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	<title>Comments on: Crash of 1987 compared to today</title>
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	<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/09/14/crash-of-1987-compared-to-today/</link>
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		<title>By: The Puzzled One</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/09/14/crash-of-1987-compared-to-today/comment-page-1/#comment-88149</link>
		<dc:creator>The Puzzled One</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2008 15:25:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=1088#comment-88149</guid>
		<description>They may be incredible smart, but for all of them to outperform the market would be a Lake Wobegon situation.
OTOH, I kinda believed back in the day that Doyne Farmer would be able to pull it off, given his casino experiences, his background in chaos theory and his work with the Santa Fe wonks on complex systems. But even that becomes common knowledge, and any engineering undergrad today can avail themself of the knowledge that was bleeding egde in the mid-90s.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>They may be incredible smart, but for all of them to outperform the market would be a Lake Wobegon situation.<br />
OTOH, I kinda believed back in the day that Doyne Farmer would be able to pull it off, given his casino experiences, his background in chaos theory and his work with the Santa Fe wonks on complex systems. But even that becomes common knowledge, and any engineering undergrad today can avail themself of the knowledge that was bleeding egde in the mid-90s.</p>
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		<title>By: Luke</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/09/14/crash-of-1987-compared-to-today/comment-page-1/#comment-88025</link>
		<dc:creator>Luke</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 02:21:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=1088#comment-88025</guid>
		<description>You make a good point, Friedrich. I was about to disagee with Philip and say that these guys aren&#039;t so smart considering all of the losses that they&#039;re racking up. (There&#039;s certainly a lack of creativity on Wall Street. All ofthese institutions appeared to make basically the same mistake.)

On the other hand, maybe they&#039;re actually quite smart. Some of these executives justified their huge paychecks a few years by pointing to the big profits of their institutions. Now that the bubble has burst and the profits have become losses, some of these guys have arranged for the taxpayers to get stuck with the bill. They walk away with their golden parachutes paid for by waitresses and truck drivers in Boise and Wichita.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You make a good point, Friedrich. I was about to disagee with Philip and say that these guys aren&#8217;t so smart considering all of the losses that they&#8217;re racking up. (There&#8217;s certainly a lack of creativity on Wall Street. All ofthese institutions appeared to make basically the same mistake.)</p>
<p>On the other hand, maybe they&#8217;re actually quite smart. Some of these executives justified their huge paychecks a few years by pointing to the big profits of their institutions. Now that the bubble has burst and the profits have become losses, some of these guys have arranged for the taxpayers to get stuck with the bill. They walk away with their golden parachutes paid for by waitresses and truck drivers in Boise and Wichita.</p>
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		<title>By: SuperMike</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/09/14/crash-of-1987-compared-to-today/comment-page-1/#comment-87952</link>
		<dc:creator>SuperMike</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 05:55:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=1088#comment-87952</guid>
		<description>Here&#039;s one question I keep asking myself when we talk about bailouts:

Are Investment banks like carrier battle groups, with massive capital investments and hard-won institutional knowledge and difficult-to-recreate systems, or are they more like law or architectural firms, nice buildings full of smart people with specialized knowledge and the right rolodexes?
I suspect it&#039;s somewhere in-between, but more on the law firm side of things. If that&#039;s the case, then who cares if they fail? Their competitors would be glad to step in and take over their less risky lines of business, their workers remain well-connected dealmakers, and their principals can always start another firm. Sure, it&#039;ll be rough in the Jet and custom pool market for a while, but it looks like aviation is in for a rough ride anyways. (P. Diddy can&#039;t even afford to fly his plane)
When Cantor Fitzgerald was devastated on 9/11, it didn&#039;t destroy the bond market; when Arthur Andersen blew up, it didn&#039;t wreck the accountancy market. I say let &#039;em fail.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here&#8217;s one question I keep asking myself when we talk about bailouts:</p>
<p>Are Investment banks like carrier battle groups, with massive capital investments and hard-won institutional knowledge and difficult-to-recreate systems, or are they more like law or architectural firms, nice buildings full of smart people with specialized knowledge and the right rolodexes?<br />
I suspect it&#8217;s somewhere in-between, but more on the law firm side of things. If that&#8217;s the case, then who cares if they fail? Their competitors would be glad to step in and take over their less risky lines of business, their workers remain well-connected dealmakers, and their principals can always start another firm. Sure, it&#8217;ll be rough in the Jet and custom pool market for a while, but it looks like aviation is in for a rough ride anyways. (P. Diddy can&#8217;t even afford to fly his plane)<br />
When Cantor Fitzgerald was devastated on 9/11, it didn&#8217;t destroy the bond market; when Arthur Andersen blew up, it didn&#8217;t wreck the accountancy market. I say let &#8216;em fail.</p>
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		<title>By: Eric</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/09/14/crash-of-1987-compared-to-today/comment-page-1/#comment-87873</link>
		<dc:creator>Eric</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 16:55:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=1088#comment-87873</guid>
		<description>It&#039;s really simple.

For corporate CEOs, it&#039;s all upside, no downside. With current executive compensation - even base compensation, much less the size of the golden parachutes out there - it only takes a few years for execs to be rich enough that they don&#039;t need more money. 

Fuld (CEO of Lehman) took home $466 million from 1993 to 2007.  If he&#039;d resigned at the end of january, the 8.6 million shares he holds would have netted him an additional $567 million (assuming he could have disposed of that many at that price). Today, they&#039;re worth a little less than $2 million.

If he ends up terminated, he&#039;s only going to walk away with around $60 million (stock, pension, deferred compensation). 

So, what was the downside for him to have done what he did? $500 million over 15 years for taking a thriving company and bankrupting it? 

Where do I sign up?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It&#8217;s really simple.</p>
<p>For corporate CEOs, it&#8217;s all upside, no downside. With current executive compensation &#8211; even base compensation, much less the size of the golden parachutes out there &#8211; it only takes a few years for execs to be rich enough that they don&#8217;t need more money. </p>
<p>Fuld (CEO of Lehman) took home $466 million from 1993 to 2007.  If he&#8217;d resigned at the end of january, the 8.6 million shares he holds would have netted him an additional $567 million (assuming he could have disposed of that many at that price). Today, they&#8217;re worth a little less than $2 million.</p>
<p>If he ends up terminated, he&#8217;s only going to walk away with around $60 million (stock, pension, deferred compensation). </p>
<p>So, what was the downside for him to have done what he did? $500 million over 15 years for taking a thriving company and bankrupting it? </p>
<p>Where do I sign up?</p>
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		<title>By: Friedrich</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/09/14/crash-of-1987-compared-to-today/comment-page-1/#comment-87843</link>
		<dc:creator>Friedrich</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 10:18:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=1088#comment-87843</guid>
		<description>Don&#039;t forget whith whom money thos &quot;smart&quot; guys work. It&#039;s seldom their own. Let&#039;s face it if you earn 1 000 000 (safe) but have to handle 1 000 000 000 other money. How much would you dare? 

You &quot;just&quot; face the risk to not earn 1 000 000 all years long but let&#039;s see what happens if you got another 5 000 000 each year variable. How worse can it be to  retire after just 3 years?


The smart guys have taken their share and probably started seeking greener grounds next stuff. It would be very interesting to know how large the fluctuation in the investement banking sector hade been. I doubt it&#039;s all to high currently but I may be wrong.

Regards
Friedrich</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Don&#8217;t forget whith whom money thos &#8220;smart&#8221; guys work. It&#8217;s seldom their own. Let&#8217;s face it if you earn 1 000 000 (safe) but have to handle 1 000 000 000 other money. How much would you dare? </p>
<p>You &#8220;just&#8221; face the risk to not earn 1 000 000 all years long but let&#8217;s see what happens if you got another 5 000 000 each year variable. How worse can it be to  retire after just 3 years?</p>
<p>The smart guys have taken their share and probably started seeking greener grounds next stuff. It would be very interesting to know how large the fluctuation in the investement banking sector hade been. I doubt it&#8217;s all to high currently but I may be wrong.</p>
<p>Regards<br />
Friedrich</p>
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		<title>By: Troy</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/09/14/crash-of-1987-compared-to-today/comment-page-1/#comment-87826</link>
		<dc:creator>Troy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 05:42:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=1088#comment-87826</guid>
		<description>Joe, you&#039;re half right.  Congress&#039; blessing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac divorced mortgage origination from mortgage risk, providing banks with a quick path to get loans off their balance sheets.  Imagine being able to buy an orange for $1 and sell it a month later for $1.25.

The GSEs happily bought $1 oranges for $1.25, and would have gladly kept doing so in the name of &quot;expanding home ownership.&quot;  Those who thought a government-sponsored, risk-ignorant aftermarket made sense in the 21st century should be shot.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Joe, you&#8217;re half right.  Congress&#8217; blessing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac divorced mortgage origination from mortgage risk, providing banks with a quick path to get loans off their balance sheets.  Imagine being able to buy an orange for $1 and sell it a month later for $1.25.</p>
<p>The GSEs happily bought $1 oranges for $1.25, and would have gladly kept doing so in the name of &#8220;expanding home ownership.&#8221;  Those who thought a government-sponsored, risk-ignorant aftermarket made sense in the 21st century should be shot.</p>
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		<title>By: Ritesh</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/09/14/crash-of-1987-compared-to-today/comment-page-1/#comment-87788</link>
		<dc:creator>Ritesh</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 23:00:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=1088#comment-87788</guid>
		<description>Scott:

Thanks to to job redundancies and economies of scale, Merrill Lynch will end up with around 24000 jobs eliminated. http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSLF8371520080915?pageNumber=2&amp;virtualBrandChannel=0

In addition, due to their high salaries every job on wall street creates additional 3-4 jobs via trickle down effect. So you are looking at close to 100,000 job losses after this acquisition. Well, the alternative (Merrill going bankrupt) would have been worse.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Scott:</p>
<p>Thanks to to job redundancies and economies of scale, Merrill Lynch will end up with around 24000 jobs eliminated. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSLF8371520080915?pageNumber=2&amp;virtualBrandChannel=0" rel="nofollow">http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSLF8371520080915?pageNumber=2&amp;virtualBrandChannel=0</a></p>
<p>In addition, due to their high salaries every job on wall street creates additional 3-4 jobs via trickle down effect. So you are looking at close to 100,000 job losses after this acquisition. Well, the alternative (Merrill going bankrupt) would have been worse.</p>
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		<title>By: rd</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/09/14/crash-of-1987-compared-to-today/comment-page-1/#comment-87751</link>
		<dc:creator>rd</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 15:50:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=1088#comment-87751</guid>
		<description>Do you really need smart people to create ponzi scheme.
watch the video on the link to see what I am talking about.
http://www.cbc.ca/sunday/2008/09/091408_1.html
It takes a certain brain to go into engineering and science.
It is not as simple as cramming.  There already a glut of lawyers.
May be they go into Energy that needs some bad ideas
to hasten global warming.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Do you really need smart people to create ponzi scheme.<br />
watch the video on the link to see what I am talking about.<br />
<a href="http://www.cbc.ca/sunday/2008/09/091408_1.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.cbc.ca/sunday/2008/09/091408_1.html</a><br />
It takes a certain brain to go into engineering and science.<br />
It is not as simple as cramming.  There already a glut of lawyers.<br />
May be they go into Energy that needs some bad ideas<br />
to hasten global warming.</p>
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		<title>By: Joe Munculus</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/09/14/crash-of-1987-compared-to-today/comment-page-1/#comment-87749</link>
		<dc:creator>Joe Munculus</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 15:29:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=1088#comment-87749</guid>
		<description>If we employ Occam&#039;s principle a simple explanation for the current financial problem can be summed up as follows.  Due to pressures from financial lobbyists the fed lowered the standards for underwriting mortgages.  When the fed changes the rules that make it ok to grant high risk mortgages, private financial institutions are not going to hesitate on the opportunity to increase profit.  So, even when potential mortgage borrower won&#039;t be able to make the payments, as long as the fed says it is ok to lend to that person then the mortgage lender is going to.  Its all about the bottom line.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If we employ Occam&#8217;s principle a simple explanation for the current financial problem can be summed up as follows.  Due to pressures from financial lobbyists the fed lowered the standards for underwriting mortgages.  When the fed changes the rules that make it ok to grant high risk mortgages, private financial institutions are not going to hesitate on the opportunity to increase profit.  So, even when potential mortgage borrower won&#8217;t be able to make the payments, as long as the fed says it is ok to lend to that person then the mortgage lender is going to.  Its all about the bottom line.</p>
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		<title>By: philg</title>
		<link>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/09/14/crash-of-1987-compared-to-today/comment-page-1/#comment-87740</link>
		<dc:creator>philg</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 14:23:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/?p=1088#comment-87740</guid>
		<description>Scott:  Merrill was paying its former CEO $50 million per year (reference: http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/04/21/statins-cholesterol-health-fancy-employee-compensation-ebitda-and-c/).  They presumably had a lot of other top executives who will be redundant now that Merrill will simply be a division of BofA.  Even if the same people stay on, they won&#039;t be able to nominate their friends to BofA&#039;s Board of Directors and set their own salaries.  Among the rank-and-file there is probably a lot of overlap between BofA and Merrill and the only way that this acquisition can work is if redundant jobs are eliminated (BofA&#039;s stock is down 15 percent today and they will have to do something to show investors that they can keep Merrill&#039;s revenue while losing Merrill&#039;s expenses).

Now would be a bad time to try to sell a house or a jet to a Merrill or Lehman executive...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Scott:  Merrill was paying its former CEO $50 million per year (reference: <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/04/21/statins-cholesterol-health-fancy-employee-compensation-ebitda-and-c/)" rel="nofollow">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2008/04/21/statins-cholesterol-health-fancy-employee-compensation-ebitda-and-c/)</a>.  They presumably had a lot of other top executives who will be redundant now that Merrill will simply be a division of BofA.  Even if the same people stay on, they won&#8217;t be able to nominate their friends to BofA&#8217;s Board of Directors and set their own salaries.  Among the rank-and-file there is probably a lot of overlap between BofA and Merrill and the only way that this acquisition can work is if redundant jobs are eliminated (BofA&#8217;s stock is down 15 percent today and they will have to do something to show investors that they can keep Merrill&#8217;s revenue while losing Merrill&#8217;s expenses).</p>
<p>Now would be a bad time to try to sell a house or a jet to a Merrill or Lehman executive&#8230;</p>
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