Too late to dissuade Iran?
Apr 22nd, 2008 by MESH
From Chuck Freilich
Is it too late to dissuade Iran from developing nukes? A nuclear Iran does increasingly loom as the likely outcome, not because it is too late, but due to lack of sufficient resolve. Iran is at least two and probably more years away from an operational capability. France has taken a firm position and Britain and Germany are also on aboard, if not as fervently. The Sunni states are manifesting growing alarm, creating new possibilities for enlisting their support. The question now is how to go from P3+1 support in the Security Council to P5 agreement, i.e. how to bring Russia and China on board.
Iran talks a very good game, warning of the consequences of excessive sanctions, or military action, but let’s not forget who really holds the bigger stick. Clearly the world does not want to go from $110 a barrel oil to much higher prices, but for the international community this is pain; for Iran it is their entire economy. If the world refuses to import Iranian crude, which accounts for 80 percent of Iran’s national budget and a huge percentage of its overall GDP, the Iranian economy collapses. Due to a shortfall in domestic refining capacity, Iran also imports 40 percent of its refined gasoline products. Were the international community to cease supplying them, the Iranian economy would be brought to its knees almost overnight.
So who has the bigger stick? The West does not want to pay the price, but if it comes to this, might temporary dislocations not be preferable to a nuclear Iran? If not through the Security Council, might not at least some U.S. allies agree to extra-UN multilateral sanctions of this kind? And if the self-motivation is lacking, might an American threat to impose a naval blockade on Iran not do the trick, both in its own right, or as a means of inducing the others to join in the sanctions in order to forestall unilateral American action? The last thing most of the potentially recalcitrant international players want is to see a replay of the “American predilection” for unilateralism.
How then can we get Russia and China on board for serious sanctions in the Security Council? Russia objects, not without reason, to enlarging NATO to include Ukraine and to the American plan to deploy an anti-missile system in Europe. The United States claims the system is designed to counter the threat of Iranian missiles to Europe. The danger that Iran would actually fire missiles at Europe is negligible to begin with, but why not get at the true source of the problem through a deal with Russia? No anti-missile system and no NATO enlargement (a worthy cause in its own right, but not an urgent one), in exchange for real sanctions in the Security Council. China does not like being in the position of “odd man out” and is likely to follow suit.
Should both this approach and multilateral sanctions outside of the UN fail, it would then be time to consider a U.S. naval blockade. The Iranians might seek to exact some small price, e.g. attack a U.S. vessel, but they are not crazy. It would be like a guppy attacking a whale: The Iranian navy and many additional sites would rapidly cease to exist. It is important that we not engage in deceptive, fearful self-deterrence. (The same holds true for the highly exaggerated fears of Iran’s capacity to retaliate against the United States in the event of an attack on its nuclear program.) The Iranians, in any event, will be far more realistic about this.
None of this is to discount the difficulties involved, but the game is far from over and there is still ample time to deal with it—given American leadership.
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3 Responses to “Too late to dissuade Iran?”
You don’t do sanctions at $116 per barrel of oil, and you don’t do war either when there is a constant imbalance between demand and supply in the oil market, for the slightest disturbance will have an enormously disproportionate impact on prices. Those who think that Israel alone or the United States can destroy a dozen nuclear targets in Iran are right only in the strictly military sense. Yes, these targets can be hit, but not in the way of the Osirak cakewalk that took the Israelis one afternoon. The campaign would involve a serious three-stage air campaign: first, take out Iran’s air defenses, then wipe out their air and naval assets that can threaten tanker traffic in the Gulf, then hit the targets themselves. Yet those tankers, especially in the Strait of Hormuz, are sitting ducks, and some will be hit. Where will the oil price go, and for how long? To $200 or $300? For a week, month or year?
So sanctions, then. Chuck Freilich has a good point—up to a point. Western strategy toward Russia Resurgent has been haphazard, if not confused. Yes, we want them in on sanctions, but then we rile the Russians with NATO expansion and BMD in a forward position, fanning their fears of encirclement. So why not “hierarchize” our policies in favor of a deal on sanctions?
One problem with this calculus is that it does not work. In Bucharest, NATO has shelved the inclusion of Georgia and the Ukraine. Has Russia become more forthcoming on sanctions? It does not look like it, does it? The larger problem with such linkages is the assumption that concessions on A will bring forth concessions on B. Yet Russia’s help for Iran’s nuclear program precedes both BMD and the latest round of NATO expansion. I am referring to Bushehr, a set of power reactors initiated by the Germans in the late 1970s and abandoned in the aftermath of the revolution. Bushehr is now being completed by the Russians, who are also supplying Iran with state-of-the-art anti-air missiles.
This raises a conundrum. Theoretically, by dint of propinquity, Russia should feel more threatened by Iranian nukes that the U.S. or Europe. Why doesn’t it? Why has it been dragging its heels on sanctions for about five years? “Stupid,” you might say. Or you might conclude: Russia values the discomfort of the West and/or friendship with Iran more highly than non-proliferation. If this is the case, why would Russia suddenly tilt to the West for a mess of potage, those two handfuls of ABM’s that cannot threaten Moscow’s retaliatory potential, as Russian generals have conceded in unguarded moments?
Now to Iran. Meanwhile, the Director of the NIC, in his February report to Congress, has cautiously amended the much-criticized NIE of December. He simply does not know whether weaponization has been resumed, he notes. But he invokes “important security and foreign policy interests” which will make it “difficult” for the Iranian regime to renounce nuclear weapons. And he reminds Congress that “enrichment and the development of long-range missiles” are proceeding apace.
Add to that a report by Jane’s (March 19). According to unnamed intelligence sources, some of them close to Iran’s AMAD, the “Organization for Planning and Special Procurement,” Tehran has been testing implosion systems (in the lab) since 2000. Recently, AMAD has gone into miniaturization, a 60-cm device that can fit on the medium-range missile Shahab-3. Quote: “Well-placed sources claim that Iran is continuing its nuclear weapons program.”
If a program initiated by the Shah in the mid-seventies has withstood revolution, precipitous drops of the oil price in the 1980s and 1990s, two sets of UN-mandated sanctions, why would we think that a third, or a fourth would turn the trick? Iran first went into the weapons business against Iraq. Its worst foe decimated, why does it continue? Arguably for the reasons that have motivated previous proliferators: status, hegemony, balancing against No. 1, the United States. And against Israel, where deterrence fits nicely with Iran’s larger interests in the Middle East: intimidate the region’s No. 1, Israel, as well as the rest from Saudi Arabia to Egypt. These are big-ticket interests that are not derailed by sanctions.
The sad conclusion: Iran will go nuclear, though not necessarily with a bang. It will get all its technological ducks lined up on the shelf, and then decide whether to assemble or not. You don’t actually need to have a weapon to enjoy its political and strategic benefits. Also, with the oil price heading toward $200, the bite of sanctions declines pari passu. It does not matter whether Iran is an economic basket case as long as those billions in oil money keep flowing into the coffers of the state, whence they will be disbursed to the populace to keep it quiet. This massive tranquilizer also implies that we can forget about “regime change” from the outside, especially since the regime has eliminated all centers of domestic opposition, beginning in the 1980s while it was simultaneously fighting the Eight Years War against Iraq.
So what’s left? The oldest weapons in the arsenal: deterrence and containment. The country threatened most, that is, existentially, by Iran is already proceeding in that direction. Three years ago, Israel managed to get two state-of-the-art conventional submarines out of Germany (at favorable terms), which it will surely equip with nuclear strike-weapons. When these subs are delivered in the early 2010s, Israel will have five—and thus a serious sea-based deterrent to complement its strike aircraft and MRBMs/IRBMs. Plus a growing missile defense, based on American and indigenous systems. So Israel talks offense, but walks deterrence and defense. The message from Jerusalem is: Iran will go nuclear, but we won’t count on sanctions, let alone military strikes. We will enhance deterrence and defense—what nations always do when faced with a tilting strategic balance.
Josef Joffe is a member of MESH.
It is possible that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons. It is also possible that Iran will be prevented from acquiring them—at least for a time—through forceful action by the United States and/or Israel. But short of regime change in Tehran (and perhaps not even then), it is highly unlikely that Iran can be dissuaded from acquiring nuclear weapons as Chuck Freilich suggests.
Freilich argues that France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sunni states all now support the United States concerning the need to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. If Russia and China could be persuaded to join this effort, serious Security Council sanctions could be applied to Iran that would cripple its economy if Iran did not drop its nuclear weapons ambition. Up to now, though, Moscow and Beijing have worked to prevent Security Council sanctions against Iran or water them down almost to the point of meaninglessness. And it is highly likely that they will continue to do so.
Moscow and Beijing both see Iran’s poor relations with Europe and especially the United States as an opportunity for their firms to gain commercial advantages in Iran. They will not risk losing this position merely because Iran appears likely to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, the resulting increased hostility between Iran and the West may serve to induce Tehran to be more amenable to the terms that Russian and Chinese firms offer it.
There are those in Moscow in particular who do not see Iran as likely to acquire nuclear weapons anyway—for no better reason than that they do not see Iranians as capable of doing so. Others, of course, fear that Iran may well acquire nuclear weapons. But if there is going to be a confrontation between the United States and Iran over this issue, there are those in Moscow and Beijing who believe that their countries should just stay out of it. Tehran, they may well calculate, is less likely to retaliate against Russian and Chinese interests if they do not join in any U.S.-sponsored effort aimed at Iran than if they do.
The United States could, as Freilich also suggested, impose a naval blockade against Iran without Russian, Chinese, or indeed, anyone else’s approval. He argues that the Iranian economy would then collapse. Perhaps this would induce a normal, status quo government to end a nuclear weapons program. But the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a normal, status quo power, but a revolutionary regime. Fidel Castro has demonstrated how a revolutionary regime can endure American sanctions for decades, remain in power, and give considerable support to anti-American forces elsewhere from time to time. Far from buckling to U.S. demands in order to spare the Iranian public from economic hardship, Tehran is likely to encourage and delight in America being blamed by other countries for the oil price increase that would result from such a blockade. Nor would a U.S. naval blockade prevent Iran from a renewed effort to acquire nuclear weapons.
The truth of the matter is: Iran either now has or will soon develop the means to acquire nuclear weapons. Since it probably cannot be dissuaded from acquiring them, should the United States and/or Israel act to forcibly prevent it from doing so? In my view, this question should be looked at in cost/benefit terms. Will such an effort succeed in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons? If so, for how long—permanently, several years, or just a few months? What will be the impact of taking such a step on America’s relations with third countries? How will Iran retaliate? Will America and/or Israel undertaking such an action embolden others—such as Russia or China—to cite it as precedent for doing something similar elsewhere (where we don’t want them to)? Whether or not there are benefits, there will surely be costs to any such effort.
And whether a preemptive strike on Iran is made or not, some thought needs to be given about what will happen, and how the United States should react, if Iran does indeed acquire nuclear weapons. Other unpleasant regimes, including Stalin’s and Mao’s, have also acquired nuclear weapons, but have been deterred from using them. The Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons does not mean that Tehran will use them either; while the ayatollahs may encourage others to launch suicide attacks, they do not appear suicidal themselves.
We must not, however, be complacent about a nuclear-armed Iran either. Non-nuclear Iran now arms Shi’ite militias in Iraq, Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank. A nuclear-armed Iran is likely to step up this activity. And while Tehran may not launch a nuclear attack for fear of retaliation, its possession of nuclear weapons could serve to constrain how the U.S. and Israel respond to its stepped up support for these groups—something that Tehran is undoubtedly both well aware of and counting on.
That’s the bad news. But the news may not be completely bad. For it is not just the United States and Israel that will fear a nuclear-armed Iran. Europe, the Arab states, Turkey, Pakistan, India, and even Russia and China (as well as others) are likely to fear a nuclear-armed Iran that behaves aggressively. And many of those that fear Iran may (despite their various objections to American foreign policy now) seek protection from or cooperation with the U.S. against Tehran then. A more threatening Iran could result in greater appreciation for the United States.
This does not mean that Washington should welcome the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons—far from it. But Tehran’s acquisition of them will result in increased fear of Iran on the part of others. The United States can take advantage of this in order to deter and defend against a nuclear Iran.
Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.
“Israel’s Strategic Future,” a special report of the Project Daniel Group, was presented to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on January 16, 2003. Among other things, the report asserted that under no circumstances should Iran be allowed to “go nuclear.” This firm position stemmed from our understanding that stable deterrence could never exist with a nuclear Iran led by the current extreme regime, and that Iran’s belligerent stance toward Israel had remained openly genocidal.
Iran has moved steadily forward with plans to build and deploy nuclear weapons. On April 8, 2008, Iran’s “National Day of Nuclear Technology,” President Ahmadinejad announced his intent to install 6,000 additional centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. Now no serious observer can any longer accept the argument that Iran seeks nuclear power only for peaceful purposes.
International law is not a suicide pact. Every state has not only the right, but also the obligation, to protect its citizens from aggression. This expectation is beyond any moral or legal question when a determined and possibly irrational enemy seeks nuclear weapons.
Ideally, Israel could deter any Iranian WMD attack by maintaining a credible posture of nuclear deterrence. But this is not your father’s Cold War, and Israel’s notably small size leaves Jerusalem very little room for strategic error. Not surprisingly, Israel continues to maintain a prudent plan for active defense against future Iranian missiles. The plan’s indispensable core is the Arrow anti-ballistic missile.
Still, no system of active defense can be “leak-proof.” And terrorist proxies, rather than missiles, could also be used to deliver Iranian nuclear weapons. It follows, as Project Daniel had advised Prime Minister Sharon, that Israel must consider and codify appropriate preemption options. Under international law, these essential options are known as “anticipatory self-defense.”
For Israel, time is quickly running out. The Jewish state cannot fully depend upon its anti-ballistic missiles to defend against any future WMD attack from Iran any more than it can rely entirely upon nuclear deterrence. Even a near-perfect Arrow complemented by credible nuclear threats would not obviate Israel’s preemption option.
Israel has the right of all states to act in anticipatory self-defense when facing an existential assault. The 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice even extends this right to the preemptive use of nuclear weapons in certain residual circumstances. These are “live or die” situations where the only expected alternatives to preemption would be unendurable assaults by enemy states or their surrogates.
Israel certainly has no wish to act upon the 1996 ICJ Opinion. But it must continue to prepare for certain critical non-nuclear preemptions, and also to implement a maximally efficient missile interception capability. Should Iran somehow become nuclear, Israel would then have to significantly enhance the credibility of its nuclear deterrent (including a prompt end to the doctrine of nuclear ambiguity or “bomb in the basement”), and to deploy a suitable second-strike force. This recognizably invulnerable (hardened and dispersed) “countervalue” force would be fashioned to inflict a decisive retaliatory blow against selected Iranian cities.
Whenever possible, Israel will continue to seek security by peaceful means. But under no circumstances will it allow Iran to imperil its citizens with nuclear arms.
Louis René Beres is professor of international law at Purdue University. Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Isaac Ben Israel is a professor of security studies at Tel Aviv University, a member of the Israeli parliament, and former chair of the Israel Space Agency. Both were members of Project Daniel.