THE US 2020 HIV/AIDS Strategy and the Limits of ACA

On July 30, the White House announced the updated 2020 HIV/AIDS strategy. The admirable vision of the strategy is that “The United States will become a place where new HIV infections are rare, and when they do occur, every person, regardless of age, gender, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, or socio-economic circumstance, will have unfettered access to high quality, life-extending care, free from stigma and discrimination.”
This said, the strategy reflects continuing concerns about the numbers of people who do not know their HIV status, who do not have access to effective treatment, and who do not take advantage of preventive strategies. Demographic groups especially at risk include men having sex with men, African American men and women, Latino men and women, people who inject drugs, youth age 13-24, people in the Southern United States, and transgender women. The strategy emphasizes care coordination, coordination between health care and other social services such as housing, treatment as prevention, and pre-exposure prophylaxis. Notable initiatives since the 2010 HIV/AIDS strategy include interagency efforts to address the intersection of HIV and violence against women, a DOJ and CDC collaboration to publish a comprehensive examination and best practices guide on the intersection between HIV and criminal laws, and demonstration projects funded through the HHS Minority AIDS Initiative Fund.

Another major improvement since the 2010 strategy is implementation of the Affordable Care Act. The 2020 strategy takes due note of the coverage expansions the ACA has brought: the end to pre-existing condition exclusions for people seeking coverage, Medicaid expansion, and access to marketplace plans. Yet given the demographic groups at greatest risk, there is a far darker side: what ACA has not yet achieved and possibly will not achieve.

In 2014, the Kaiser Family Foundation published a report estimating the impact of ACA on health insurance coverage for people with HIV. The 2020 strategy relies on the estimates in this report: that of 70,000 persons with HIV who were uninsured, about 47,000 would become eligible for Medicaid if that program were expanded in all states and that another 23,000 would qualify for subsidized private coverage in the marketplaces. These estimates, however, refer only to people with HIV who are uninsured and are already in care. The KFF report (relying on CDC estimates) also guesses that about 700,000 people with HIV are not yet in care and that an additional 124,000 people in this group could gain new coverage were the ACA Medicaid expansion and marketplace subsidies to be in effect in all states.

By my calculation, this leaves out over 500,000 people who are not yet in care and who still would not gain coverage even with the full deployment of ACA. Half a million—not a trivial figure in view of the importance of encouraging testing, treatment as prevention, and pre-exposure prophylaxis. To be sure, Ryan White funds pay pick up some of the slack—but only for those who know their HIV status.

Leslie Francis

The Unintended Effect of Medicare on the Law of Torts

By Alex Stein

If you are familiar with about a thousand medical malpractice decisions and can’t think of an accident that might surprise you, read Stayton v. Delaware Health Corporation, — A.3d —- 2015 WL 3654325 (Del. 2015). Another reason for reading this new decision of the Delaware Supreme Court is that it has delivered an important precedent: the Court decided that the collateral source rule does not cover medical costs written off by Medicare. Continue reading

What Should the Future Look Like for Brain-Based Pain Imaging in the Law? Three Eminent Scholars Weigh In

By Amanda C. Pustilnik, Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law; Faculty Member, Center for Law, Brain & Behavior, Massachusetts General Hospital

What should the future look like for brain-based pain measurement in the law?  This is the question tackled by our concluding three contributors:  Diane Hoffmann, Henry (“Hank”) T. Greely, and Frank Pasquale. Professors Hoffmann and Greely are among the founders of the fields of health law and law & biosciences. Both discuss parallels to the development of DNA evidence in court and the need for similar standards, practices, and ethical frameworks in the brain imaging area.  Professor Pasquale is an innovative younger scholar who brings great theoretical depth, as well as technological savvy, to these fields.  Their perspectives on the use of brain imaging in legal settings, particularly for pain measurement, illuminate different facets of this issue.

This post describes their provocative contributions – which stake out different visions but also reinforce each other.  The post also highlights the forthcoming conference-based book with Oxford University Press and introduces future directions for the use of the brain imaging of pain – in areas as diverse as the law of torture, the death penalty, drug policy, criminal law, and animal rights and suffering.  Please read on!

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Neuroimaging as Evidence of Pain: It’s Time to Prepare

By Henry T. Greely, Edelman Johnson Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; Professor (by courtesy) of Genetics, Stanford Medical School; Director, Program in Neuroscience & Society, Stanford University

The recent meeting at Harvard on neuroimaging, pain, and the law demonstrated powerfully that the offering of neuroimaging as evidence of pain, in court and in administrative hearings, is growing closer. The science for identifying a likely pattern of neuroimaging results strongly associated with the subjective sensation of pain keeps improving. Two companies (and here) recently were founded to provide electro-encephalography (EEG) evidence of the existence of pain. And at least one neuroscientist has been providing expert testimony that a particular neuroimaging signal detected using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is useful evidence of the existence of pain, as discussed recently in Nature.

If nothing more is done, neuroimaging evidence of pain will be offered, accepted, rejected, relied upon, and discounted in the normal, chaotic course of the law’s evolution. A “good” result, permitting appropriate use of some valid neuroimaging evidence and rejecting inappropriate use of other such evidence, might come about. Or it might not.

We can do better than this existing non-system. And the time to start planning a better approach is now. (Read on for more on how)

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Of Algorithms, Algometry, and Others: Pain Measurement & The Quantification of Distrust

By Frank Pasquale, Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law

Many thanks to Amanda for the opportunity to post as a guest in this symposium. I was thinking more about neuroethics half a decade ago, and my scholarly agenda has, since then, focused mainly on algorithms, automation, and health IT. But there is an important common thread: The unintended consequences of technology. With that in mind, I want to discuss a context where the measurement of pain (algometry?) might be further algorithmatized or systematized, and if so, who will be helped, who will be harmed, and what individual and social phenomena we may miss as we focus on new and compelling pictures.

Some hope that better pain measurement will make legal disability or damages determinations more scientific. Identifying a brain-based correlate for pain that otherwise lacks a clearly medically-determinable cause might help deserving claimants win recognition for their suffering as disabling. But the history of “rationalizing” disability and welfare determinations is not encouraging. Such steps have often been used to exclude individuals from entitlements, on flimsy grounds of widespread shirking. In other words, a push toward measurement is more often a cover for putting a suspect class through additional hurdles than it is toward finding and helping those viewed as deserving.

Of Disability, Malingering, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Disutility (read on for more)

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An ELSI Program for Pain Research: A Call to Action

By Diane Hoffmann, Director, Law & Health Care Program; Professor of Law; University of Maryland School of Law

As someone who has been greatly concerned about and devoted much of my scholarship to legal obstacles to the treatment of pain, I applaud Professor Pustilnik for increasing attention to the role of neuroimaging in our efforts to understand our experience of pain and how the law does or does not adequately take into account such experience. Pustilnik has written eloquently about this issue in several published articles but her efforts to bring together scientists, medical experts, legal academics, and judges (see also here) deserves high praise as a method for illuminating what we know and do not know about pain and the brain and to what extent brain imaging can serve as a diagnostic tool or an external validator of pain experience.

In this post, I discuss how DNA testing serves as a precedent for how to develop responsible uses of new technologies in law, including, potentially, brain imaging for pain detection. The ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) of DNA research and testing were integral to developing national protocols and rules about DNA. Brain imaging of pain needs its own ELSI initiative, before zealous adoption outpaces both the technology and the thinking about the right guiding principles and limitations.

The idea of brain images serving as a “pain-o-meter” to prove or disprove pain in legal cases is clearly a premature use of this information and likely an over simplification of the mechanisms of pain expression. However, the potential for an objective diagnostic tool or indicator of the pain experience is something that lawyers representing clients in criminal, personal injury, workers comp or disability cases may find too attractive to resist and attempt to have admitted in the courtroom. This state of affairs brings to mind the ways in which lawyers have attempted to use genetic test results, initially obtained for medical purposes, in litigation.  (Read on for more about ELSI in DNA and several national pain initiatives that could adopt the Human Genome Project and DNA ELSI model).

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The Right to Die and Informed Consent: New Ruling by the Supreme Court of Argentina

By Martín Hevia

In “D.M.A. s/ declaración de incapacidad” decided early this month, the Supreme Court of Argentina upheld the right to decide about one´s own death (“muerte digna”). As I had explained in a previous comment written when the ruling of the case was pending, the case involved a patient, M.A.D., that had been in a permanent, irreversible, vegetative state for 20 years due to a car accident. His sisters requested the discontinuation of the vital supportive measures which maintained M.A.D alive in an artificial way. Although this was not the first time that the Court discussed the right to die, it was a different case in that there was not a patient’s written statement on whether it was appropriate for him to continue or not certain medical treatment to keep him alive.

The Argentine National Congress had already passed legislation stating that, whenever a patient is unable to give informed consent, her relatives can do so in her name. On that basis, following the opinion of the sisters of M.A.D., the Supreme Court ordered the discontinuation of the vital supportive measures which maintained M.D alive in an artificial way. Continue reading

Emotional Harm as “Bodily Injury” in the Law – and in the Brain

By Francis X. Shen, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School

Earlier this month the Supreme Court of New South Wales ruled that an individual who experienced post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as the result of an airplane crash could recover damages under the Montreal Convention. The case was important because many courts have previously ruled that PTSD, absent any other “bodily injury,” was not covered by the bodily injury provisions of the international agreement.

The case is illustrative of the way in which courts across the world continue to find a meaningful distinction between “physical” (or “bodily”) injury/pain and “mental” (or “emotional”) injury/pain. If you want an example closer to home, pull out your auto insurance policy and scan for the phrase “bodily injury.” Auto insurance cases sometimes include disagreement about whether mental injuries are considered bodily.

I’m on the record as saying this traditional physical/emotional distinction no longer holds up because substance dualism is no longer a viable theory. If neurons and glia cells are physical (and last I checked they were), then emotions and emotional pain must be physical too.  But that doesn’t mean that the law has to treat all pain the same. Even if everything is physical, law may – for a variety of good reasons – choose to differentiate amongst them. For instance, do we want to understand assault (which is the infliction of “bodily injury”) to include the infliction of emotional pain? Maybe, but it’s not so cut and dry.

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Emotion and Pain – Beyond “All in Your Head”

By David Seminowicz, Principal Investigator, Seminowicz Pain Imaging Lab, Department of Neural and Pain Sciences, University of Maryland

A potential difficulty, but also an opportunity, relating to using neuroimaging evidence in legal cases arises from the difficulty brain researchers have in separating emotional and physical pain. We know that pain and emotion are tightly linked. In fact, “emotion” is in the very definition of pain. The IASP definition of pain is: “An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.”  Yet, the legal system deals with “physical” versus “psychiatric” versus “emotional” pain in different ways.

Chronic pain is associated with anxiety, depression, and stress. These factors can exacerbate the pain, and pain can exacerbate them. Pain’s sensory and emotional components connect in a “feed-forward” cycle. It may not be possible to entirely separate the sensory and emotional components of pain, biologically or experientially. But it might be necessary for the purposes of legal cases, as important areas of law create sharp distinctions between physical and emotional, or body and mind.

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Some Optimism on Brains, Pain, & Law – Let’s See What We Can Achieve

By Martha Farah, Director, University of Pennsylvania Center for Neuroscience & Society

Neurolaw includes some fascinating issues that lack any practical legal significance – for example whether we should consider anyone responsible for anything they do, given that all behavior is physically caused by brain processes.  It also includes some legally important issues that lack intellectual juiciness – like regulatory issues surrounding neurotechnology.

Thank goodness there are also some issues that combine intellectual fascination with practical legal importance. The Petrie-Flom Center at Harvard Law School and the Center for Law, Brain & Behavior at Massachusetts General Hospital recently focused on just such an issue when they convened a meeting of neuroscientists and legal scholars on the brain imaging of pain.

Pain, I learned at this meeting, is at the heart of many legal proceedings. A major problem to be solved in these proceedings is the determination of whether someone is truly in pain. Chronic pain in particular may not have physically obvious causes. There may be clinical and circumstantial evidence of pain – like adhering to a medication regime, seeking surgeries or other interventional procedures, and avoiding pleasurable activities – but often the major evidence of pain is just what someone says that it is. However, the motivation exists to lie about pain – to sue for more money, to obtain disability benefits – and so an objective measure of pain, a “pain-o-meter,” would be helpful.

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Pain-o-meters: How – and Why – Should We Develop Them?

By Karen Davis

The prevalence of chronic pain is staggering.  The Institute of Medicine reported in 2011 that 100 million Americans suffer from chronic pain – more than those with heart disease, cancer and diabetes combined.  The report also highlights that the annual costs for medical care, lost wages and productivity is more than $600B.  These enormous personal and societal costs of chronic pain has driven an effort to “prove” if and how much pain an individual is suffering from for health care providers, insurance companies and legal actors.  This is challenging because pain is a personal and subjective experience.  Ideally, self report would be sufficient to establish the “ground truth” of the pain experience.

However, some are not able to provide self reports accurately, and the potential financial gain associated with claims of pain has tarnished the perceived authenticity of subjective reports.  This has led some to develop brain imaging-based tests of pain – a so-called “painometer.”  Yet, current technologies are simply not able to determine whether or not someone has chronic pain.  Here, I consider specifically how we could develop a brain-imaging based painometer – and whether we would want to do so.  As we ask: “Can we do it?,” we should always ask, “Is this the right thing to do?”

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Pain on the Brain: A Week of Guest Posts on Pain Neuroimaging & Law

By Amanda C. Pustilnik

This week, the Petrie-Flom Center of Harvard Law School and the Center for Law, Brain & Behavior (CLBB) at Massachusetts General Hospital are hosting a series of posts on how brain imaging can help the law address issues of physical and emotional pain. Our contributors are world leaders in their fields, who participated on June 30, 2015, in the CLBB/Petrie-Flom conference Visible Solutions: How Brain Imaging Can Help Law Reenvision Pain.  They addressed questions including:

  • Can brain imaging can be a “painometer” to prove pain in legal cases?
  • Can neuroimaging help law do better at understanding what pain is?
  • How do emotion and pain relate to each other?
  • Does brain imaging showing emotional pain prompt us to reconsider law’s mind/body divide?

Professor Irene Tracey, D.Phil., a pioneer in pain neuroimaging and director of the Oxford Centre for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Brain, opened the conference with a keynote explaining what happens when the brain is in pain.

Professor Hank T. Greely, Edelman Johnson Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Neuroscience and Society at Stanford Law School, provided a keynote explaining the many implications of brain imaging for the law.

This conference was the culmination of CLBB’s year of work on pain neuroimaging and law. As the first CLBB-Petrie-Flom Center Senior Fellow on Law & Applied Neuroscience, I focused on pain because it is one of the largest social, economic, and legal problems that can be addressed through new insights into the brain. Pain imaging can be a test case for how neuroscience can contribute positively to law and culture.  (Full conference video proceedings are available here.)  Please read on below! Continue reading

Payments to Egg “Donors”

By David Orentlicher

[cross-posted at HealthLawProfs blog and orentlicher.tumblr.com]

Interesting article in today’s Wall Street Journal about a lawsuit over limits on payments by fertility clinics to women who supply eggs for infertile couples. Under influential, though not mandatory, guidelines issued by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, payments to egg “donors” above $5,000 “require justification,” and payments greater than $10,000 “are not appropriate.” (When I was in the Indiana legislature, a statute was passed limiting payments to $4,000, plus out-of-pocket expenses.)

In one view, payment caps are needed to “prevent coercion and exploitation in the egg-donation process.” But one also can view the guidelines as an “illegal conspiracy to set prices in violation of antitrust laws.” More to come in a case that could go to trial next year.

In the meantime, there are other important concerns about payments for eggs and the costs to infertile persons. As with other assisted reproductive treatments, insurers generally do not cover those costs. This encourages the infertile to seek multiple births in one treatment cycle rather than single births over multiple treatment cycles, which puts mothers and their infants at greater risks to health. In addition, lack of coverage leaves treatment unaffordable for many of the infertile. As I have argued elsewhere (here and here), social policy treats infertile persons unfairly when coverage is denied for assisted reproductive services,

HIPAA and the Physician-Patient Privilege: Can Doctors Defending Against Medical Malpractice Suit Carry Out Ex Parte Interviews with the Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians?

By Alex Stein

Whether a litigant’s right to conduct informal ex parte interviews with fact witnesses extends to the plaintiffs’ treating physicians, given the confidentiality provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), is a question of considerable practical importance. This question has recently received a positive answer from the Kentucky Supreme Court in Caldwell v. Chauvin, — S.W.3d —-, 2015 WL 3653447, (Ky. 2015), after “percolating through state courts, federal district courts, and academic circles for a decade.” Id. at *5. Continue reading

Bioethicist Art Caplan: Planned Parenthood’s awkward clash

A new opinion piece by contributor Art Caplan in The Chicago Tribune (free registration required):

Planned Parenthood finds itself under attack by anti-abortion activists. Not much new about that. But the terrain of the battle has shifted. The way in which fetal tissue for research is obtained at Planned Parenthood clinics is now center stage.

Planned Parenthood stands accused, as a result of a sting operation launched by anti-abortion political operatives, of selling “baby parts” for profit. Edited videos show individuals pretending to be tissue brokers discussing with Planned Parenthood doctors how to get fetal tissue, the cost for tissues, techniques for increasing the chance of obtaining particular tissues and other related issues. The doctors do not come across well. Discussions are in restaurants, there is wine on the table, the attitudes are cavalier and the doctors don’t seem to pick up on the cues that they are getting set up. […]

Read the full article here.

Check out the latest news from the Petrie-Flom Center!

Check out the July 24th edition of the Petrie-Flom Center’s biweekly e-newsletter for the latest on events, affiliate news and scholarship, and job and fellowship opportunities in health law policy and bioethics.

Featured in this edition:

November 4, 2015 1:00 – 5:30 PM  
Harvard Law School

Please join us for an afternoon of reflection on the life, work, and enduring influence of Professor Alan Wertheimer (1942-2015). Professor Wertheimer was a leading philosopher of law and bioethics, making critical contributions to clinical research ethics; theories of coercion, undue influence, and exploitation; consent in a variety of contexts, and much more. This tribute event will feature leading scholars discussing and engaging with Professor Wertheimer’s many contributions, and exploring how he influenced their own work.

At the time of his death in 2015, Alan Wertheimer was Senior Research Scholar in the Department of Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health. He was Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Vermont, where he taught from 1968 to 2005 and was honored as University Scholar in 1995-1996. Before retiring from UVM, he was also John G. McCullough Professor of Political Science. He authored  Coercion (Princeton University Press, 1987), Exploitation (Princeton University Press, 1996), Consent to Sexual Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Rethinking the Ethics of Clinical Research: Widening the Lens (Oxford University Press, 2011). He was twice a Visiting Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and held fellowships at the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton (1984-85) and the Program in Ethics and the Professions, Harvard University (1989-90).

This event is free and open to the public but seating is limited and registration is required. Register now online

‘The Week in Health Law’ Podcast

By Nicolas Terry

twihl 14x14

This week we discussed Fraud & Abuse Laws and the “Two-Midnight” Rule with Elizabeth Weeks Leonard from the Georgia Law faculty. You can find many of Professor Leonard’s publications here.

The Week in Health Law Podcast from Frank Pasquale and Nicolas Terry is a commuting-length discussion about some of the more thorny issues in Health Law & Policy.

Subscribe at iTunes, listen at Stitcher RadioTunein and Podbean, or search for The Week in Health Law in your favorite podcast app.

Show notes and more are at TWIHL.com. If you have comments, an idea for a show or a topic to discuss you can find us on twitter @nicolasterry @FrankPasquale @WeekInHealthLaw

Worth Reading This Week

By Nicolas Terry

Another Opinion Upholding the Contraceptives Coverage Accommodation

Today, the 10th Circuit issued its opinion in the Little Sisters of the Poor case, holding that the accommodation offered to religious nonprofits – and now also to certain closely-held for-profits – is legally acceptable under the standard imposed by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  The accommodation, just recently finalized in its current form, allows eligible employers to avoid covering contraceptives for their employees so long as they notify their insurer or the government of their religious objection to doing so. Importantly, employees are still legally guaranteed access to free contraceptives through alternate mechanisms, usually the via insurer directly.

The 10th Circuit’s opinion represents the fifth win for the administration on the accommodation issue following Hobby Lobby. (Note that Hobby Lobby was about an employer who was not previously eligible for the accommodation.)  The RFRA standard provides that the government “may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

In Little Sisters, the 10th Circuit dispensed with the RFRA claim by holding that there was no substantial burden, one of the threshold questions in the RFRA analysis.  It explained that the fact of the employer’s opt-out does not *cause* contraceptives coverage (i.e., by requiring another party to provide coverage in their stead), which instead is mandated by federal law.  It also determined that there is no substantial burden from complicity in the overall scheme to deliver contraceptive coverage, i.e., by delivering notice of objection, because their only involvement in the scheme is the act of opting out.  Thus, RFRA’s protections were not implicated, and the accommodation can stand.

I fully agree with the result in this case, but would have gotten there another way.

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