The Disbursement “Gap” III: A Non-problem?

A postscript on the disbursement “gap” issue which may be something of a non-problem. See here and here for earlier posts.

In talking with colleagues more knowledgeable about budgeting and the commitment process by the various donors, there is a sense that the difference between commitment and disbursement is both (1) normal and (2) idiosyncratic somewhat to the experience of the United States.

It’s normal in the sense that the amount of money being dedicated to this problem has ramped up dramatically so one would assume that both administrative issues on the donor end and distribution/absorptive capacity on the recipient side would make scaling up tricky, particularly in the early years. We have to remember that none of these programs existed five years ago. The Global Fund was created in 2002, and PEPFAR was announced in 2003, and so it takes time.

On the U.S. side, the U.S. is a little more idiosyncratic than other donors. Some streams of U.S. funds do not have to spent in a single year (like from USAID) so U.S. policymakers might think in terms of a commitment, but not actually disburse the funds until the following year or years. Some U.S. funds do have to be spent in the same calendar year, and other countries have this a feature by law. I think based on conversations with British officials in the past that this is a constraint for them.

The U.S. apparently is very different from the other donors in that U.S. policymakers think in terms of commitments. That idea is somewhat ill-suited to other governments like the UK and continental European governments. Whereas the U.S. will track its commitments and then assess disbursement, other governments just report disbursements and commitments as if they were the same. So, trying to infer from British behavior that they are better at disbursement could be problematic since, unlike the U.S., they may not distinguish between the two and differentially track the difference as a function of policy.

In any case, I think the scaling up and absorptive capacity issues are probably real ones that will be with us for some time, particularly as donors seek to enhance their commitment in the goal of providing universal access. Here, I think a non-jaundiced view of donor behavior is probably valid. In other words, I’m hopeful that the donors are not only doing this work out of good will but also have competent managers on the ground. At the same time, there will be inevitably be problems, and to that end, I think the detailed reports from CGD and other organizations about where the money is going are really helpful contributions. Watch this space for more on this topic.



		

		

	

The Disbursement Gap II.

In thinking about President Bush’s request to extend PEPFAR’s life for another 5 years and an additional $30 billion, I’ve come across some data that suggests the U.S. is having disbursement problems. While I don’t think this will pose a problem for PEPFAR reauthorization in the short run, I wonder if these problems are unique to the U.S. and what is their origin. I blogged about it before and Kim Yi Dionne of UCLA suggested bureaucratic delays might be partially responsible.

According to data from Jennifer Kates of the Kaiser Family Foundation:

  • In 2006, the U.S. committed $2,631.7mn for bilateral and multilateral HIV/AIDS programs in the developing world and disbursed $1,589.8mn (a disbursement level of 60.4%).
  • In 2005, the U.S. committed $1918.7mn and disbursed $1095.0mn (a level of 57%) .

In conversations with some other folks who work on this issue, colleagues suggested this was not unique to the United States. Other bilateral donors may be experiencing this problem. The Global Fund was identified as also potentially suffering from a disbursement gap.

I first looked into Canadian and UK patterns of disbursement, and it doesn’t appear that they have those problems. Of course, the Canadians aren’t giving nearly as much, though I suppose it could be a lot for them. The British come closer in terms of volume and given the size of their economy, it is pretty substantial.

When I look at Jennifer Kates’ data on 2005 and 2006, DFID and Canada disbursed all that they pledged for bilateral giving. Canada’s bilateral pledges/disbursements were $107.1mn and $63.1mn in 2005 and 2006 respectively. The UK bilateral pledges/contributions were $637.1mn and $779.6mn in 2005 and 2006 respectively. The only other major bilateral donor that faced a disbursement gap was the Dutch. In 2006 they pledged more than $900mn and only disbursed $345mn.

As for the Global Fund, it has made agreements of grants of nearly $7.6bn since inception and disbursed about $4.6bn (a disbursement level of 61%). There is considerable variation by region with southern, western, and Central Africa’s 57.6% disbursement level and large proportion of overall grants (about 30%) driving the average down. See here for data.

What accounts for this disbursement gap? The Global Fund website suggests this is normal:

Disbursements will always lag behind commitments. The Global Fund follows a performance-based approach to grant-making. This means that additional funds are not disbursed until evidence of progress has been seen. Disbursements are typically made on a quarterly basis.

Cynics might suggest the $15bn and the $30bn figures are designed for maximum political effect with few able to gauge and monitor the actual disbursement levels. I wouldn’t doubt that the President is hoping to achieve some positive press for a now politically popular cause, but the more tricky issue which could bedevil attempts to ramp up spending in the future is absorptive capacity.

Michael Bernstein of the Center for Global Development suggests this may be a huge barrier to getting more money dedicated to this problem:

A major barrier to moving money more quickly is the limited capacity in recipient countries. Many countries with large AIDS epidemics historically spent little on health, so a sudden inflow of large sums cannot be easily absorbed. Donors disbursement policies can exacerbate the problem, making it harder for recipients to manage AIDS funds.

He provides this graphic which shows the rapid increase in donor financing for HIV/AIDS efforts from PEPFAR, the Global Fund, and, to a lesser extent, the World Bank. He notes that:

The new resources provided by the “big three” funders represent a huge increase in funds at the country level. In Uganda and Ethiopia, once AIDS money began flowing from all three funders in 2004, the amount of money provided quickly approached (and by 2005 had exceeded) the governments’ 2003 budgets for the entire health sector.

He emphasizes the difficulty of complicated reporting requirements that vary by donor, and the amount of time it takes to get proposals through. He also details the vagaries of the way in which PEPFAR agreements of various forms take shape with recipient countries. Bernstein recommends more flexibility in how donors allow funds to be spent.

In any case, this is an interesting area. Some of my colleagues suggest rescinding U.S. restrictions on prevention spending would enable the U.S. to spend more (rules requiring 2/3 of prevention funds be spent on faithfulness and abstinence, restrictions on talking with sex workers). Since prevention is only a piece and a smallish piece of U.S. HIV/AIDS spending (20%), I wonder if flexibility post-reauthorization would provide all that much cushion in the U.S. ability to disburse more.

I think the real challenge is what happens if donors (even partially) make good on their commitments at Gleneagles to provide universal access to treatment by or near 2010. The UNAIDS study on the costs of scaling up, not only for treatment but prevention and care, are quite large, requiring a doubling to quadrupling of current flows, as I blogged about here.

The absorptive capacity issues will likely loom even larger in the months and years to come, which could be problematic for donor’s willingness to foot a larger assistance program.

Michael Gerson on the Daily Show

With PEPFAR up for reauthorization and a big expansion on Capitol Hill (and by all rights, likely to pass), there still may be medium-term trouble on the horizon within the Republican Party. The hangover of Iraq is giving isolationists like Ron Paul more traction, and there is, according to Bush’s former speechwriter Mike Gerson, growing disenchantment with the internationalism of the Bush years, which for all the flaws of Iraq, has also been accompanied by an expansion of foreign assistance, particularly for international AIDS efforts.

Gerson has a new book on “heroic conservativsm” that he is promoting. He was on the Daily Show defending the Bush Administration’s AIDS policies and suggesting that there was a huge fight in the Republican party over whether or not these sorts of generous international policies would continue.

Watch the clip here.

Global Fund replenishment

The Economist has a great story on the replenishment process for the Global Fund that is happening in Berlin. I am a big supporter of treatment, but here is the nub of the issue, which gets back to the notion of an open-ended lifetime entitlement that Western donors are providing for those infected with HIV.

The problem with AIDS is that the more successful you are at treating it, the more you end up paying. That is because, unlike malaria and tuberculosis, it is incurable. Once someone is infected with HIV, the virus that causes it, they will end up requiring treatment for life.

UNAIDS has a new report that examines three possibilities for expanded coverage for treatment, looking at modest expansion of current rates (8 million people by 2015, universal access by 2010 for 14 million, or universal access by 2015). The price tag is pretty high.

Scaling-up at current rates. This approach would require between US$ 14 to US$ 18 billion and would provide treatment for 8 million people by 2015.

Universal Access by 2010. This approach envisages significant increases in available resources and an urgent and dramatic scale-up of coverage in all countries. The approach would provide treatment for 14 million people by 2010 and would require between US$ 32 to US$51 billion. In 2015 the approach would require between US$ 45 and US$63 billion.

Phased scale-up to 2015. This approach assumes different rates of scale-up for each country based on current service coverage and capacity, with the achievement of different programmatic targets at different times and the achievement of universal access by all countries by 2015. The approach would require between US$ 41 and US$ 58 billion in 2015.

Cheap by Iraq War standards, but expensive when you think about what donors provide for global public health. The additional $32bn-$51bn a year is more than twice than busines as usual for the extra 6mn people. This year, $10bn will be spent so gearing up to $32bn or more is going to be some tough sledding.Fortunately, some money will come from middle income countries like Brazil who will finance much of their country’s own efforts to deal with the problem, so it’s not all donor dependent.

That said, the level of external resources is pretty amazing. I’m surprised by the continued commitment, but the political support in the U.S. and the UK is pretty deep and broad. With both the G8 meeting and the replenishment conference being held in Berlin, Germany’s new Merkel government has started to change its tune. In the UK, Gordon Brown, has already announced a £360mn (about $720mn) over 2008-2010, which is about half of what activists wanted. On the other hand, it’s still about $300mn more than what the UK pledged in the period 2005-2007 when it pledged $437mn.

I’ll post some new stuff soon about the other pledges from other donors. We need to come to grips with prevention strategies that work, lest this unmet need for ARV therapy for people continues to climb inexorably.

Review of Amy Patterson’s book on AIDS in Africa

I’ve blogged a bit about the book before (see here), but here is my review of Amy Patterson’s book on AIDS in Africa that just appeared in Political Science Quarterly (here is a link to the PDF).

The Politics of AIDS in Africa by Amy S. Patterson. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006. 226 pp. Cloth, $52.00; paper, $19.95.

Amy Patterson’s book provides an informative look at the AIDS epidemic in Africa that is likely to appeal to both specialists and readers new to the topic. She paints a portrait of indifference among most African leaders and of suffering publics distracted by poverty and other grave problems. Her discussion of the lack of political salience of AIDS in much of Africa is the best part of the book and echoes Alex de Waal’s recent AIDS and Power: Why There Is No Political Crisis—Yet (London: Zed Books, 2006).

Patterson is less successful in explaining the variation among African countries in their responses to the epidemic. She evaluates several hypotheses related to institutional attributes of African states, including state capacity, centralization, corruption, and stability. However, in her case studies of South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, she finds that no single hypothesis explains the level of effort on AIDS by different governments. She would expect that a poor country like Uganda, with its centralized government, would perform badly, but Uganda’s AIDS prevention program is perhaps the continent’s most well-known success story. South Africa, given its relative wealth, would be expected to have a better AIDS program, but Thabo Mbeki, the President since 1999, has famously undermined his country’s AIDS efforts. Patterson tries to explain why there is no meta-answer for variations in country performance, but there could be a more unified narrative. The closest the book comes to one is a recognition that personal leadership (or its absence) by a state’s top leaders has been critically important in countries like Uganda, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.

Patterson uses the AIDS Programme Effort Index (API) as one of the main measures for evaluating the performance of the different governments in her case studies. The API is a survey instrument that is intended to reflect a country’s level of effort on AIDS on a number of criteria, including political support, policy and planning, organizational structure, legal and regulatory environment, and human rights. Scores are derived from surveys with experts knowledgeable about different components of the country’s AIDS program. Scores are generated on a 100-point scale for individual components as well an aggregate. The experts base their judgments on what would constitute an ideal level of effort. In the 2003 API, the average number of respondents per component was four. This is likely to make aggregate scores troublesome for cross-country comparison. South Africa, for example, scored a 75 on the 2003 API, similar to Uganda (76) and less than Botswana (80) and Rwanda (81). However, as Patterson notes, President Mbeki has undermined South Africa’s AIDS program. Mbeki denied that HIV causes AIDS and resisted the use of anti-retroviral therapy in the treatment of HIV-positive South Africans, although South Africa is the country with the second-highest number of HIV-positive people (India has the highest number). How could South Africa score so high on the API? Patterson is understandably constrained by data availability. In the absence of better indices or metrics, the API is perhaps the only option. An exploration of the API’s limitations could have been helpful.

Patterson’s chapter on donor responses to the epidemic is, like the rest of the book, rich in detail. Her review of the George W. Bush administration’s response to the epidemic is insightful, particularly the discussion of how the politically contested nature of prevention programs has contributed to the increased focus on treatment. This chapter is more descriptive than explanatory. She addresses donor motivations in passing, and because her final chapter is a call for greater political commitment, more discussion of political mobilization dynamics in donor countries would have been useful. For readers trying to get a handle on why African governments have had such difficulty dealing with the epidemic, Patterson’s book is a good introduction.

Frist is not the Senator from Matobo*…

Senator Frist is back in the news this past week for his laudable involvement in Save the Children.  Save the Children has joined a new One initiative calling for an increase in US foreign aid for mothers and children of low-income countries.  Laudable certainly but a bit disappointing too when I read this in the NYTimes [Sept 7, "Ex-Senator to Lead Global Drive on Children's Health"]…

Save the Children hopes Mr. Frist will open doors, and it is still in the process of recruiting senior Democratic leaders, to make its appeal bipartisan.

“The children and mothers who die are in huts beyond the end of pathways with no direct access to political or
media leaders,” Mr. MacCormack said. “We need people who can walk into prime ministers’ and presidents’ offices.”

The children and mothers live in countries whose leaders are clearly failing them.  Their leadership, not ours alone, should be plying the wide halls of prime ministers and the fine offices of presidents.  I work in East Africa and still remember clearly the local constituent outrage over Uganda’s very public problems with the Global Fund.  Taxpaying Ugandans, as citizens anywhere, demand performance and accountability from government.  More of that grassroots, old fashioned constituent involvement is needed if external efforts are to have any lasting impact.

*Matobo was the fictional African country in The Interpreter.

Bono Made Bill Frist Cry, too! – 2008 Elections and Child Survival

In homage to a paper I wrote on the Jubilee 2000 campaign, a colleague of mine sent me this article in the Times about Bill Frist, the former Tennessee Senator and ex Repub majority leader, who is leading a new initiative to seek more U.S. funding for child survival. Frist, as you know, is a trained medical doctor and has long been interested in global public health. He and Jesse Helms were champions of greater U.S. action on AIDS. Frist had a pretty good reputation on these issues until he squandered his political capital by demagoguing on Terri Schiavo. But I digress….

The other interesting part of the story is how the Gates Foundation is financing a major effort in 2008 to put these issues on the agenda and how activists are seeking to broaden global public health advocacy to focus on child survival. The Gates Foundation gave $22mn to the One Campaign, with Frist and former North Dakota Senator Tom Daschle on board as the co-chairs of the One Vote ‘08 initiative.

Quoted in the piece is Charles MacCormack, head of Save the Children, who said: “The children and mothers who die are in huts beyond the end of pathways with no direct access to political or media leaders,” Mr. MacCormack said. “We need people who can walk into prime ministers’ and presidents’ offices.

MacCormack was a participant in a recent conference I went to in Aspen, Colorado. It was the so-called Brookings Blum Roundtable on new actors in development. Given the opulence and lifestyle of Aspen, it was something of a surreal experience to give this paper with people like George Soros and Al Gore as participants. Nonetheless, it was great to see such an influential body concerned about developing countries, even if people had quite different views on what should be done. See here an Economist profile on two African businessmen, Mo Ibrahim and Sam Jonah, who participated in the conference. There was heavy if not exclusive emphasis on Africa, and these guys represented a new face of African commerce, very optimistic about the possibilities for Western investors.Thinking back to advocacy efforts to get the candidates thinking about global public health and other issues, I think activists have been savvy to focus on child survival. I mean who can be against that? Here is what they want…

Having left the Senate only in January, Mr. Frist is not yet allowed to lobby members of Congress to support the Global Child Survival Act, a bill introduced this year that would sharply increase spending on the problem. But the One Campaign has mobilized. More than 150,000 of its supporters have written letters to members of Congress, encouraging them to vote for the bill, which has sponsors from both parties.

The measure proposes increasing the budget of the United States Agency for International Development for child and maternal health to $600 million next year and $1.6 billion by 2011, from $356 million this year.

The amounts being considered in the appropriations process are much lower. The Bush administration proposed $345 million. The House version of the bill countered with $374 million, while the Senate bill offered $450 million.

In the paper I presented in Aspen, I was not as nearly sanguine about the possibilities for sustained increases in funding for development. I worry that there is not nearly enough investment in health systems and governance and that activists have been so focused on the quantity of aid that there has not been sufficient discussion of its quality.

Development advocates need to think about whether just getting more money for aid and for AIDS should be their main focus. Donors have embarked upon a multi-billion dollar open-ended commitment to anti-retroviral therapy for AIDS sufferers. Unless countries both come to prevent HIV and build broader health systems, the experiment could run aground if local capacity remains lacking and if donor money ever runs dry. There is a recognition that project-based development is broken, and donors have not had great success improving governance in weak and failing states. The Millennium Challenge Account has been an experiment in this direction, but it has not been sufficiently funded, despite strong advocacy by groups like DATA. The U.S. and other governments do not have adequate tools in their toolkit for institution-building. The main U.S. development agency, USAID, is under-funded, perceived in some quarters to be ineffective, and increasingly has had its mandate taken away by other institutions.

I think the new child survival initiative is good, but I hope the money also supports health systems and not just us saving children now at the expense of developing countries be able to save their own children in the future.

Cost-Benefit, Oster, and AIDS

Picking up the theme Ben mentioned earlier, economist Emily Oster suggests (see our prior blog post here) that exports helped determine the rate of diffusion of AIDS in Uganda. As prices of Ugandan coffee exports declined, men had less pocket money which made it harder for them to have more sexual partners. This view actually could make it possible for Helen Epstein’s arguments on concurrency to co-exist with Oster’s work, as the Center for Global Development argues. They suggest that there could be a problem of people having multiple sexual partners and also true that export price fluctuations might alter how many partners they do have. Here’s a video link to Oster’s presentation at TED (Technology, Entertainment, Design).

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It’s interesting to think about Oster’s thesis, and I’m not sure it sits that well with Epstein’s recent book. If Oster is right, then it may be harder to replicate Be Faithful programs around the continent through conscious efforts. It may be harder for people to be faithful if commodity prices increase and give people more income to be able to afford to support more sexual partners.

However, I’m not sure if Oster’s thesis is internally consistent. If people have more money, then, according to Oster, a cost-benefit ratio over the long-term would suggest they have more to live for, so they shouldn’t wreck it by being risky. On the other hand, she also finds that a large proportion of the variance in AIDS rates is explained by variations in export revenue. With higher export revenue, AIDS prevalance goes up. What gives? Am I wrong or are these two conjectures at odds? I believe there may be a correlation there with declining export revenue and prevalance in Uganda, but is the causal connection between walk around money and how many girlfriends men could support right?

Postscript: Oster’s old paper is the one that made the claim that richer people should be more risk averse because they have more to live for. Her newer paper makes the claim that higher export earnings are correlated with higher prevalence levels. It seems to be driven by volume and the time truckers are away from home rather than individual earnings power. More exports means more time demanded of truckers to be away from their families. However, that must also mean more money in their pockets which should mean that, as any forward thinking rational animal, truckers should put a sock on it. Sounds like they don’t which sits uneasily with Oster’s previous work, as far as I can tell.

Postscript 2: I had a good interchange with Oster about this issue, and she sought to reconcile it by talking about long-term vs. short-term behavior change. She wrote that the subject of her first paper was how making people richer over their whole lives could motivate behavior change. It wouldn’t happen overnight, as it relied on shifts in people’s expectations about the future, and she noted that the effects were small.

Whereas the first paper relied on long-term behavior change, she suggests the export story in her new paper is really short-term, as trend data has been explicitly removed. With more exports she says, there are more truck drivers. They have more sex partners, driving epidemic rates up. Over the long-term, high exports could make the country richer, leading people to protect themselves, but in the short-run, the issue is one of more exports–>more truckers–>more risky sex–>more HIV.

The more I read her paper, and from her e-mail, it’s really not about income, but it’s about export volume and the presence of more truckers on the road. She disputed the notion that export volumes in the short run would necessarily mean more income. But, unless truckers have more pocket money, how are they able to enter into these sexual relationships?

I think the mechanism influencing the number of sexual partners needs more elaboration. Do truckers’ change their number of sexual partners in response to education/information, income, or time away from home. It seems like Oster’s thesis comes down to the third explanation. Guys are away from home, and no matter how much money they have in their pocket, they will engage in risky sex. The fact that Uganda experienced a a decline in prevalence wasn’t because the truckers got information or even that they had less money, but there were simply fewer of them on the road. This may be a hasty read of her argument, but I still think it needs some tweaking/refinement.

Renewed institutional support for innovation in HIV prevention

This is reposted in full from the Lancet blog post of Aug 23th, “US$14 million grant for HIV prevention campaign”.

The AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition is launching a new organization
to promote the development of a wide variety of HIV prevention
strategies, including microbicides and oral preventive drugs.

The launch of the new organization, called The HIV Prevention
Research Advocacy Network, was announced by AVAC Tuesdsy, Aug 21 in
Seattle at the AIDS Vaccine 2007 conference.

The initiative will be funded by five-year, US$14 million grant from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

According to the press release announcing the network’s launch, the organization will:

•Develop international advocacy partnerships that support both the
needs of communities involved in research and a global advocacy
movement for HIV prevention research.

• Translate complex scientific ideas to communities AND translate community needs and perceptions to the scientific community.

• Work to hold both research agencies and advocates accountable for accelerating ethical prevention research and development.

• Help ensure that communities, policymakers, and civil society have
realistic expectations about HIV prevention research and specific
clinical trials.

• Work closely with other groups conducting HIV prevention research advocacy, including microbicide advocacy groups.

AVAC also released it annual report, which provides an overview of
the state of HIV vaccine research today. Of particular interest is a
section that looks at the slow uptake of both male circumcision as an
HIV prevention strategy and the vaccine for human papilloma Virus
(HPV). These case studies, the report argues, holds lessons for those
seeking to implement other prevention strategies.

To visit AVAC site and download the new report go to: http://www.avac.org/

To visit the AIDS Vaccine 2007 conference website go to: www.hivvaccineenterprise.org/conference/index.html

U.S. AIDS funding disbursement gap

Jennifer Kates of the Kaiser Family Foundation and her collaborators found that in 2006, the U.S. promised much more for global AIDS funding than it disbursed for the second year in a row. In fact, the U.S. only disbursed 56% of bilateral funds that were promised. In 2006, the U.S. committed $2,362.8mn but only disbursed $1,320.9mn. In 2005, the U.S. committed $1,918mn but disbursed only $1,095mn.

The U.S. was still the largest donor, contributing more than 44% of bilateral donations in that year, but it does raise questions. Is the gap a problem with U.S. overpromising or insufficient absorptive capacity in recipient countries? Would disbursement be higher if the U.S. delivered more funds through the Global Fund than through bilateral channels? (In 2006, the U.S. committed about $464mn to the Global Fund, only 58% (abou $269mn) of which went to AIDS.)

Anybody know?

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