environment, yet in comparison they seem enlightened. After Egyptian journalists and writers are finished devouring one of their own over a boycott that has done absolutely nothing to advance the Palestinian cause, they might want to investigate why collectively they have become little more than a second rate sideshow in a region bursting with journalistic activity.

Steven A. Cook is a member of MESH.

In a 2008 essay entitled “The Conundrum of Iran: Strengthening Moderates without Acquiescing to Belligerence,” Brennan wrote the following regarding Hezbollah:

It is similarly foolhardy to believe that Hezbollah will not remain a potent political force within Lebanon for many years to come, as the organization has strong support within the Lebanese Shia community and well-established political and social welfare credentials throughout the country. Hezbollah’s growing paramilitary strength and political and social resiliency were clearly demonstrated in 2006, when Israel showed a remarkable inability to inflict strategic damage on Hezbollah despite a major military campaign to do so.

It would not be foolhardy, however, for the United States to tolerate, and even to encourage, greater assimilation of Hezbollah into Lebanon’s political system, a process that is subject to Iranian influence. Hezbollah is already represented in the Lebanese parliament and its members have previously served in the Lebanese cabinet, reflections of Hezbollah’s interest in shaping Lebanon’s political future from within government institutions. This political involvement is a far cry from Hezbollah’s genesis as solely a terrorist organization dedicated to murder, kidnapping, and violence. Not coincidentally, the evolution of Hezbollah into a fully vested player in the Lebanese political system has been accompanied by a marked reduction in terrorist attacks carried out by the organization. The best hope for maintaining this trend and for reducing the influence of violent extremists within the organization—as well as the influence of extremist Iranian officials who view Hezbollah primarily as a pawn of Tehran—is to increase Hezbollah’s stake in Lebanon’s struggling democratic processes.

Because Israel views Hezbollah as a serious and lethal adversary, this will not be an easy sell. Washington will need to convince Israeli officials that they must abandon their aim of eliminating Hezbollah as a political force. This previously employed Israeli strategy did not work with the PLO and Fatah, and Israeli officials have adapted to the reality of engaging in political dialogue and negotiations with Palestinians formerly branded as “terrorists.” A similar change must take place within the minds of Israeli government officials in regard to Hezbollah. One way to help effect this change would be if Iran were willing to press Hezbollah to cease its attacks against civilian targets and to declare so publicly. While insufficient to satisfy many Israelis who view Hezbollah as a serious military threat, it would be a positive first step.

More recently, Brennan briefly made headlines for essentially reiterating this argument at a talk he gave at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in early August. Brennan’s comments came in response to a question by The Nation correspondent, Robert Dreyfuss, whether the United States should start talking to organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban. Brennan focused most on Hezbollah and painted a remarkable picture of the group:

Hezbollah started out as purely a terrorist organization back in the early ’80s and has evolved significantly over time. And now it has members of parliament, in the cabinet; there are lawyers, doctors, others who are part of the Hezbollah organization.

However, within Hezbollah, there’s still a terrorist core. And hopefully those elements within the Shia community in Lebanon and within Hezbollah at large—they’re going to continue to look at that extremist terrorist core as being something that is anathema to what, in fact, they’re trying to accomplish in terms of their aspirations about being part of the political process in Lebanon. And so, quite frankly, I’m pleased to see that a lot of Hezbollah individuals are in fact renouncing that type of terrorism and violence and are trying to participate in the political process in a very legitimate fashion.

Whether or not Brennan was the source for the Washington Post report, one can detect the similarity of the viewpoints that are evidently, as per the WaPo report, being raised by “some White House advisers.”

The main points of the argument are familiar to anyone who’s kept up with the scholarly literature on Hezbollah, especially the proponents of the so-called “Lebanonization” theory, chief among whom is Augustus Richard Norton. This view holds that Hezbollah has “evolved” from a terrorist group into a mainstream political party.

In order to sustain this argument, its proponents have often resorted to distancing Hezbollah from terrorist activity dating after its involvement in Lebanese politics, or, at the very least, minimizing it. This had been the norm in Hezbollah scholarship prior to the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh in February 2008.

Brennan does the same in his 2008 article, claiming rather remarkably, that “the evolution” of Hezbollah into a political player was simultaneous with “a marked reduction in terrorist attacks carried out by the organization.” Moreover, “increasing Hezbollah’s stake” in the Lebanese political process has had no effect on Hezbollah’s military operations, as evident form their involvement in Iraq, and Yemen, Egypt and Azerbaijan (as noted by Matt Levitt in his post).

However, what’s more problematic is the definition of “political participation.” Hezbollah has made a mockery of Lebanon’s constitution and parliamentary political traditions. Needless to say, the idea of a sectarian group with an arsenal that rivals that of an army, and with external foreign connections and networks, “participating in politics in a tightly balanced sectarian society” is itself an absurdity.

Furthermore, those who make this argument miss the point of Hezbollah’s political participation: it is precisely in order to protect its military autonomy. This was articulated by a Hezbollah spokesman in a 2007 interview with the International Crisis Group: “Paradoxically, some want us to get involved in the political process in order to neutralise us. In fact, we intend to get involved—but precisely in order to protect the strategic choice of resistance.”

Hezbollah has used its weapons in order to bend the political system to fit its agenda and has intimidated its political rivals by force of arms. As the author of the ICG report, Patrick Haenni, put it: “Hezbollah realized that they had [to be internally involved to a greater extent], but the issue was still to secure their weapons…. Hezbollah has a real interest in making the state part of its global project.”

The flawed understanding of the nature of Hezbollah has led people like Brennan to posit the existence of various “wings” in Hezbollah: “extremists” vs. “moderates” and those who supposedly “renounce terrorism” vs. those who support it. While this illusory categorization has not been translated into U.S. policy, it has, alas, become British policy. Ironically, Hezbollah officials have publicly mocked this kind of artificial dichotomies.

This fundamental misunderstanding of the group is captured in the wording of the Washington Post report, which described Hezbollah as “the armed Lebanese political movement.” That has it backwards. To quote Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, Hezbollah is “first and foremost a jihadi movement that engages in politics, and not a political party that conducts jihad.” One must qualify that further by adding what Na’im Qassem wrote in his book, that the jurisprudent (al-wali al-faqih)—i.e., Iran’s Supreme Guide, Ali Khamenei—”alone possesses the authority to decide war and peace,” and matters of jihad. Therefore, in effect Hezbollah is a light infantry division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

That’s not the kind of model the US wants to see in Afghanistan.

Tony Badran is research fellow with the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Perhaps we should consider whether the Pashtun tribes are a problem because they are Taliban, or whether the Taliban is a problem because of its support by Pashtun tribes. Correspondingly, rather than considering how we should deal with the Taliban, perhaps we should consider how we should deal with the Pashtun tribes.

The American military has had recent success in allying with once-insurgent Sunni tribes in Anbar province of Iraq, and other tribes elsewhere in Iraq. They did this, in part, by dealing directly with the tribes, rather than through the framework of the Iraqi government. There is a good reason that such direct ties were successful: tribes are by their nature not units of states, but alternatives to states; tribes detest interference, and strongly prefer independence to state control.

As long as the intervention in Afghanistan places state-building as its highest priority, tribes will naturally lean toward resistance. So what is more important: building a state apparatus, or stabilizing the region and removing threats to external parties? In the short- and medium-run, treating with the tribes may be the most effective way to stabilize and neutralize the region.

Philip Carl Salzman is a member of MESH.

Hala’s case also sheds a spotlight on the stifling conformity that still pervades much of Egyptian life. For the entire decade I have known her, Hala has been harassed repeatedly for being too liberal, too independent, too pro-American, too willing to talk to Israelis, and for being a woman who stands shoulder to shoulder with men in a society where that is still rare. I hope that, in her hearing before the Journalists Syndicate, high-ranking people from the Ahram Center and/or NDP will stand up to say that in meeting with an Israeli official, Hala has been neither more nor less patriotic than President Hosni Mubarak. I hope someone also points out how hypocritical it is of Egyptians to praise President Obama’s willingness to engage Iran, an enemy nation, while Egyptians themselves refuse to meet with the ambassador of a neighboring country with which Egypt is ostensibly at peace.

Michele Dunne is a member of MESH.

Robert O. Freedman is a member of MESH.

Experience of the past three decades clearly shows that whenever non-OPEC producers like the United States increase their production, OPEC decreases supply accordingly, keeping the overall amount of oil in the market the same. In other words, when we drill more, OPEC drills less.

What happens when we use less oil due to gasoline taxes or mandatory fuel efficiency standards? We just had a good demonstration on this last year. In 2008, gasoline prices soared to nearly $5 a gallon. Think of it as a $3 gasoline tax, which is much more than we would be able to impose today through legislation. As a result U.S. gasoline demand dropped by nearly 10 percent. This was as if the U.S. fleet increased fuel efficiency by 2.5 mpg overnight. Improving fuel economy by that much could have saved the United States almost one million barrels per day.

What was OPEC’s response? Between October and December that year, OPEC dropped production by roughly 4 mbd, which is more than the amount of oil that was actually saved due to reduced consumer demand.

Strategically, domestic drilling and increased fuel efficiency are two sides of the same coin. The axiom to remember is: when non-OPEC countries drill more, OPEC drills less, and when we use less, OPEC also drills less.

Playing in the same playing field with the likes of Hugo Chavez, Saudi King Abdullah, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Vladimir Putin is playing a game we can never win. They have most of the world’s oil; we have—drill everywhere—barely three percent of conventional oil reserves. The sooner we adjust our thinking and focus on game-changing, transformational solutions, instead of inconsequential, time-buying policies, the sooner we can reach true and lasting energy independence.

Gal Luft is a member of MESH.

Robert O. Freedman is a member of MESH.

The United States is hurt when the price of oil goes too high, regardless of what share of our consumption is imported. It is high oil prices, caused by production capacity being too little above oil demand, that gives oil suppliers power. If it is a buyers’ market, as it often has been, and as recently as a decade or so ago, oil suppliers do not have political power—although some of them have more money than we would prefer.

The worldwide balance between supply and demand is improved when anyone reduces demand, or when anyone increases production.

At least for the next several decades there is ample oil in the ground—in various forms—so that production capacity can be comfortably above demand if sufficient investment is made.

Oil prices could be high if total consumption ten years from now were lower than today, the same as today, or higher than today. And those prices could also be low if consumption then were higher, lower or the same. It is not the level of consumption that counts, it is the ratio of production capacity to consumption that matters. And production capacity is within our collective power to determine; it depends on investment in production equipment and facilities—and on overcoming various political barriers to production.

Max Singer is an independent consultant on public policy and a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.