Robbins Library Notes

Good morning, readers, and a happy Friday to you!

Regular readers may remember that I wrote a post about the Honderich/McGuinn feud earlier this year.  While browsing through Bookforum.com a few days ago, I found a link to an article that appeared earlier this year, in the Journal of Consciousness Studies:

Ross, J.A. (2008). Hitting on Consciousness: Honderich Versus McGinn.   Journal of Consciousness Studies 15(1): 109-128

Ross’ article provides some background to the feud, along with summaries of the arguments being discussed, reviews of Honderich’s book, and summaries of the exchanges between Honderich and McGinn.

Ross’ conclusion is interesting:

There is much to be learned about the current state of academic philosophy of mind in this unseemly tale. For me, the main lesson is that professional philosophers have no monopoly of wisdom in consciousness studies, either in writing books about consciousness or in reviewing the efforts of their peers. The JCS illustrates with its judicious balance of peer-reviewed articles and other texts (such as the present metareview) that consciousness studies can be enriched by reaching beyond conventional academic work.

Spare a final moment to consider the longer implications of the cat fight you have just witnessed. Googling ‘Honderich’or ‘McGinn’ will regularly find the two names paired with each other for the rest of digital eternity. Whether they like it or not, the two prickly protagonists are now sparring partners in cyberspace, bound in a fellowship of reciprocal contempt and vituperation. Perhaps future generations of philosophers will amuse themselves with animatronic replays of the Ted and Colin show, where photorealistic avatars trade vile words with heated fluency in comic clips.

In any case, the philosophical soil in which this debate is rooted will soon be ploughed over. I suspect that neither radical externalism nor the new mysterianism will attract much attention once we witness the arrival of the first conscious robots.

I’m not so sure about the possibility of conscious robots, but Ross may be on to something — much in the way that Kierkegaard is forever linked with the war of words surrounding the Corsair affair, so too Honderich and McGinn in their feud.

In any event, it’s an interesting article for those who follow such things, and who are interested in philosophical practice, consciousness, philosophy of mind, and the like.

Good morning, readers!

At right: René Girard

There has been a lot of great philosophical material popping up over the last few days.

For instance: while poking around Bookforum.com yesterday, I found a link to a translation of an interview with the French anthropologist, René Girard. Titled “Intellectuals as Castrators of Meaning,” Girard offers sharp criticisms of modernity in its many forms, from post-modernism to scientism.  While Girard challenges mainly French post-modernism, he also does not spare parts of the analytic tradition as well, especially philosophy of science.

Here is one example of Girard’s critique:

Today there are three areas—nuclear weapons, terrorism, and genetic manipulation—in which man is especially placed in danger:

“The twentieth century was the century of classical nihilism. The twenty-first century will be the century of alluring nihilism. C. S. Lewis was right when he talked about the abolition of man. Michel Foucault added that the abolition of man was becoming a philosophical concept. Today, one can no longer speak of ‘man.’ When Friedrich Nietzsche announced the death of God, in fact he was announcing the death of man. Eugenics is the negation of human rationality. If one considers man as the outcome of mere chance and as crude material for the laboratory, a malleable object to be manipulated, one reaches the point of being able to do anything to man. That ends with the destruction of the fundamental rationality that belongs to the human being. But man cannot be reorganized thus and still remain man.”

The other parts of the interview are worth reading, if only as an alternative view to the modern project.  Nonetheless, I suspect that much of what Girard writes will irritate, annoy, and perhaps even anger some of my readers.

At left: Giambattista Vico (1668-1744)

Those upset by Girard’s critique might remember that he is not alone in challenging the dominant modern project’s paradigms.  Giambattista Vico, for example, offered many critiques of the modern project (and especially of Cartesian thought) in The New Science, On Humanistic Education, and On the Study Methods of Our Time.  Or Leszek Kolakowski’s essay, “Modernity on Endless Trial,” in the collection of the same title.

Sometimes, it’s a good idea to read things with which we might disagree, if only to see where the strengths and weakenesses of our own positions lie.

As for what I think of this interview, I’m not, at this point, suggesting that Girard is completely correct.  I have not read his work extensively, so I do not know how solid his critiques are.  All I will say is that his interview is provocative — to say the least! — and bears further study, nothing more.

What do you think, readers?

While browsing through Bookforum.com this morning, I came across a link to an article in The Philosophers’ Magazine written by Brian Leiter.  In “The State of the Vocation,” Leiter offers his view on where philosophy is at the moment, and the benefits and downsides of the professionalization of the discipline.

After a few readings of this article, I’m not sure where I stand on it.  I agree largely with Leiter’s observations on where the field is, at the moment, and on the professionalization of philosophy, but not completely.

Update: After a few hours of thinking about this article, I sense where some of my ambivalence may lie.  As I see it, there’s something about the confining of philosophy within the narrow walls of professional academia that leads to easily to pedantry, overspecialization, lack of interdisciplinary dialogue, and sycophants merely repeating and following whatever the “acceptable” problems and the means of addressing these problems happen to be.  I think what I’m trying to say is that I am less sanguine about the benefits of professionalization than Professor Leiter is.

However, let it be noted that Leiter himself is not blind to the downsides of professionalization in this article.  I think where we might part company is the degree to which we admit the downsides, not that the downsides exist.  And there are benefits to specialization, to be sure, many of which Leiter notes.

What do you think of Leiter’s account, readers?

Good morning, readers!

Over the summer, I’ve been reading some fascinating histories of philosophy in the 20th century.  Two of them address American philosophy during the Cold War, and the third looks at philosophy at a pivotal moment in the first part of the century, before the notorious split between analytic and Continental philosophy.

What emerges from these three books is the degree of influence that the political and historical context in which philosophy is lived and practiced can have. While it’s too simplistic to claim that understanding philosophy can be reduced to merely studying its historical, social, and cultural contexts, I would argue that it’s important to see that philosophy does not exist in a vacuum, and that historical, social, and cultural forces can have a great influence on philosophy, though these need to be interpreted and assessed with care.*

This holds true, I will claim, for American philosophy, especially during the 20th century.  After reading the first two histories, it’s frightening to see how figures like, e.g., Rudolph Carnap, were kept under surveillance for their supposed political activities, or threatened in subtle and not-so-subtle ways to get in line.  It’s scary to read how lives and careers could be ruined or altered by people settling personal scores or demanding ideological conformity under the cloak of national security.  And it’s also sad to consider what might have been, had philosophy not been forced into (and chosen to remain) in a defensive position for so many decades such that it limited the scope of its inquiries and interests.

Without further ado, here are the books, along with a brief review of each:

Time in the Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era, John McCumber (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2001)

McCumber’s book explores how the McCarthy era had a devastating effect on American philosophy during the late 1940s and 1950s, and beyond.  McCumber analyzes how philosophy and philosophers were targeted by the FBI, HUAC, and others during the Cold War, and how this had a chilling and limiting effect on how philosophy was studied and practiced.  McCumber offers evidence to show that the defensive position and apolitical stance that American philosophy was forced to take has never been abandoned, and that these have limited and driven the discipline to focus on a narrow range of topics and questions, to the exclusion of others.

It’s a fascinating, if not frightening, read, especially in contemporary times when conservative forces are again trying to silence dissent and questioning by claiming these to be “unpatriotic” and “treasonous.”  In these interesting times, and in light of McCumber’s (and Reisch’s — see below) claims, the quote from Santayana that I posted last week rings true.

However, if there is one failing with the book, it’s that I find that McCumber has an ax to grind, especially towards the end of the book, when he discusses how Continental philosophy and philosophers have been excluded from the American philosophical discourse.  While he does have a point, at times I found that McCumber quickly became strident in his criticism, and found this to be off-putting.

How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic, George A. Reisch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Similar to McCumber’s book, but from more of an analytic perspective, Reisch’s book also examines how the Cold War, and the shift in political climate from the progressive 1930s to the conservative 1950s wrought a number of changes on the practice and understanding of American philosophy (and especially philosophy of science).

This is an decent book, overall, especially if you are looking to get a good grounding in the basis of some of context around and concepts of philosophy of science during the early and middle parts of the 20th century.

Nonetheless, I do have a complaint about the book.  I’m bothered by the fact that relatively little attention is given to the conservative critics of philosophy of science, in comparison with the left-wing critics.  Mortimer Adler and Robert Maynard Hutchins get a few dismissive paragraphs and mentions throughout the book, but no chapter in their own right — unlike the left-wing critics, who get two chapters of their own.  And there were certainly more critics of philosophy of science than just these two men.

Furthermore, there was (and is still) a battle over where philosophy belongs: is it merely a part of science?  Or is it part of the humanities?  What sort of questions should philosophy address?  Should it be apolitical, or be used in the service of political agendas?  Do the empirical sciences supplant the social sciences and humanities, or do the latter have their own contributions to make and value to add?  These and other questions remain relevant, and were given serious consideration by people like Adler and Hutchins, and perhaps deserve more attention than they are given in this book.

I’m also a bit uncomfortable with Reisch’s attempt at engaging Continental philosophy at the end of the book, wherein he attempts a Foucauldian-style power analysis.  In short, he makes the claim that the American academy during the Cold War and beyond, was akin to a concentration camp.  The conservative power structure, in an attempt to silence and render impotent their progressive adversaries, shunted the latter off into the irrelevance of the ivory tower, where they would have little to no effect.  While the claim is intriguing, prima facie, I’m not sure that it stands on deeper inspection.  For one thing, the analogy strikes me as being inapt — being a tenured intellectual in an academic setting is nothing like the dehumanizing brutality of the camps.  For another, it strikes me as being somewhat offensive, for the same reasons.  Finally, in light of my own reading of several of Foucault’s works, I’m not sure that this analysis is something with which Foucault would himself agree, though I may be wrong on this account.

In spite of these criticisms, don’t discount the book entirely on these grounds.  It’s still worth reading, if you keep these flaws in mind.

A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Michael Friedman (Chicago: Open Court, 2000)

Of the three histories that I read over the summer, this one was by far the best.  Friedman discusses the 1929 Davos Conference, at which Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger debated, and Rudolph Carnap attended.  In examining the thought projects of these three men, Friedman provides a clear and lucid outline, not only of Heidegger’s, Carnap’s and Cassirer’s thought, but also of Kantian epistemology, neo-Kantianism, and phenomenology. Moreover, Friedman shows how these three interact and critique each other, and where they will ultimately split, because of political and historical circumstances, into the two-fold division of 20th century Western philosophy.  Finally, Friedman shows the importance and continuing relevance of Cassirer, who is often overlooked in the history of 20th century thought, other than as an historian of thought.

I thoroughly enjoyed this book, and have recommended it to several others who are working in this field and on these topics.

Do any readers have opinions on these books? Are there other histories that I should look at and review, e.g., Glock’s What is Analytic Philosophy?

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*Peter Gordon offers some relevant discussion on historical context and the history of ideas in Gordon, P.E. (2004).  Continental Divide: Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger at Davos, 1929 — An Allegory of Intellectual History. Modern Intellectual History (1)2, 219-248.  (You’ll need a Harvard PIN and ID to access this article.) This article is especially relevant in light of the third book that I review, Thomas Friedman’s A Parting of the Ways.

Good morning, readers!

Many readers are likely familiar with the hype and news surrounded the latest Batman move, The Dark Knight, which opened recently in theaters.  For those who don’t know, the action of the movie centers on Batman, played by Christian Bale, and several other characters trying to capture and stop the psychopath, the Joker, played with disturbing perfection by the late Heath Ledger.

While doing my usual morning sweep of the newspapers last Friday (25 July 2008), I found a fascinating editorial in the Boston Globe, “Should Batman kill the Joker?”   Written by Mark D. White and Robert Arp, co-editors of Batman and Philosophy: The Dark Knight of the Soul, the editorial explores the arguments for and against Batman’s killing the Joker from several philosophical perspectives.

Before readers roll their eyes and ask, “Why is he even mentioning this on his blog? After all, what does pop culture have to do with philosophy?*  Isn’t this just some silly post-modern attempt to make philosophy ‘relevant’ by being trivial?”

These are valid criticisms, but I ask those who voice them for their indulgence and patience for a moment.  I’ll argue, agreeing ultimately with White and Arp, that pop culture, well-used, can provide some interesting thought experiments in which to examine and discuss abstract philosophical points and concrete, real-world philosophical issues.

White and Arp note towards the beginning of the editorial:

Pop culture, such as the Batman comics and movies, provides an opportunity to think philosophically about issues and topics that parallel the real world. For instance, thinking about why Batman has never killed the Joker may help us reflect on the nation’s issues with terror and torture, specifically their ethics.

White and Arp then proceed to examine whether Batman might kill the Joker by considering three ethical perspectives: utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics.  They conclude by saying:

Taking these three ethical perspectives together, we see that while there are good reasons to kill the Joker, in terms of innocent lives saved, there are also good reasons not to kill him, based on what killing him would mean about Batman and his motives, mission, and character.

However, there’s more to this examination than mulling over what a fictional comic-book character should or should not do:

The same arguments apply to the debate over torture: While there are good reasons to do it, based on the positive consequences that may come from it, there are also good reasons not to, especially those based on our national character. Many Americans who oppose torture explain their position by saying, “It’s not who we are,” or “We don’t want to turn into them.” Batman often says the same thing when asked why he hasn’t killed the Joker: “I don’t want to become that which I hate.”

In other words, by using the hypothetical “Should Batman kill the Joker?” thought experiment, we can, by extension, examine difficult, emotional topics like torture.  This is White and Arp’s conclusion, and one with which I agree:

Applying philosophy to Batman, South Park, or other pop culture phenomena may seem silly or frivolous, but philosophers have used fanciful examples and thought experiments for centuries. The point is making philosophy accessible, and helping us think through difficult topics by casting them in a different light.

Regardless of your position, torture is an uncomfortable and emotional topic. If translating the core issue to another venue, such as Batman and the Joker, helps us focus on the key aspects of the problem, that can only help refine our thinking. And Batman would definitely approve of that.

Definitely read the whole editorial.  I think you will find it thought-provoking, even if you may not agree with using pop culture in philosophical discussions.

*Those interested in the general topic of pop culture and philosophy might want to check out my earlier post on pop culture and philosophy. For another take on the movie as a modern morality play, please click here. 

Update 8/5/2008: The Dark Knight is generating a lot of commentary and analysis, which you can read about here, here, here, here, here, here, and here — more proof that pop culture can be used to analyze and discuss important philosophical issues.  (Please note that I do not endorse some of these interpretations. I offer them only to show the breadth of discussion surrounding the movie.)

Good morning, readers, and happy Friday!

I found this article yesterday — via Bookforum.com — which takes a look at the controversial figure of Socrates.  Emily Wilson, author of The Death of Socrates, notes:

We may be in danger of forgetting that Socrates has always been, and remains, a controversial figure. This is a great pity, not least because gadflies cannot help shake us out of our intellectual slumbers if we feel no pain at their bites. I recently wrote a book about the changing ways in which the death of Socrates has been imagined, in art, literature and philosophy since antiquity (The Death of Socrates: Hero, Villain, Chatterbox, Saint, Profile/Harvard UP 2007).I was surprised to find, as I researched this project, that my own devoted attachment to Socrates gradually turned into something more complex, and more antagonistic. One of the main goals of the book was, as it turned out, to show that it is possible not to admire Socrates, and that many people have had good reason to mistrust him. Since the modern cult of Socrates shows no sign of diminishing, this may be a good time to list some of the reasons why one might want to bring him down from his pedestal and quarrel with him face to face.

What do you think, readers?

Good morning, readers!  Welcome back from the long holiday weekend!

Last week, while browsing through Bookforum.com, I found two articles that may interest you.  The first is an article from Eurozine on Nietzsche and the “death of God.”  The second is from First Principles, on how philosophers play with fire — or is it the fire that plays with philosophers?

What do you think?

Good morning, readers! While browsing through Bookforum.com yesterday, I found the following: Manuel Bremer (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany) reviews Timothy Williamson’s book, The Philosophy of Philosophy.

Of the book, Bremer notes:

In fact Williamson argues from a very specific position within current analytic philosophy, and makes use of a couple of claims controversial within analytic philosophy (like theories of direct reference and de re modalities, having a rigid actuality operator, how to understand tacit knowledge and so forth). Williamson often refers to his own work and results (e.g. in the theory of vagueness), and accordingly sometimes (e.g. discussing vagueness or probabilistic reasoning) the discussion seem to be too engaged in setting out one theory on a topic than reflecting on ways to develop philosophical theories. So Philosophy of Philosophy could also be titled One Way to Do Analytic Philosophy. Williamson acknowledges that his book ‘makes no claim to comprehensiveness. … it explores some interrelated issues that strike me as interesting and not well understood’ (8).

Philosophy of Philosophy also makes in some chapters use of the formal devices of analytic philosophy. Although the formalisms are elementary they presuppose some background in modal logic and the theory of counterfactuals (as two formal appendices are provided as well).

The book, therefore, aims neither at the layman or the general philosopher, but is of interest to analytic philosophers who reflect on their way of doing analytic philosophy. It is especially worthwhile for those analytic philosophers who rather disagree with Williamson’s sub-branch of analytic philosophy, as the book invites them to compare their methodological self-understanding to Williamson’s and defend it in the light of his criticisms.

I have not read the book yet, though I am most interested in doing so in the near future.  We do have the book here in Robbins, though it is not yet cataloged.  I expect to have it cataloged within the next six weeks or so, depending on when I get the materials off to the catalogers.

Have any of my readers read this book?  And, if so, what did they think of it?

Via Bookforum.com, here are two blog posts to get you thinking this morning:

• Stephen Dubner asks: Who is the Greatest Modern-Day Thinker?
• The Philosopher’s Magazine asks: Has philosophy responded adequately to big events?

What do you think, readers?  Who gets your vote for the greatest modern thinker?  And has philosophy responded adequately to big events? Does philosophy even have to do so?  Feel free to leave your responses in the comment box.

Good afternoon, readers!

Last week, I received this e-mail for a philosophy-related survey. I’ve checked, and the survey is legitimate. So, if you’re interested, click on the link below and take the survey. It’s relatively painless and easy to fill out. Enjoy!

Dear Fellow Philosophers,

We hope you will be so kind as to forward this email to your students and faculty. In order for this study to work, we need a large pool of both philosophers and non-philosophers to take the survey linked below.

We hereby welcome both philosophers and non-philosophers alike to help us explore the contours of people’s beliefs, intuitions, and feelings concerning some philosophical issues. Unlike experimental philosophy studies in the past, our latest survey is open to philosophy majors, graduate students, and professors! Indeed, one of our goals is to see what effect, if any, philosophical training has on our intuitions. So, please help us out by setting some time aside to participate in our on-line survey. Your answers will be entirely anonymous and it shouldn’t take longer than 30 minutes to complete the survey. And by participating, you will not only help us with our current project, you will also contribute to a data set that will be of interest to social psychologists and philosophers alike. Hopefully, you are willing and able to set aside some of your time this summer to participate. Thanks in advance for your time and consideration.

To take the survey, just follow this link: http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey?id=979829 Please pass the link on to your friends, colleagues, and students!

Best wishes,

Thomas Nadelhoffer, Trevor Kvaran, and Eddy Nahmias