Blackwater Indictments
Information is coming out regarding the five indictments and plea bargain for Jeremy Ridgeway who pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and attempted manslaughter. The synopsis says he agreed that he
used deadly force when he could have used “other safe alternatives to the use of deadly force” against Iraqis in Baghdad rather than opening fire against them on September 16, 2007.
Several items of note at first glance at these legal (and related) documents:
1. Blackwater has ‘tactical support teams’ that are on-call just to provide “back-up fire support” for the primary security team. Four heavily-armed convoys go out to defend the first security team in trouble. This seems like a bad idea given the military has “quick reaction forces” for just such emergencies. Having two parallel, separate but practically equal, rescue teams — one civil, one military — is a recipe for just this kind of problem. Somehow the rescue call brought on too much firepower and passion. It was a matter of time, perhaps, until this kind of horrible event put the “rules of engagement” front and center. Maybe this case, if it goes to trial, will sort out the King Solomon line between “defensive” and “offensive” operations in this new battlefield where soldiers and armed civilian contractors conduct parallel missions.
2. The Dept. of Justice categorizes these contractors as being “employed by the Armed Forces outside the U.S.” and further as contractors for Blackwater on a State Dept. contract. This is a big embrace. There must be a legal reason why they reach up from State and Blackwater to the DoD to categorize them. Nowhere else do you see this “chain of hiring”. Frankly, the State contract is separate and independent of the DoD…I thought. Upon further scrutiny of the DOJ press release, it becomes more clear. The defendants are being charged under MEJA, specifically its 2004 extension that allows MEJA to reach non-DoD contractors who provide services “in support of the DoD mission overseas”. Not a huge stretch to argue that the DoS security guards are supporting the mission of DoD in Iraq, I suppose.
This is an interesting element. This case then involves two strands: the criminal complaint but brings in contract law: if they are under the DoS contract, how does MEJA reach them exactly? I need to brush up on the 2004 amendment.
3. The teams are not allowed to produce “suppressive fire” (a military tactic) but it seems that’s the best way to describe what they did. Some of the Blackwater weapons used: automatic weapons, grenade launchers, sniper rifles, machine gunes, grenades, assault rifles. What, no CS gas?
4. The tactical support team, Raven 23, was not given permission to leave the Green Zone in the first place. It went anyway. It was ordered back by the Regional Security Officer (RSO); instead it set up a blockade at Nisour. It seems the point where things really went south was after the first Blackwater shooter killed a driver whose foot hit the gas, sending the car into the traffic circle (which then got the driver’s mother killed) — so Blackwater thinks its intentional and starts unloading. This reminds me of the poli. sci. concept of “security dilemma” wherein one side (or both) misreads the other’s intentions and escalates insecurity by building more defense systems.
So if Blackwater, with its high-priced PR team on the case again, depicts these contractors primarily as “decorated veterans” — that may backfire (no pun intended). It seems that current soldiers would not want to blur the perception lines more by having security contractors under this kind of indictment (faint whiff of Haditha) to be veterans more than anything else. They were paid civilians when this event happened. Feeding this misperception may help the defendants (or not) but it certainly doesn’t help the cause of contractors generally.
ABC had a grainy video of the incident last year. Here’s their map of the Nisour incident.
