On the two major Middle East issues that divide Russia and the United States and that could have been talked about at the U.S.-Russian summit—Moscow’s legitimization of Hamas by regularly inviting its delegations to Moscow, and Russia’s protection of Iran from serious UN Security Council sanctions—not much appears to have been accomplished. I have seen no references to Hamas, and as far as Iran is concerned, all that Obama was willing to say publicly was the following:

Ultimately, you know, we’re going to have to see whether a country like Russia, for example, is willing to work with us to apply pressure on Iran. That’s not something we’re going to know the results of, probably for several more months, as we do the basic diplomatic work of putting this coalition together.

A Russian source, Yury Ushakov, an aide to Putin, told Interfax: “Obama said emphatically that Russia and the United States could cooperate more intensively on Iran, that Russia’s role is extremely important there, and that America is interested in stronger cooperation.”

What Ushakov’s comment may imply is that if Obama were to give Moscow a freer hand in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia might be more willing to be more cooperative on Iran. I doubt Obama is willing to make that bargain.

From Steven R. Ward

Immortal grew out of my nearly quarter-century of covering Middle East military issues as a CIA intelligence analyst. I had looked for years without success for a book covering the broad sweep of Iran’s military history, and had occasionally thought that perhaps I should try to fill that gap. There were three factors, however, that pushed me from thinking about writing to actually doing it: ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions, my experiences with the Afghan and Iraq wars, and the utility of having such a history available for analysts joining the intelligence community since September 2001.

When I started working on Immortal in late 2005, the potential for hostilities between the United States and Iran was a concern for Washington because of Iran’s role in post-Saddam Iraq and its provision of weapons and training to armed groups opposing Coalition forces there and in Afghanistan. Given Iran’s history of supporting provocative lethal activities against U.S. interests I was concerned that, totally distinct from the U.S. policy debate, the Islamic Republic was capable of triggering a conflict.

Admittedly, the improved situation in Iraq lowered tension as I moved my manuscript into the publication process in late 2007 and early 2008. More recently, President Obama’s offer of an open hand to Tehran may have further decreased the likelihood of hostilities. I still think, however, that Iran remains a potential military opponent for the United States as it seeks to elevate its influence and change the regional status quo at America’s expense. Should events take us back toward more hostile relations, Immortal can help show how Iran has been shaped by its history and, in turn, improve our understanding of Tehran’s security outlook and strategies. And, not to be too negative, I think that knowing Iran’s military history, which covers a lot of the grievances the Iranian regime has asked the U.S. government to address, can be useful in any efforts to improve relations between our countries.

Back-to-back assignments working on the intelligence side of Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and Operation Iraqi Freedom against Saddam Hussein were the events that made me think seriously about writing Immortal in preparation for potential military encounters with Iran. In both cases, as intelligence community analysts were shifted from their primary country accounts to support these U.S. military operations, I saw the great need others had for help in understanding Afghanistan and Iraq and in putting current events into their larger historical context. Analysts with more time on these accounts, I noted, were able to do some of the best work because they were familiar, not only with the Soviet experience in Afghanistan or the Iran-Iraq war, but with the role of Afghanistan’s ethnic and tribal traditions in combating the British in the 19th century or with the British occupation of Iraq in the 1920s. So, it was not much of a leap to decide that a book on Iran’s military history would be very useful to have on hand in the event of a conflict.

The traumatic events of the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the emotions that surrounded the run up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, also reminded me that a stronger grasp of the history shaping these foreign cultures was one of the best protections against analysis distorted by our own heightened nationalism and ethnocentric views. I wrote Immortal, in part, in the hope that a better understanding of Iran’s history would prevent preconceptions, misconceptions, and ethnocentric bias from clouding our view of Iran’s true capabilities and likely intentions. As an intelligence analyst, I was aware that, at least since the days of Sherman Kent and start of the U.S. intelligence community, one of the primary objectives of strategic intelligence has been an empathetic understanding of foreign countries. My history aims to contribute to such an empathetic understanding of Iran, helping us to avoid problems (as discussed in Kenneth Booth’s Strategy and Ethnocentrism) that deprive an adversary of intentions other than hostility, but also deprive our policy of constructive possibilities on which to build a more stable relationship.

Finally, I am a strong believer that history matters, and this is something I wanted to share with the new analysts joining the intelligence community to work on Iran and other critical national security issues. As historians and strategists have noted over the years, our experience with the past provides the only real empirical data we have about how people conduct war and behave in crisis. New analysts and others dealing with Iran also can benefit from Immortal’s presentation of the role of Iran’s military history and ethnic, tribal, and religious heritages in shaping contemporary issues such as civil-military relations, military professionalism, and innovation. Its military history also helps distinguish Iran’s war-fighting style from that of neighboring Arab militaries, and can add nuance to analysis of regional power balances.

Knowing Iran’s history, of course, does not provide easy answers for such a complex country. But my fondest hope is that Immortal will help intelligence analysts, military personnel, policymakers, and other interested Americans isolate the important questions about Iran that affect peace and stability in the region.

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the CIA or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or Agency endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

Israel America Academic Exchange (IAAE) is a new organization that sponsors educational missions to Israel for American scholars in the fields of political science, international relations, international law, international economic development, modern history, and Middle East studies. By special arrangement, participants in the inaugural mission (June 22-29) have been invited to guest-post their impressions and assessments. Bruce Jentleson is professor of public policy and political science at Duke University. He is also a member of MESH.

From Bruce Jentleson

Central to our discussions was the debate over force and diplomacy as Israeli strategies, so I’ll focus on that for this post.

Is it the case that the lessons of the last 10-15 years are that force has worked, both as compellence and deterrence, and diplomacy has not? This was the dominant argument we heard from Israeli speakers. While the speaker selection was short of representative, I know from other interactions and reading that this perspective has become more prevalent. It also is a view our American group debated among ourselves.

Four main parts to the argument:

1. The Gaza war was intended to impose substantial costs on Hamas and to deter further attacks on Israel. It achieved both; e.g., attacks from Gaza are down since the war.
2. The same regarding Hezbollah and the 2006 Lebanon war: Look at the northern front and how quiet Hezbollah has been, and how weakened the recent elections showed it to be in Lebanese politics.
3. Oslo didn’t work; Camp David 2000 was another instance of the Palestinians never missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity; unilateral withdrawals, both Barak in Lebanon and Sharon in Gaza, gave land but didn’t bring pace; plus the recent stories swirling about Olmert ostensibly offering even concessions on Jerusalem. Arafat was an essentialist; his successors may have more will but lack capacity; Hamas is ideological.
4. The status quo is not great for Israel, but it’s tolerable. Risk aversion, both security and politics, says keep relying on military power. Be sufficiently willing to negotiate to check off that box for the United States and the international community but not much more. Don’t antagonize the political coalition on which your power (read Netanyahu’s) depends.

An alternative analysis:

• Gaza: The evidence is more mixed and uncertain than claimed. On the one hand we were told of how few rockets had been launched, on the other of how there’d been a recent uptick. At minimum, six months is hardly enough of an empirical base on which to attribute durable deterrence success. The criteria for durability is not some out-there notion of the long-term, but it also can’t be so short term as to need to be “serviced” again with anything close to a comparable operation in the next year or two. Moreover, gains made need to be part of a net assessment that also takes into account costs incurred and gains made by the other side. One can see a strategic logic for Hamas by which the price it paid had value as (a) diversionary war, detracting attention from problems of its governance and re-igniting the enemy on which to increase its appeal (so lowering a negative source and increasing a positive one), and (b) playing into Israeli politics in ways that strengthen the Right, which in turn makes for strained relations w/the United States. The net assessment may still come out positive, but less dichotomously.
• 2006 Lebanon War: We do have three years of data, and it is a fact that the northern border has been quieter than in many years. That goes in the plus column, as does the demonstrated capacity to impose costs. But in the negative column: the Israeli military’s failure to prevail in this nonconventional warfare as a deterrence-weakening message; the failure to bring captured soldiers home alive; the political disarray that helped doom the Olmert government; and the further loss of international legitimacy as an instrumental and not just normative matter. Moreover, the causal link to Hezbollah’s June 2009 election performance is questionable. Hezbollah came out of the war strengthened. But it then overplayed its hand by unleashing its militias into Lebanese politics in 2007-08. Then as intervening variables in the run-up to the election, Saudi money for the coalition and, I’d at least postulate, the Obama effect made it more politically legitimate to at least not be anti-American.
• Lessons of Oslo, other diplomacy: George Kennan made the distinction between flaws of execution and flaws in the concept. The former means that the policy could have worked but was done poorly; the latter that it was inherently flawed. Oslo, et al., did have elements of the latter, but also plenty of the former, and on all sides (United States, Israel, Palestinians, others). It didn’t work—but that doesn’t mean it couldn’t have worked. What would have happened if Rabin was not assassinated, given his domestic credibility and that he was having at least a degree of success in dealing with Arafat? And if the 1996 election, which Netanyahu won by less than 1 percent amidst the spoilers who got going on both sides, had come out differently? If the Clinton administration had been less accommodating and firmer against both sides playing both sides of the street? In the end, Arafat was the major problem, a Gromyko-like Mr. Nyet. He was never going to be a Mandela, but the essentialist analysis is too straight-line and dismissive of decision points and interactive dynamics along the way. As to Hamas, while it’s shown plenty of essentialism, it’s not clear that even this is fixed; see, e.g., the analysis of Khaled Meshal’s recent speech by Brig. Gen. (ret) Shlomo Brom.
• Deteriorating status quo: The domestic opportunity costs to Israel from the status quo were more graphic to me than ever before. See the economic analysis by Professor Dan Ben-David, Tel Aviv University and head of the Taub Center for Social Policy Research. Walk around and see and feel the rising societal power of the ultra-Orthodox, abetted by continuation of the Palestinian conflict both directly through the political utility of the enemy and indirectly as a distraction from the nation focusing on the threats to its balance of secularism and Jewish identity.
• Shifting regional strategic dynamics? While much is too soon to tell, there are signs that the strategic dynamics in the region may be shifting. Anti-fundamentalism is pushing back on many fronts in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The U.S.-Syria relationship has some traction. Perhaps Iran will come out of the current crisis more flexible. The Saudis and Arab League may be ready to make their peace initiative more than a piece of paper. Don’t know for sure, but the alignment of forces may potentially be more favorable than in a long time.
• Palestinians as a credible peace partner and viable state: This may not be the world’s hardest case for state-building, but it’s up there. Among the many challenges their leadership faces is better synching their maximalist positions on terms of a peace and their more limited capacities as yet to function as a viable state. This is tricky politically as well as in substantive policy terms. It likely will require various roles for various third parties. Plenty of work to be done here: the PA-Hamas talks being run by Egypt, security forces, the economy, lawlessness, spoilers. Not to be underestimated.

I’m still not ready to bet the next mortgage payment (non-subprime) on peace and security in the Middle East. But nothing we saw or heard has been sufficient to counter the Churchillian sense of a peace process still being the worst strategy except for all the others.

Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.

Israel America Academic Exchange (IAAE) is a new organization that sponsors educational missions to Israel for American scholars in the fields of political science, international relations, international law, international economic development, modern history, and Middle East studies. By special arrangement, participants in the inaugural mission (June 22-29) have been invited to guest-post their impressions and assessments. Michael Barnett is Harold Stassen Professor of International Affairs in the Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Policy at the University of Minnesota.

From Michael Barnett

Prior to the trip, I was of the opinion (1) that it is increasingly unlikely that there will be a negotiated two-state solution, and (2) that in the remote chance that the parties do negotiate a settlement, it will lead not to peace but rather to a new phase of the conflict. I believed that the trends were moving in the wrong direction, but I hoped that the trip would alleviate my fears. Although we did not meet a representative sample of Palestinians or Israelis, I came away from my encounters more fearful and anxious than ever before.

The prospects for a negotiated solution appear dim, at best. I see little ground for optimism from the Israeli side. Although Israelis insist that they will always try to negotiate, even the most hopeful of them express little hope. The Israelis seem convinced that they have offered the Palestinians nearly everything they have demanded, but that the Palestinians still prefer to fight it out. Perhaps they do. (Or perhaps Israel has still not offered the best deal possible. In every negotiation, Israel has always claimed that it could do no more, yet it always had more to give: Israeli offers have inched closer to the Palestinian ideal point from Oslo to Camp David to Taba to the purported plan of then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.) Israelis also seem convinced that these failed negotiations represented nothing short of a “test” of the Palestinians’ sincerity regarding the possibility of a peaceful settlement. And Israel’s unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza have not brought peace, but rather allowed their enemies to get closer to Israel’s population centers.

Moreover, and in contrast to my previous trips, I was struck by the near absence of any kind of Israeli sympathy for the Palestinians. Whereas a decade ago I heard Israelis speaking about the rights of Palestinians, the need for justice, and a genuine sympathy for their plight and suffering, this time any sort of compassion was overwhelmed by sheer frustration. Why should the Israelis continue to feel badly for the Palestinians when the Palestinians do not seem prepared to do anything to help themselves?

Because Israelis do not believe that a negotiated two-state solution is likely (though a majority continue to support the idea), they identified a mish-mash of “Plan Bs.” In nearly all cases, though, these contingency plans appears to be a jumble of inconsistencies and logical contradictions: withdrawing alongside occupying, disengaging while engaging, believing that developing the Palestinian economy is the ticket to success despite evidence to the contrary, putting their faith in a wall when Gaza tells them that good fences don’t do much good. The only thing that the Israelis seem to agree upon is that they would like to be rid of the Palestinians.

What about the Palestinians? The Palestinian representatives are certainly more polished than ever. But it was not clear what the Palestinians would accept (or, rather, what the Palestinian leadership would try to sell to their public) short of their maximum demands. I left convinced that while Israel may not have offered the Palestinians the best deal imaginable, the Palestinians might not accept even that. There are lots of explanations for why the Palestinians seem incapable of saying “yes, but,” including principled beliefs, domestic politics, and a lack of Arab support. Perhaps the Palestinian “no” is overdetermined. However, I was impressed by the Palestinian failure to imagine the conditions under which they might accept less than they demand.

Assuming that the Israelis and the Palestinians will not be able to negotiate a two-state solution, and assuming that, as one Israeli negotiator aptly said, the longer we negotiate the more “complex” the situation becomes, what should be done? Until this trip, I supported the idea of an imposed solution, putting a deal on the table (Taba-plus) and telling the parties that they will be rewarded if they accept it and punished if they do not. Some Israelis suggested that the leaders would never be able to reach an agreement on their own and that the Americans would have to apply considerable pressure on both parties. I agree that American pressure will be necessary, but I do not think that American pressure, no matter how intense, can move both parties to peace. Assuming that an imposed solution ever was a viable option, I am not sure it is anymore.

Instead, I think the Israelis should follow the British colonial strategy: withdraw and hand off the problem to the United Nations. The Israeli situation appears eerily like the one confronted by the British mandatory authorities after the Second World War. In 1947, following decades of trying and failing to find a compromise between Jews and Arabs, the British announced their imminent withdrawal and informed the UN that Palestine was now its problem. Israel might do the same. It could tell the UN that it will be “consolidating” its settlements and retreating behind the separation wall (declaring it an armistice line and not a legal border). The Israelis also could announce that they are prepared to internationalize Jerusalem once the security situation has stabilized. In short, rather than another unilateral withdrawal, the Israelis might consider working closely and coordinating with the UN.

At this point, it would be up to the UN Security Council to decide how it wanted to proceed. Ideally, the United States would lead the Security Council to authorize a Chapter VII operation, working closely with the Palestinian Authority (thus giving the moderates considerable legitimacy), replacing the Israelis forces as they withdrew from the territories, and deploying to Gaza if and when the situation became less violent. The international authority would have to be ready, willing, and able to use force if and when necessary, and it also should come bearing a significant aid package. This “strategy” has its various problems, but at least it gives the parties something to look forward to besides mutual suicide.

Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.

One of the joys of traveling in the Middle East is the possibility that one can be on the spot to observe the reactions of the residents of the region to important events as they actually happen, instead of being dependent on newspaper or television reporting of the reactions. Thus, I was fortunate to be in Israel as U.S. President Barak Obama gave his speech on U.S. relations with the Muslim world, and in Egypt when Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu gave his speech on achieving an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. While each speech was aimed at multiple constituencies, there might be just enough overlap between them to jump-start the stalled Arab-Israeli peace process.

President Obama’s speech on U.S. relations with the Muslim world had a major impact, both in Israel and in the Arab world. It is clear that the main goal of Obama’s speech was to turn a new page in U.S.-Muslim and particularly U.S.-Arab relations, and if the reactions of the individuals whom I interviewed in Egypt (in Cairo and Alexandria) are any indication, his words were greeted with great enthusiasm, as he went out of his way to demonstrate respect for Islam.

However, despite the assertions of some right-wing Israeli and American commentators, Obama did not pander to his Muslim audience. He emphasized the need to combat Islamic violence, to stop stereotyping both the United States and Israel, and to accept the Holocaust as a fact. While he also emphasized the need to allow greater roles for women in Muslim society and for democracy—in this he did not go as far as some of my interviewees had hoped—overall his speech was very well received.

As far as Israel was concerned, Obama reiterated the U.S. commitment to Israeli security, but he also made very clear that Israel’s responsibility in moving the peace process forward included accepting a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and stopping the construction of settlements. That Obama’s words were clearly understood in Israel became apparent not only in Netanyahu’s concession on a two-state solution, but also in the words of a security guard whom I interviewed at the West Bank settlement outpost of Kedar Bet (near Maaleh Adumim). When I asked him if Kedar Bet would grow across the valley to meet the already established settlement of Kedar (this is a frequent pattern for settlement growth), he replied: “It all depends on the President of the United States.”

As the security guard’s words indicated, a second audience of Obama’s words was the Israeli body politic. However, in measuring the impact of Obama’s speech on Israel, one must take into consideration the shift to the right of the Israeli public over the past few years, which was reflected in major gains for right-wing parties, and especially Likud, in the election of last February 10 which brought Netanyahu to power as the head of a right-of-center coalition. Essentially, many Israelis, having experienced unilateral withdrawals from Southern Lebanon (2000) and Gaza (2005), which instead of bringing peace brought barrages of Hezbollah and Hamas rockets, were quite sympathetic to Netanyahu’s election position which opposed withdrawals from the West Bank. Such withdrawals, he argued, would result in Hamas rocket attacks against Tel Aviv and Ben-Gurion airport. Thus Obama’s call for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had a negative resonance for many in the center and right of the Israeli political spectrum, and a June 19 poll in the right -of-center Jerusalem Post found that 50 percent of Israelis now considered Obama to be more pro-Palestinian than pro-Israeli. (Only 6 percent considered him to be more pro-Israeli, while 36 percent said his policies were neutral and 8 percent did not comment.)

Nonetheless, despite support from a significant part of the Israeli public for his hard-line policies, Netanyahu could not simply ignore Obama’s speech. Israel is dependent on the United States for $3 billion in annual military aid, for protection in the United Nations against the numerous anti-Israeli resolutions introduced by Israel’s enemies, and, above all, for U.S. support for an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear installations, if the Israeli government deems it necessary—-a possibility now somewhat more likely following the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown on demonstrators after the disputed June 12 Iranian presidential elections.

Consequently, Netanyahu adopted what might be termed a “minimax” strategy: doing the minimum necessary to satisfy the United States—agreeing to a two-state solution, albeit with reservations—while retaining the maximum support in his coalition government. Thus, Netanyahu’s speech was a careful balancing act between the United States and the center-right portions of his coalition government, and the Israeli prime minister’s speech, consequently, precipitated multiple reactions. It was welcomed both by coalition member Labor—the leftist element of Netanyahu’s government—and also by the main opposition party, Kadimah, which may now, at least in part (the faction led by Shaul Mofaz), be prepared to join the coalition. Rightist elements of Netanyahu’s own Likud Party were more reserved in their support, although he sought to win them over with his positions that any Palestinian state would have to be demilitarized, that Jerusalem would remain united under Israeli rule, that no Palestinian refugees could be resettled in Israel, and that Israeli settlers, whom he described as “an integral part of our people, a principled, pioneering and Zionist public” had to be allowed to live “normal lives.”

These positions, together with Netanyahu’s call for the Palestinians to recognize Israel as “the state of the Jewish people,” succeeded in neutralizing, at least in the short run, much of the opposition in his coalition government. Indeed, Netanyahu’s approval ratings shot up after his speech. On the far right of the Israeli political spectrum, however, there were strong protests against Netanyahu’s speech, both by a coalition member, the Jewish Home Party, and by the opposition National Union Party, as well as by some settler leaders such as Rabbi Dov Lior.

Obama, for his part, appeared willing to accept the “half a loaf” which Netanyahu offered—acquiescence in the establishment of a Palestinian State—and, at least initially, appeared to disregard the other elements in Netanyahu’s speech, including his rather vague call for “normal life” for the settlers. Indeed, Obama called Netanyahu’s speech “an important step forward.” By contrast, The response in the Arab world to Netanyahu’s speech was almost universally negative, except for a few commentators writing in Al-Ahram and the Egyptian Gazette, who saw the possibility of building on Netanyahu’s commitment to a two state solution.

The Palestinian leadership on the West Bank, in what I think was a major tactical error, totally rejected the speech which it claimed offered no hope for moving the peace process forward. The lines of the Arab critique of Netanyahu’s speech were as follows: 1) a Palestinian state’s sovereignty would be limited by demilitarization; 2) no Arab could accept Jewish sovereignty over East Jerusalem, including the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque; and 3) Israel was evading its responsibility for the 1948 Palestinian exodus by claiming no Palestinian refugees could be resettled in Israel. Most of all, the Arabs seemed angered by Netanyahu’s demand that Israel be recognized as a Jewish state. noting that such a recognition (they claimed) would make them Zionists and would also jeopardize the position of the Israeli Arabs in Israel.

Given the contrasting views on Netanyahu’s speech, is there any hope for moving the peace process forward? The answer is a qualified “yes,” but it is highly dependent on the actions of Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, who, unfortunately, is not a strong leader. If the July talks in Cairo to set up a national unity government between Hamas and Fatah fail—as many such unity talks have failed in the past—and if Abbas comes to the belated realization that the United States won’t simply “deliver” Israel, as Abbas may have naively thought after his visit to Washington in late May and the Obama speech in Cairo, then Abbas may agree to resume negotiations, building on the two-state solution which Obama pressured Netanyahu to accept. Given the fact that Palestinian elections, both for the Legislative Council and for the Palestinian Executive, are due in January 2010, Abbas may wish to demonstrate some progress in his talks with Netanyahu before the elections.

Netanyahu, for his part, has already made some gestures to Abbas by removing a number of roadblocks and check points on the West Bank to make travel in the region easier, and by agreeing to halt, on a trial basis, Israeli raids into a number of West Bank cities, thus enhancing both the role and the prestige of Palestinian police units. Whether Abbas will be willing to resume talks remains to be seen, and it may well be that Obama, who so far has primarily prodded the Israelis, may find it necessary to pressure Abbas into resuming peace talks.

The Boston Globe, Christian Science Monitor, and Washington Post have dubbed it a “Twitter Revolution,” speculating about whether new technology will enable Iranian protesters to overcome government forces. The role of technology in the current unrest is well-covered elsewhere. What is lacking in much of the coverage, however, is a sense of context.

Technology has been essential both to empire formation and preservation, and to state degradation in the Middle East. The late historian Marshall G.S. Hodgson described the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires as “gunpowder empires.” Their sultans and shahs consolidated control over expansive territories by controlling weaponry which potential aspirants to power along the periphery did not have. Once the central government lost monopoly over guns and cannons, however, the empires fractured—devolving into fiefdoms or dissolving completely.

In Iran, technology played a particularly important role in state preservation Looking at 18th and early 19th century atlases, borders are all over the place. Discrepancies of dozens if not hundreds of miles mark frontiers on maps published by different gazetteers. Whereas today imperialism is presented in almost cartoonish terms as a free-for-all, in reality there were huge debates during the 19th century whether or not to expand imperial control over various territories. Imperial rule was an expensive prospect, and so many imperial powers preferred to advance informal control.

Britain did this in Iran by supporting various regional officials—for example, briefly recognizing the autonomy of Makran (Baluchistan) in the mid-19th century and flirting with Sheikh Khazal in Khuzistan at the beginning of the 20th century. While rulers could claim as much territory as they liked, the real litmus test was whether they were able to extract taxes. Sometimes governors or sub-district governors along a country’s periphery, many of whom paid for their offices, calculated they could keep all the revenue for themselves and not remit anything to the center. Often, foreign powers encouraged such defiance (e.g. in Georgia, Kuwait, Herat, and Khorramshahr).

This would create a quandary for the Shah. If he ignored the governor’s defiance, he would effectively lose that province. Mobilizing the military and launching a punitive expedition, however, was extremely expensive. As Iran flirted with bankruptcy throughout the 19th century, the Shah had very few resources at his disposal, and the periphery knew it.

Nasir al-Din Shah (r. 1848-1896), however, embraced the telegraph. He could threaten and cajole opponents, and keep on top of the latest intelligence. What were the Russians doing in Azerbaijan? What were Kurdish tribes doing across the Ottoman frontier? Could he afford to dispatch the army and still maintain his security? In many ways, it was the telegraph which allowed the Shah to play foreign powers and domestic competitors off each other and preserve Iranian independence, even in the regime’s weakened state.

What was a blessing for the government and for the consolidation of the state, however, turned into a liability. Over time, the Shah’s government lost control over the communications network. While the popular belief in the 1860s and 1870s was that the telegraph ended at the Shah’s throne, myriad Iranian groups discovered that they could communicate directly with each other and against the central government. This became quite clear in the early 1890s when, desperate to raise revenue, the Nasir al-Din Shah granted the unpopular Tobacco Regie which gave the British a monopoly over all phases of one of Iran’s most important industries, from agriculture to sale. Liberals, nationalists, and clerics joined forces to force the Shah to retract. Clerics in Najaf used the telegraph to issue a fatwa, obeyed even by members of the Shah’s household, prohibiting the use of tobacco until the Shah recanted. The telegraph network enabled the formation of the mass movement.

This point was driven home in the first decade of the 20th century during Iran’s constitutional revolution. Britain backed constitutional forces, and the Russian government supported the autocrat shah. The conflict was bloody and, just as in Iran today, it made headlines. When reactionary forces laid siege to Tabriz, then Iran’s second largest city, British papers reported news of the deprivation and starvation received by telegraph. What once would have occurred without notice in Europe, sparked outrage.

As the Shah cracked down, a broad array of constitutionalists, nationalists, liberals, clerics, and Bakhtiari tribesmen coordinated their actions by wire. The Shah’s forces sought to cut the wires, but the network was too vast, and not entirely under the government’s control. Importantly, the telegraph extended across the frontier into what now is Iraq. Senior clerics cabled instructions from Najaf and Karbala.

Technology created a template upon which the opposition could act. Oppression was a constant during the Qajar period and, indeed, before. It was technology, however, that enabled the mass movement; it simply could not occur before the technology template was laid.

Into the 20th century, the Iranian government sought again to dominate technology. Early in Reza Shah’s reign (1925-1941), the Iranian government controlled radio. Under his son and successor, the state controlled television. However, it could not control audio tapes smuggled across the border from Iraq, and so in the 15 years before the Islamic Revolution, the audio cassette—easily copied and distributed—was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s only means of communication. While Khomeini’s image is iconic now, it should be remembered that until his return to Iran, many Iranians knew his voice but had not seen his image.

The Islamic Republic knows it is unpopular, and knows its vulnerability to technology. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps stepped in to cancel a 2004 contract granted to Turkcell to create an independent cell phone network in Iran. Only this past year did the Iranian government bless the introduction of multimedia messaging services in the Islamic Republic. It could be a decision the Islamic Republic will not live long enough to regret.

Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.

Some sixty years ago my mentor Hans J. Morgenthau posited as a cardinal rule of diplomacy that states should “give up the shadow of worthless rights for the substance of real advantage.” It is not clear whether Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has ever read Morgenthau, but he seems attuned to this basic adage of statecraft.

In his much heralded June 14 foreign policy address, Netanyahu was clearly reacting to U.S. pressure focused on two matters: acceptance of a two-state model for Israel-Palestinian negotiations, and a freeze on further building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Acceptance of a two-state model is, under present circumstances, primarily a verbal act with no immediate operational implications. By conceding this point, Netanyahu was giving up a shadow in order to retain substance; Morgenthau would have approved.

This is not to say that Netanyahu’s concession was meaningless. Words do have consequences, and the fact that Netanyahu put the words “Palestinian” and “state” into the same sentence puts the seal on consensus within Israel on the preference for two states compared to other options. Predictably there have been vocal protests from within the Likud and elsewhere on the right, but nothing that Netanyahu cannot weather—especially given the perception that he has, in fact, given away little or nothing in substance.

The fact is that the speech included no immediate operational changes of importance. Before serious negotiations over two states get anywhere, Palestinians would have to satisfy a number of conditions with which Netanyahu’s version of two states is encumbered. First they must make their own verbal leap: explicit acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state, something much harder for them than Netanyahu’s terminological retrenchment was for him. They must somehow present a united front without Hamas, but including Gaza. They must come to terms with the reality that the refugee issue will be solved “outside the borders of the State of Israel.” And they must accept a draconian version of demilitarization surpassing any such measures on today’s world map. Not a single one of these eventualities is imminent, meaning that pressure on Netanyahu to negotiate the substance of a two-state solution is also, presumably, not imminent.

In this regard, the Netanyahu government is simply exploiting the biggest natural advantage that it has at the moment, which is that there is no Palestinian negotiating partner both able and willing to negotiate and to implement a final peace settlement in all the Palestinian territories. So long as this is the case, any Israeli government will be able, with minimal diplomatic skill, to deflect outside pressures to make major concessions in advance of negotiations. And for that matter, even a fervently dovish Israeli government would find itself unable to convert its support for two states into reality.

Netanyahu’s surrender of shadow also has to be seen in the context of Israel opinion, which has moved to overwhelming support of two states in principle, if only in reaction to the new prominence of much more ominous one-state proposals. Majorities of up to 78 percent, in one poll, express willingness to accept a Palestinian state alongside Israel under the right conditions. Any Israeli government that rejected a realistic chance to negotiate a two-state solution would find itself replaced, as Netanyahu implicitly recognized even before his recent speech. In that case, as he has repeatedly stated, “the terminology will take care of itself.”

What remains to be seen is how far the Obama administration will take satisfaction in having the first of its demands met, on a verbal level, while nothing changes regarding the second demand, on settlements. The issue of “natural growth” in West Bank settlements remains contentious; Netanyahu’s pledge of no new settlements merely continues official policy set under Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon, and changes nothing on the ground. As before, “outposts” are occasionally dismantled and then quickly rebuilt. Significantly, according to reports in the Israeli press, settlers in the territories have reacted to Netanyahu’s speech, by and large, with great equanimity.

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MESH adds this: Click on the thumbnail on the right (or here) for a word cloud of Netanyahu’s speech, illustrating the frequency of the one hundred most-used words.

Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.

The Internet and Democracy project at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society (which graciously provides hosting services for MESH) has produced a map of the Arabic blogosphere. Click on the thumbnail to enlarge, and download the full report here. The key finding:

Most bloggers write mainly personal, diary-style observations. But when writing about politics, bloggers tend to focus on issues within their own country, and are more often than not critical of domestic political leaders. Foreign political leaders are discussed less often, but also more in negative than positive terms. Domestic news is more popular than international news among general politics and public life topics. The one political issue that clearly concerns bloggers across the Arab world is Palestine, and in particular the situation in Gaza (Israel’s December 2008/January 2009 military action occurred during the study). Other popular topics include religion (more in personal than political terms) and human rights (more common than criticism of western culture and values). Terrorism and the US are not major topics. When discussing terrorism, Arab bloggers are overwhelmingly critical of terrorists. When the US is discussed, it is nearly always critically.

These two maps depict official Iranian presidential election results by province with varying degrees of detail. The map on the left has been produced by Critical Threats, a project of the American Enterprise Institute. The map on the right has been prepared by the Guardian Datablog. Click on the thumbnail of each to view full-scale original.

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Daniel Byman :: The Obama administration made a decision to engage Iran well before it seemed like Ahmadinejad even had a chance of being unseated as president, so it is no surprise that the doubts over the current elections are not leading the administration to change course. The brief hope was that a Mousavi victory would usher in a government that would end Iran’s nuclear program and welcome closer ties to Washington. This was always unrealistic: Mousavi himself was not a cuddly figure, the nuclear program is popular across Iran’s elite, and Khatami’s experience as president painfully showed that conservative forces could easily undercut any attempt to reach out to the United States. So we are back to dealing with a conservative regime, albeit one whose legitimacy is dented. The silver lining to the cloud of dashed democratic expectations is that the odds of engagement succeeding are probably similar if not better under the conservatives, however noxious their overall policies.

In addition to their genuine hostility to U.S. policy, conservatives feared that moderates would exploit the political benefits of improved relations with the United States, which would be widely popular in Iran. With Ahmadinejad’s victory, however, conservatives are in power across of Iran’s institutions: any benefit of improved relations would go to them. In addition, conservatives could be confident they would control the pace of any rapprochement. Moreover, Iran’s economy is also declining, and even a return of higher oil prices will not rescue it. Battered economically, and with doubts about the regime’s legitimacy after the fraud at the polls, perhaps the regime will look for ways to improve its political position—like opening up to the United States—that would take the wind out of rivals’ sails. (Okay, this is a big perhaps.)

Some of the same logic, of course, held years ago as well, and it is likely that the rivalries in Iran and pervasive hostility of the conservative elite will prevail. Predictions of a rapprochement are made constantly, and they so far have always been dashed. With Iran, the safe bet is always against improved ties to the United States.

Yet it would be a mistake not to try for fear of failing. To capitalize on the regime’s newfound legitimacy concerns, Washington will have to recognize that efforts by Tehran to reach out may be accompanied by hostile rhetoric or other actions designed to shore up the conservative base. In addition, Tehran will prove especially sensitive to calls for regime change or other challenges to its legitimacy. Separating rhetoric and reality will prove difficult, and, as we try to glean insights into the regime’s thinking, Iran’s nuclear program continues to move forward.

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J. Scott Carpenter :: Autocrats the world over rely on elections to provide them with a veneer of legitimacy. Quite why this matters to them so much is something I’ve never fully grasped. Still, when even a horrendously flawed electoral process yields results that the Supreme Leader must further manipulate, what’s left of the system’s legitimacy degrades precipitously. Moral authority—if not the state’s monopoly on force—is lost and proves difficult to recapture, especially in tough economic times.

President Obama should take advantage of this moment of regime weakness to increase pressure on Tehran. This will require him to side strongly with the Iranian people and recognize the farce that these elections were. It does not mean using the phrase “regime change.” Instead he and other democratic leaders from around the world should speak to the hopes of individual Iranians who were robbed of a better future when the Supreme Leader undercut his own sham process. The Khamenei regime promises nothing but more misery and malaise; we in the international community offer something much better: opportunity and access.

In doing this, one of Obama’s key target audiences should be European public opinion. For some reason, Europeans seize much more forcefully on images of the Basij beating old women and students than on the prospects of mushroom clouds over Warsaw. Of course, siding with the Iranian people won’t do much to sway either Moscow or Beijing, especially as the latter recently managed to sweep Tiananmen under a Chinese carpet, but stiffening European spines is a first priority to applying sanctions with any teeth.

Beyond recognizing the need to sharply change his rhetoric, the President should now realize his engagement strategy as defined so far is bound to fail. To this point, the strategy has been predicated on a direct approach to the Supreme Leader as the sole decision maker within the system. If we can get directly to the Supreme Leader, the argument goes, he can be convinced through a combination of carrots and sticks of the merits of accommodating the West’s demands on the nuclear file. Within this strategy has been the implicit belief that the nature of the regime doesn’t matter. After the past few days, however, it should be clear how preposterous such a notion is. A regime prepared to shoot its own citizens to preserve itself will not negotiate away its nuclear program to the “Great Satan” and can’t be trusted even if it did. Engagement with this regime simply will not work. So what is Plan B and when do we implement it?

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Hillel Fradkin :: There is little doubt that the Iranian regime has suffered some dents in its legitimacy, both through the election campaign and its outcome. During the campaign itself, the leading candidates—Ahmadinejad and Mousavi—flung charges against one another of such vehemence and character as to taint the regime, its history and legacy. As for the elections, the speed with which the results were announced—speed which seemed physically impossible given the number of ballots cast—called those results and the fairness of the election into question. So too did the announced landslide for Ahmadinejad, which confounded expectations of a much closer race and brought hundreds of thousands of Iranians into the streets of Tehran in protest. In the short term the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has compounded the problem of legitimacy by first blessing the announced results as a “divine assessment” and then turning—in response to the protests—to the Guardian Council to perform a legally permitted review of the conduct of the elections.

It is of course uncertain what its verdict will be, although the safest bet is that it will confirm Ahmadinejad as the winner. There can be little doubt that he will pursue a radical and revolutionary policy. But can the controversy over the elections be turned to the ends of American interests, especially the attempt to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and even the interests of the Iranian people? Perhaps.

The necessary first step is for President Obama to speak out forcefully on behalf of democracy in accord with his own well-established statements in that regard. He should express his support for the Iranian people in stronger terms than he did in his Iranian New Year’s message. This would be tantamount to denying that Ahmadinejad was the legitimate representative of the Iranian government or its people.

Whether this would have some substantial and long-term effect within Iran itself—for example the “color” or “velvet” revolution which Iran’s leaders have claimed to fear and oppose—is very hard to know, but this is the most propitious time to try to find out. In the event that Iran continued to be disturbed by internal opposition, the United States would have laid the groundwork to lend whatever support was practicable.

Such an approach would require some alteration of current American policy. Practically speaking, it would mean an end to the effort to establish a dialogue with the Iranian government, which was unlikely in any case, and which now lacks the grounds of having a legitimate interlocutor. This would permit the administration to move quickly to what was likely to be the next stage of its policy: the attempt to impose “crushing sanctions,” Secretary of State Clinton’s phrase. The success of this effort always depended upon our capacity to persuade others to support such a regimen. Although that may still be difficult—as it was in the past—the dubious legitimacy of the Iranian government might now make that easier. For it could now be represented as a “rogue regime” from every point of view. And even if it should fail, the United States would have laid the ground for the proposal of other options.

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Josef Joffe :: You’ve heard about the “electronic herd” as moniker for those investors and venture capitalists who buy and sell exactly what the fad du jour demands. But what about a close relative, the “mooing media,” which so often reports what it wants to see?

And so with Iranian election. Behold this immortal headline on the editorial page of the International Herald Tribune: “The Velvet Revolution, ” followed by cheery prediction that “whatever its outcome, this (dramatic) expression of the popular will carries the promise of better times.”

“Hope Breeds Hype” would have been the better headline, followed by the warning to resist the “North Tehran” syndrome. In this fanciest section of the Iranian capital, they speak English, wear Chanel dresses under their chador and believe in the imminent demise of a despised regime. (In Tel Aviv, it is the “Sheinkin Street Syndrome,” where your basic foreign correspondent talks to artists, Meretz activists and assorted lefties before he files his story on “Change, Hope and the Peace Process” or on the evils of the Netanyahu regime.)

If these good folks had dug deeper and wider, if they had gone into the slums or countryside, they would not have confused a few cute girls who show lots of ankle and hair or a university rally with a “velvet revolution.” If they had read their Hanna Arendt, Franz Neumann or Lenin, they would have been still more skeptical about the incipient decrepitude of the Ahmadinejad regime. If they had studied the history of the Iranian revolution, they would not have called Mr. Mousavi a “reformer” instead of a “disgruntled conservative,” ditto Messrs. Karrubi and Rezai. Their battle against the past and future president was a very mild remake of what happens in any revolution: a falling out among chiefs.

The electoral outcome is no “velvet revolution” at all, though—give honor where honor is due—the “Iranian street” was more vocal and courageous than at any time since the crushed student revolt of 1999. But remember the election of 2005, when Ahmadinejad garnered a mere 19.5 percent in the first round, and then beat former president Rafsanjani with almost 62 percent. This time, Ahmadinejad won right away, and by one point more.

Of course, there was systematic (and brazen) fraud. Why else had the election authorities “counted” millions of ballots right after the polls had closed? On the other hand, Iran is not Enver Hoxa’s Albania (where he came in at 97.8 percent each time), and so Ahmadinejad’s massive majority could not have been completely rigged. As went North Tehran, the country did not. But the regime did not want to take any chances, and so added to vox pop without having to falsify it. Think Richard Daley the Elder, not Enver Hoxa.

The more interesting news is the opposition to Ahmadinejad in the “Holy City” of Qom, the spiritual headquarters of the 1979 revolution. The vocal protests of many clerics lead to a fascinating speculation: The old theocratic revolution is dead, power has passed to the—let’s call them—”secularists.” They are still bearded, but they wear suits or the battle dress of the Pasdaran, the Revolutionary Guards. They don’t trade in fatwas, but in economic privileges. Their weapon of choice is not the Quran, but the Kalashnikov, and their badge is the Iranian flag and not the green of the prophet (the battle insignia of Mr. Mousavi).

Let’s carry speculation on step farther. On Monday, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered an investigation into what Mousavi calls outright voting fraud. Whence we might conclude: The old clerical guard has understood the true import of the electoral verdict. It was a putsch at the ballot box, masterfully executed by Ahmadinejad and his henchmen, and it was directed not so much against the students and the wealthy denizens of Niavaran and Shemiran, but against Khamenei and his religious cohorts. It is Robbespierre vs. Danton, who had led the uprising against the King in 1792.

If this assessment is correct, we will see a lot more strife in the days to come. In the end, it might lead to a Persian Napoleon and his military dictatorship. And why not a “little war” to stabilize the new autocracy? These are dark thoughts, and like all historical analogies, they may be wildly off the mark. So over to Barack Obama, who has staked his first months in office on wooing the Islamic world in order to give a boost to moderates and liberals. Round one goes to the reactionaries.

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Mark N. Katz :: The prolonged protests in Tehran against the Iranian regime’s claim that Ahmadinejad was overwhelmingly re-elected president have raised the possibility that Iran might be on the verge of a democratic revolution. The widespread belief that election results were falsified has triggered successful democratic revolutions in several countries, including the Philippines, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. Such protests, though, do not always succeed, as has been seen in Burma (Myanmar), Armenia, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere.

I have previously argued at MESH and elsewhere that a rapprochement between the United States and Iran’s authoritarian regime would be in American interests. The democratic transformation of Iran, though, would be far more beneficial for the United States (and, of course, for Iran). A democratic Iran might become an American ally or, if not that, friendlier to the United States than Tehran has been since 1979. A democratic Iran could also be expected to push Hamas and Hezbollah in a democratic direction, or perhaps even sever its ties with them. Further, while a democratic Iran could be expected to continue the atomic energy program that Tehran began under the Shah, it would presumably be more willing to accommodate the concerns of the international community than the Islamic Republic has been.

With all these possibilities at stake, the Obama administration’s restrained, “even-handed” reaction to the disputed Iranian election results may appear quite odd. This cool reaction, though, may be the best way for Washington to help the cause of Mir Hossein Mousavi—the presidential candidate who is charging electoral fraud. Greater public American support for him could be seized upon as an excuse by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad to discredit him as an American agent. Expressing support for a transparent process instead of a specific politician may avoid this problem—especially since there may be little that the United States can actually do to help Mousavi right now.

As past occasions have shown, whether or not widespread popular protest against perceived electoral fraud results in democratic revolution or not depends on whether elements of the security services defect from the regime to the democratic opposition. The defection of even a few key personnel can quickly cascade into the defection of much of the security services and the immobilization of the rest. But without these initial key defections, the democratic opposition cannot hope to prevail, and its protests will sooner or later (and more probably sooner) be crushed.

It is virtually impossible, of course, for the United States to engineer the key security service personnel defections away from the regime and to the opposition during the brief window of opportunity that may be available before the democratic opposition is crushed, if security force defections don’t take place. What the United States can do, though, is quietly signal that it is prepared to work with those security service forces that do defect and to not seek their destruction. This is because organizational survival and personal advancement are often just as or even more important motives than the desire for democracy for officers considering defection to the democratic opposition in such situations.

Even if the regime succeeds in crushing the democratic opposition, its self-confidence is likely to decline and its internal divisions to remain and even grow. In similar circumstances elsewhere, some elements inside an authoritarian regime have made common cause with democratic forces outside of it. Helping them do so may be the sort of long term project that the United States could discreetly help with—whether or not Washington goes forward with attempting to achieve détente with the Islamic Republic.

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Martin Kramer :: There are days when I’m supremely grateful that I’m not paid to make policy decisions. Those who must make them on Iran have much more information than I have, but it probably still won’t be enough, so that in the end, analogies will play as large a role as analysis. Already much of the public in the West has embraced the analogy between Iran’s protests and the “color revolutions” of Europe. The potential for error there is great: Iran’s politics are sui generis even in the Middle East. But there’s a bit of room for such an error, because the regime doesn’t have nukes. If it had them, we’d be biting our nails instead of tweeting on Twitter.

Harvard’s Stephen Walt, on his blog, made an assertion that exposes the fundamental weakness of the realist claim that the outcome doesn’t matter, at least to us: “In the end, what really matters is the content of any subsequent U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, not the precise nature of the Iranian regime. If diplomatic engagement led to a good deal, then it wouldn’t matter much who was running Iran.” Walt is right when he goes on to say that Mousavi, specifically, may not be a vast improvement over the Khamenei-A’jad duo. But in keeping up Iran’s end of any “good deal,” does it really not much matter who runs the country? In our own lives, we prefer to do business with reputable dealers, as opposed to known scam artists, thieves, and forgers. The meaning of this past week is that the ruling mob has been exposed, and that alternatives aren’t entirely unimaginable. No one should get their hopes up, but the moment Khamenei, A’jad, and even Mousavi aren’t the entire universe of options, there’s every reason to put engagement on hold.

And since it’s always better to have options, perhaps the United States should act to promote them. “The Americans do not have the experience or the psychological insight to understand Persia.” That was Ann (Nancy) Lambton, the great British Iranologist, back in 1951. (She thought Mossadegh could be readily overthrown; the Americans at first thought otherwise. She was right.) So it’s a long shot. But there may be an opportunity here, and perhaps even awkward Americans—now with an additional sixty years of experience and a president with psychological insight—can find it.

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Walter Laqueur :: Has the legitimacy of the Iranian regime been seriously dented? The regime was no doubt surprised and even shocked by the intensity of feeling against Ahmedinajad by so many in the capital, but there seems to have been much less resistance outside it. The country is split ,but the levers of power (and the weapons) seem to be firmly in the hands of the regime, and this is all that matters at the present time. Mousavi, in any case, is part of the regime, not a true reformer, at best half-hearted; his fervent supporters are bound to be disappointed. A rotten compromise to solve the present crisis seems quite likely. The decomposition and eventual breakdown of the regime are bound to happen but they will take time.

Perhaps there was fraud in Iran, but most outside observers were apparently not aware how easily elections can be won in authoritarian regimes without even using the grosser forms of fraud such as stuffing the ballot boxes. If part of the population is illiterate, a desirable outcome of the elections becomes even easier to achieve. As far as now known, there was no outright forgery on a massive scale in the elections in the fascist and communist regimes in Europe.

The U.S. approach? What approach? I suspect Washington has accepted, knowingly or not, an Iranian regime in possession of nuclear weapons. No substantial help to slow the process can be expected from Europe, Russia and China. Military action will not be used, and its use by Israel will not be accepted.

No thought seems to have been given to what American policy should be once this stage has been reached. Should there be a grand bargain with Iran, accepting some or all of its “legitimate demands,” including its wish to extend its influence throughout the Middle East? Or should America support the anti-Iranian forces? I suspect there will be a little bit of appeasement and a little bit of resistance, some engagement and some disengagement, all the options will be tried in an attempt to muddle through until (or unless) something wholly unforeseen will happen.

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Michael Mandelbaum :: The principal goal of American policy toward Iran is to prevent that country from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Obama administration proposes to accomplish this through direct negotiations with the Iranian regime. Success is unlikely, but it is less unlikely if greater international pressure is brought to bear on that regime. The administration should therefore use the stolen election, and the outrage it should provoke in the democratic West, to try to persuade the Europeans to agree to tougher economic sanctions on Iran.

It would be helpful to have the Russians and the Chinese join in such an effort, but the events surrounding the election are not likely to prompt either to do so. The governments in Moscow and Beijing are no doubt just as appalled as the Europeans at what has happened, but for different reasons: the Russians because of the way the regime in Tehran has botched a rigged election, the Chinese at Tehran’s decision to hold an election at all.

Ultimately, Iran will cease to be a major strategic problem for the United States only if the current regime falls and is replaced by one less resolutely opposed to Western interests and values. Here the events of the last several days count as good news. Dictatorships fall when the governing elite loses the will to rule (as in Eastern Europe in 1989) or when it is sharply divided. The candidate from whom the election appears to have been stolen must represent a segment of the governing structure, otherwise he would not have been permitted to run in the first place. The unfolding conflict in Iran therefore pits not only the society against the rulers but also one part of the ruling clique against another. The United States can probably have little or no influence over internal Iranian politics, but anything American policy can do to widen this second division (the regime itself can be counted to do everything necessary to expand the first one) is worth doing and should be done.

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Philip Carl Salzman :: Watching the Iranian elections is like watching a Model United Nations or a Mock Supreme Court The issues are real and important. The passions are deeply felt. The divisions reflect divisions among the population. But the decisions have no effect whatsoever in the real world.

The elections, to change the metaphor, are like shadow plays or puppet shows: it is the manipulators behind the scenes who make the actors move, or negate the movements of the actors. In Iran, it is the Supreme Leader, the Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council, and increasingly the Revolutionary Guard who call the shots.

We have already seen this play, starring reformist President Khatami. Whatever the president and the reformist Majlis tried to do, the real rulers denied. Elected officials are mainly a façade, giving faux-democratic respectability to the regime. Yes, to an extent, elected officials provide a face to the regime, and do have some influence over internal matters, such as economic measures. But on the greatest matters of substance, they are entirely powerless.

Why should we pin any hopes on the Iranian elections? Does it matter all that much whether the face of the regime is sweet and smiling or angry and frowning? The regime will be the same.

What if, as many suspect, the current election, allegedly won by Ahmadinejad, was itself manipulated? The supporters for other candidates, like participants in a Mock UN, are incensed that, as they believe, the rules were violated and the results unfair. In this case, with electoral cover gone, the regime stands naked, its reality exposed. Naive Iranians will be disappointed and angry.

What about hopeful foreign leaders and diplomats? What has changed for them? Nothing. If they did not know what they were dealing with before, they were not only hopeful, but naive.

What approach to Iran would be most beneficial for the United States? Again, let’s look at past experience: When did Iran last do something agreeable to the United States? Iran stopped their nuclear program when the United States invaded Iraq, fearing that Iran might be next. When the threat appeared to recede, Iran reactivated their nuclear program. It thus seems that Iran responds to a serious threat by pulling in its horns. If the United States wants Iran to stop its nuclear bomb and missile program, reduce its terrorist support throughout the Middle East, and ease the pressure on its neighbors, then Iran must feel that the cost of pursuing its current path would be too high. President Obama must show the stick, and be ready to use it.

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Raymond Tanter :: The unfolding drama on the streets of Tehran raises key issues of whether Iranian instability will threaten survival of the ruling ayatollahs and if it is possible for a diplomatic breakthrough with them on Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons status in light of growing political instability.

Two schools of thought conflict in addressing these two issues.

One approach holds that although election fraud represents something of a setback for Iran’s “illiberal democracy,” efforts at engagement should be continued. Just as such analysts were wrong in presuming the regime would be constrained from cheating to maintain power, they falsely assume that representative institutions legitimize the rule of the ayatollahs in a less-than-liberal democracy.

A second school, of which the Iran Policy Committee is a contributor, finds that Iran does not have even a “limited” or “illiberal” democracy. Rather than deriving legitimacy from the people, the ayatollahs rule by assertion that clerics should rule because they are representatives of God on earth.

Regarding the issue of whether illegitimate elections in Iran are a point of departure for a breakthrough in Western diplomacy, such an assertion overlooks the role revolutionary ideology plays in motivating the Iranian regime to pursue its nuclear weapons program. Whether Iranian elections are legitimate is irrelevant to the regime’s pursuit of the bomb.

To motivate the Iranian regime to bargain in good faith requires leverage. An unused point of leverage against Tehran is for the West to reach out to its main opposition as it reaches out to the regime.

The Iran Policy Committee performed a content analysis of leadership statements regarding all major Iranian opposition groups. The study showed that the Iranian regime pays attention to the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), the main Iranian opposition group, 350 percent more than all other opposition groups combined. In view of this surfeit of attention, it is reasonable to infer that Tehran fears the MEK as a threat to the survival of the regime.

Reaching out to the Iranian opposition, which is based in Iraq but has an extensive network in Iran, would be a common point of leverage for Washington and moderate Arab allies of President Obama to counter Iranian regime expansion in the region. Rather than a binary choice of pressure or engagement, an approach that incorporates the Iranian opposition would allow for a coherent policy of coercive diplomacy. Such a policy is likely to be more effective than either pressure or engagement alone.