Upcoming Lectures

April 21st, 2009

Good morning, readers!

There are two lectures coming up here at Harvard that you may be interested in attending:

“You are not your brain”

April 13th, 2009

Good morning, readers!  Happy Monday to you!

Via Garrett Eastman’s Library News & Notes, a fascinating interview by Gordy Slack of Salon.com with philosopher Alva Noë, on why Noë thinks that certain reductionist accounts of the brain are problematic.

TED Talks on How the Mind Works

February 9th, 2009

Good morning, readers!

Those interested in epistemology, neuroscience, psychology, and related fields might find this group of TED Talks to be of interest.

Speakers include Philip Zombardo, Steven Pinker, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Dan Gilbert, Doris Kearns Goodwin, and many more.

Enjoy!

Good morning, readers!

Here are the January 2009 Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.  Though collection development is on hold for the time being at Robbins, are any of these worth considering for purchase at a later date?

Aesthetics

Philosophers

Metaphysics

Epistemology

History of Philosophy

Moral & Political Philosophy

Philosophy of Law

Philosophy of Religion

Philosophy of Science

Good morning, readers!

I received this announcement yesterday — those interested in cognitive science, philosophy of mind, epistemology and consciousness may find it of interest:

Neuphi February 2009 Extravaganza Announcement

Here is the blurb from the e-mail:

This February we have three great talks coming up: Christof Koch will revisit his stance on consciousness and attention, tying it in with Tononi’s theory, Steve Grossberg will tackle the Mind-Body Problem, and Ted Gibson will discuss his work on language comprehension…. See http://www.neuphi.com. For updates, contact organizers@neuphi.com.

Good morning, readers!

We’ve just received the latest issue of The MonistMonist 91(2), April 2008 — and the general topic for this issue is “Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness.”

Here is the Table of Contents:

  • Amie L. Thomasson, Phenomenal Consciousness and the Phenomenal World
  • Joseph Levine, Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet
  • Colin McGinn, Consciousness as Knowingness
  • Adam Pautz, The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality
  • Katalin Farkas, Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise
  • Itay Shani, Against Consciousness Chauvinism
  • James Tartaglia, Intentionality, Consciousness, and the Mark of the Mental: Rorty’s Challenge
  • Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel, Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind

The issue should be available electronically at some point in the near future, but is not, at the moment.  (You’ll need your Harvard PIN and ID to login.)

Good morning, readers, and a happy Friday to you!

Regular readers may remember that I wrote a post about the Honderich/McGuinn feud earlier this year.  While browsing through Bookforum.com a few days ago, I found a link to an article that appeared earlier this year, in the Journal of Consciousness Studies:

Ross, J.A. (2008). Hitting on Consciousness: Honderich Versus McGinn.   Journal of Consciousness Studies 15(1): 109-128

Ross’ article provides some background to the feud, along with summaries of the arguments being discussed, reviews of Honderich’s book, and summaries of the exchanges between Honderich and McGinn.

Ross’ conclusion is interesting:

There is much to be learned about the current state of academic philosophy of mind in this unseemly tale. For me, the main lesson is that professional philosophers have no monopoly of wisdom in consciousness studies, either in writing books about consciousness or in reviewing the efforts of their peers. The JCS illustrates with its judicious balance of peer-reviewed articles and other texts (such as the present metareview) that consciousness studies can be enriched by reaching beyond conventional academic work.

Spare a final moment to consider the longer implications of the cat fight you have just witnessed. Googling ‘Honderich’or ‘McGinn’ will regularly find the two names paired with each other for the rest of digital eternity. Whether they like it or not, the two prickly protagonists are now sparring partners in cyberspace, bound in a fellowship of reciprocal contempt and vituperation. Perhaps future generations of philosophers will amuse themselves with animatronic replays of the Ted and Colin show, where photorealistic avatars trade vile words with heated fluency in comic clips.

In any case, the philosophical soil in which this debate is rooted will soon be ploughed over. I suspect that neither radical externalism nor the new mysterianism will attract much attention once we witness the arrival of the first conscious robots.

I’m not so sure about the possibility of conscious robots, but Ross may be on to something — much in the way that Kierkegaard is forever linked with the war of words surrounding the Corsair affair, so too Honderich and McGinn in their feud.

In any event, it’s an interesting article for those who follow such things, and who are interested in philosophical practice, consciousness, philosophy of mind, and the like.